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This report represents Phase 2 of a two-part project aimed at providing predictive modeling of the 
extraction of the 5300-5900 pillar at the Gold Hunter portion of the Lucky Friday mine. Phase 1 of 
the project consisted of an initiai rock mechanics modei calibration study (Board, 2010). In this 
phase of the project, a three-dimensional (3D) model was used to simulate the creation of the circular 
5900, 30 Vein access crosscut pillar at Gold Hunter by nrirung of the adjacent stopes. The predicted 
induced stresses, orebody yielding, and hangingwall-to-footwall closure of the pillar were compared 
to: a) measurements of stress change (IRAD gauges), b) yielding extent observed in adjacent stopes 
and in pillar obseryation hole breakouts, and c) vein closure measurements along the 5900 drift. It 
was concluded that the model provided. adequate comparison to these observations and that the rock 
mass properties and in situ stress state could then be used for simulation of the response of the 
mining of the 5300-5900 pillar. 
2) This current report summarizes the results of a geomechanical analysis of extraction of the 30 Vein 
pillar remaining below the 5300 level stopes and above the 5900 level stopes in the Gold Hunter 
portion ofthe Lucky Friday mine in Mullan, Idaho. This mining block will provide production from 
the Gold Hunter operation through approximately 2013. Current concepts call for extraction of this 
reserve by using underhand cut and fill methods, by mining down from the base of the 5300 level 
stopes to meet up with 5900 stopes which were extracted using overhand cut and fill methods. This 
remaining reserve will be mined from the 5500 level to the 5700 level. This approach will continue 
to create a pillar of reducing vertical height (and decreasing width to height ratio) that will 
concentrate vein-perpendicular stresses wiUlin the pillar. This report presents the results of 2D and 
3D numerical stress analyses of this mining and examines the stress concentration and failure within 
the reducing pillar and the surrounding rock mass. Additiolli!.lly, the stresses along flat, north-dipping 
footwall faults are detennined to estimate the slip potential of these faults and the general likelihood 
of producing seismic response. 
3) The results of the analyses were used to estimate the potential seismic mechanisms that could occur 
during the pillar extraction. The most likely seismic mechanisms and their timing within the mining 
sequence are estimated as follows: 
• Fault Slip Fauit slip on flat north-dipping footwall fault structures within the region 
bounded by the ore body to the south and out to approximately the outer turnings of the ramp 
to the norJi. These events are most IL1<:ely to occur in the footwall region adjacent to the pillar 
or below it where the ratio of shear to normal stress along the faults exceeds the estimated 
Mohr-Coulomb slip condition. Seism.idty appears less likely to occur near the top of the 
pillar and adjacent to the above mined underhand stopes as this orientation tends to promote 
clamping rather than shear. In other words, due to the orientation of these fault structures, it 
is expected that the underhand stope would be less susceptible to seismicity (in the footwall) 
than the overhand stope up to a certain pillar height that both stopes interact. This point is 
difficult to detennine from the results of the modeling. Based on the :ftictional properties and 
locations assumed for these faults, seismic events on them are possible in the current time (in 
fact, they appear to be occurring now) and are expected to potentially occur throughout the 
pillar mining. Estimation of the possible magnitude of these events from the model is very 
difficult to make due to unlmown fault continuity and topography, but the slippixlg area 
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would suggest events in the 1.5 Mt. range, or slightly higher, are possible. Events to date 
show that events in the 1.5 to 2.5 .M1, range have occw-red in this area. As recorrunended 
later, .a program of structural mapping and classification of the fault orientation. and 
continuity (to the extent possible) as well as the stirface characteristics (waviness and 
infilling) should be made and related to the seismic record in an attempt to define which 
fault characteristics give rise to seismic response. 
• Pillar Foundation Failure - Foundation shear failure occurring in the hangingwall and 
footwall rocks as a result of pillar punching appears possible when the pillar height is 
reduced to somewhere around 75' in height. The term '<punching" means that the pillar itself 
is stronger than the wall rock and may act as a rigid "punch" that indents into the wall rock 
under the applied pillar loads. This results in shear fracturing through the wall rock 
emanating from the pillar edges. The modeling indicates that, for the strength assumptions of 
the footwall and hangingwall rocks, the pillar is still too wide to induce this type of 
mechanism with the current stope and pillar geometry. The modeling indicates that this 
mechanism could potentially result in seismic events due to fomiation of shear fractures in 
the wall rock and would occur relatively close to the stope. This is a result of a relatively 
(relative with respect to the wall rock strength) strong orebody with a squat, strong pillar 
sandwiched in a weaker, bedded rock mass. This type of failure has been noted in some 
South African gold mines (COMRO, 1988) as well as deep room and pillar operations. 
• Strain-Bursting - More common pillar strain-bursting mechanisms, typical in other Coeur 
d'Alene mines, appear less likely, but are estimated to be possible in siliceous veins if the 
pillar is reduced to around 50' in height or less. From the cment seismic record, it does not 
appear that this mechanism is currently operating in the 5900 pillar, and would only be 
expected when the pillar height is sufficiently reduced. 
4) Recommendations include: 
• Ground Support - Conduct a review of the footwall development and stope ground 
support to detennine whether the ground support is within seismic standards for the 
expected magnitudes and locations of footwall seismic events. These events would be 
located in the region between the stope and ramp, and have magnitudes from 1.5 to 2.5. 
• Geologic Interpretation of Structure - Develop a project with the Gold Hunter 
geology/geotechnical staff to map footwall fault locations, orientations and continuity, as 
well as surface characteristics. A methodology for relating fault characteristics to seismic 
potential in mining has not been developed, to my knowledge. However, understanding 
why certain faults/structures in specific locations at the Gold Hunter are susceptible to 
seismicity would prove very useful in developing a method for identifying regions where 
larger events can be expected. Additionally, this would assist in development of 
numerical tools that can be used to anticipate future locations and timing of events. I 
would suggest that the Gold Hunter geology staff examine the following types of 
characteristics of structures and develop some form of ciassification system for 




o Orientation (dip, dip direction) 
o Continuity (traceable length) 
o Surface characteristics (gouge, strong infilling, slickensides, thickness, etc.) 
o Surface topography (waviness and amplitude, offsets and splays, etc). 
This classification could then be compared to the seismic monitoring history (see below) 
and observations of damage and fault offsets underground as a function of time to attempt 
to relate the fault characteristics to seismic potential. 
• Laboratory Strength Testing - Conduct a program of laboratory testing to identify the 
triaxial strength properties of conunon orebody and wall rock units to better understand 
potential failure mechanisms. There is currently an inadequate database of strength 
information on these rocks. The following types and numbers of laboratory tests are 
suggested: 
For each major lithology (argillite, silicic argillite/silty argillite, sericite), conduct 
uniaxial and triaxial tests as follows: 
o Uniaxial compression - eonduct approximately 10 UCS tests on each of the 
above lithologies. For samples with strong cleavage, attempt to choose samples 
with a variety of angles of the cleavage to the core axis to understand the impact 
of anisotropy on UCS. 
o Triaxial compression - conduct at least 3 triaxial test series on each lithology. A 
triaxial test series would include strength testing at confini.rig pressures of 5, 10, 
15, and 25 MPa. 
• Seismic Monitoring - Discuss with Dr. Wilson Blake to determine what additional 
infom1ation can be gained from future seismic monitoring. In particular, it would seem 
useful to determine source mechanisms for the larger events to correlate with the fault 
characterization program described above, as well as the results of modeling. This 
· analysis-relating the fault characteristics and model predictions of slip location and 
magnitude-would help to increase the confidence level in predictability of future 
seismic potentiai. Tne types of seismic parameters that would prove usefol would be: 
o Source location 
o Magnitude 
o Orientation of slipping structure 
o Slip radius 
• Mining Methods- Examine alternative mining sequences for removal of the last 75-100' 
(approximate) of the pillar. Potential methodologies include: 
o Use of de.stress blasting in the orebody below the underhand mining front to 
precondition the orebody and reduce its stiffness. This addresses potential pillar 





o Revision of the current method to a narrow vein blasthoie-and-fill end-slicing 
method in which the two current stop es retreat from the center of th"" ~p::i n tnw1mi 
the abutments. This . approach attempts to progressively push stress 
concentrations toward the abutments during extraction without increasing pillar 
stresses. Advantages include a more stable stope geometry and potential 
reduction of worker exposure. The obvious disadvantage of this approach is the 
potential dilution from wall rock as well as introduction of a new mining method 
and equipment. The plan could be optimized to detennine size of blasts and re-
entry protocols, retreat distances prior to backfill, possible remote controlled 
equipment, control of stope access to minimize worker exposure, etc. It is 
recommended that a location be chosen away from the current pillar extraction 
region, perhaps at the ends of the previous stopes, to test the method. The testing 
could determine the best methods for slot raise development, maximum open 
span prior to filling, dilution, and other design parameters. 
5) This report provides estimates of rock mass response to mining using the best information available. 
The resulting conclusions and recommendations are preliminary in nature, with the following 
limitations: 
• There is a small database of laboratory strength properties for the various rock mass 
lithologies. Additionally, the Wallace Formation is a thinly~bedded material that has highly 
anisotropic behavior that is complex in its mechanical response. This means that estimates of 
rock mass strength cannot be made with great confidence without extensive calibration of 
the models against information including stope and drift deformations. The rock mass 
strength and material model estimates have a significant impact on numerical results, and 
thus overall confidence in the conclusions. 
• The location, orientation, continuity, and surface characteristics of the faults assumed here 
are not well understood at present. Assumptions as to the fault characteristics have a direct 
impact on predictions of slip potential, and location and magnitude, which are, obviously, 
preliminary in nature. 
• Fir1.ally, due to the complex nature of rockburst source mechanisms, prediction of the 
specific locations and timing of these events is inherently an inexact science. The 




Subject: Calibration of 5900 Pillar Numerical Model 
1 Introduction 
This repo1t reviews calibration of the 3DEC numerical model against stress meter data, 
borehole and drift stability observations in the 5900 Gold Hunter drift at the Lucky Friday 
Mine in Mullan, Idaho. The 5900 drift crosses from the Silver Shaft through the 30 and 40 
veins to the footwall ramp development and is required to be stabile for access to the stopes 
from the Silaver Shaft. A 50' radius circular stabilizing pillar was left in place through the 30 
vein with the 5900 drift at its center. The pillar was created by adjusting the ends of adjacent 
cut and fill stopes such that a circular shape was created. After driving of the 5900 drift, 
IRAD stressmeters were installed in short boreholes drilled vertically up and horizontally into 
each wall of the drift at the orebody intersection. These stressmeters are oriented to monitor 
stress change resulting from the pillar creation in the vein-perpendicular (roughly N-S) 
direction. In addition to the stress data, two horizontal observation diamond drill holes were 
drilled in the sidewalls of the drift down the axis of the vein after the pillar was completed. 
The core was examined to record initial pillar condition and have been scoped with a digital 
borescope a number of times to record damage accumulation. 
A previous study of the stressmeter data and pillar failure observations was conducted by 
Pikalnis and Associates (2009). This study utilized an elastic numerical model (MAP3D) to 
perform a prediction of stress change in the pillar as a function of estimated orientation and 
magnitude of the in situ stress components. The conclusions of this study was that an E-W 
major horizontal stress component with a value of 1.5 times the vertical (gravitational) stress 
provided a best fit to the stressmeter data. Empirical damage criteria, based on the ratio of 
either the maximum shear stress ( cr 1 - a) or the maximum induced stress ( cr 1) to the uniaxial 
compressive strength (o"c), were used to compare to observations of borehole discing, 
reportedly showing good correlation to the discing. 
this study, ti1e 3DEC model is used to simulate the mining and pillar creation assuming . 
orebody and rock mass behave as yielding materials. The induced pillar stresses and damage 
are compared to stressmeter data and borehole observations. The conclusions reached are that 
the model corresponds reasonably well to the data and observations, and that the major 
principal stress is at an azimuth of roughly N 40W. The conclusion from the analyses indicate 
that the pillar is yielded around its periphery, but that the interior of the pillar remains at an 
unyielded, elastic state. It is felt that the pillar stresses will not increase dramatically from the 
current state. It is still possible to have relatively low-level seismicity occurring around the 
periphery of the pillar where the stresses are high, but the potentially larger events would 
occur due to pillar or slip on fractures the around the pillar 
periphery. 
numerical modeling approach used here is the .P~ogram 2007). 
program is used to simulate three-dimensional mrnmg geometries and is uses a 
"discontinuum" method. This means that the program is capable of representing the failure of 
rock mass (i.e., the general rock mass consists of intact rock and situ jointing) as well as 
movement along maior fracture or fault surfaces. To reoresent the rock mass. it is tvoicallv 
subdivided into blocks separated by the major fault traces.'· The blocks, which consists of intact 
rock blocks separated by fracture or bedding surfaces, are typically represented by a rock mass 
failure criterion (that takes into account the weakening effects of the general rock fracturing). 
Specific, important faults may be represented explicitly as breaks in the model that separate 
rock mass blocks. In this project, the rock mass is represented without specific fault surfaces, 
and as a rock mass only. The rock mass is subdivided into a large nurrib~r of tetrahedral finite 
difference elements in which the stress state and deformation are determined at each element. 
The 5900 pillar and surrounding 30 and 40 vein stoping are represented in the 3DEC model. 
DXF files of the 30 and 40 veins and the development were supplied by Lucky Friday staff, 
and these were used to form the ·numerical model. The 30 vein stopes were subdivided as per 
the DXF file and extracted stope-by-stope in the actual sequence that occurred in the mine. 
The stopes that formed the basic circular shape of the pillar were mined in a series of 23 steps 
(termed Phase I as was used by Pikalnis, 2009), followed by extraction of the remaining ore 
above and below the pillar in 2 steps, termed Phase II and III. Figures 1 and 2 show large 
scale and close~up views of the 5900 pillar from the hangingwalL Here, the actual dxf stope 
outlines are shown in transparent mode with the 3DEC model representation given behind. 
The infrastructure development is also given showing the correspondence of the model to the 
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Itasca Consulting Group. Inc. 
Minneapolis. Minnesota USA 
Figure 1 Outer bqundary of the model showing 3DEC block structure. The model is 
about 3300' on a side, with (/le y axis pointing north. The orientation of 
the orebody (dip 9ff, dip direction 17°) can be seen in the blocks. The 30 
vein is located d,eep inside this model. 
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Figure 2 Large scale view of the 30 Vein geometry superimposed on the 3DEC 
model (note, the non-pillar ar_~as of the 30 and 40 Veins are removed from 
the 3DEC model for visual clarity). 
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Figure 3 Close~up view of the 30 Ve.in aiid infrastructure geometry superimposed on 
the 3DEC model of the 30 · Vein 5900 pillar area. The 3DEC model is 
sitbdivided into slopes as seen· to form the 5900 pillar. 
3 Rock Mass Material Modei'-and Properties Estimate 
3.1 Material Models to Represent the Major Rock Units 
The Gold Hunter rock mass is represented in this calibration model as two material types : the 
orebody and the footwall and hangingwall argillites. For the level of this analysis, it is felt that 
the orebody and host rock are not required to be further subdivided into various rock types 
since we don't have detailed mapping of the variability. However, a sensitivity study is made 
to look at variability in the ore strength and separate models are run assuming a silicic 
quartizite and siderite ore. 
3 .2 Orebody Representation 
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~ peak 
strength to residual strength type model 
or "strain-degradation" model in that the strength is degraded with 
increasing shearing after peak strength. The strength ore is defined using a 
standard method using the Hoek-Brown failure criteria (Figure 4). 
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Figure 4 The Hoek-Brown failure envelope is a parabolic function describing the 
rock mass failure condition in terms of the major principal stress. Stress 
states below the criteria lridicai~ an elastic rock mass, while stress states on 
the. criteria indicate a failed state. Stress states above the criteria are not 
possible due to yielding and stress redistribution. 
A Hoek-Brown strength cri,teria defines the peak strength of the rock mass in terms of the 
principal stresses (crt - the m_ajor, or driving, principal stress, and cr3 , the minor or confining 
principal stre~_s). During excavation, the stresses in the 5900 pillar will change from the in situ 
stress, to some ()ther state as a result of stress relief and concentration from the mining. If the 
stress state reaches the failure condition, yield in that region will occur, and the stresses will 
decrease based on hqw much strain occurs in the rock mass. Figure 5 shows a schematic of 
the stress-strain behavior of the rock mass that is assumed and is typical of strong, brittle rocks 
such as quartzite. This figure indicates that after peak strength, the rock will yield and 
strength decays to a residual level over some amount of strain. The "brittleness" (or, violence) 
of the failure response is governed by how quickly the strength decays from peak to residual 
strength. If this strength decay occurs over very small levels of strain, the response is brittle 
and violent, and similar to how glass might behave when fracturing. If the strain over which 
this decay occurs is larger, the response is more "ductile" in nature and less violent. In the 
3DEC analyses, it is assumed that the ore responds as a relatively brittle could 
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Figure 5 The orebody rock mass is represented with a peak and residual strength, 
termed a "strain softening" model. The brittleness (i.e., the violence of 
the failure response) is controlled by the slope of the failure response going 
from peak to residual strength. In this report, it is assumed that the 
response is relatively brittle to reflect the brittle fracturing response 
observed in the orebody. 
3 .3 Argillite Wallrock Representation 
The argillite, on the other hand, is assumed to behave in a ductile fashion in which the 
response is dominated by the weak cleavage planes which are assumed to strike sub-parallel to 
the orebody. A material model, termed the ubtquitous joint model, is used in 3DEC to 
represent a thinly-bedded rock mass like tbe argillite. This material model assumes that the 
rock mass has a large nuniber of bedding planes or joints oriented parallel to the orebody, and 
that these joints are weak (i.e., no cohesive strength - in other words, the can be pulled apart 
easily, and that the friction angle along them is low as a result of the typical slickensides and 
chloritic/talcy minerals on .their surfaces. This model allows shear to occur in the direction of 
the cleavage planes, and buckling into -~he excavations. 
3.3 Rock:Mass Properties Estimates 
As stated above, the Hoek-Brown strength criteria is used to represent the stress level at failure 
for the orebody. The Hoek-Brown criteria is a parabolic relationship between the major and 
minor stress at failure (Figure 4). Rock mass properties are estimated by the following 
approach: 
1. The Hoek-Brown failure criteria for intact (laboratory-scale) rock specimens is 
defined by curve-fitting the criteria to uniaxial (UCS) and triaxial compression 
data. The HE failure critieria is expressed as follows: 
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Two parameters describe the failure envelope for intact samples rock: the 
UCS (? c1) and m; which defines the amount of curvature of the envelope. In our 
case, we have little actual laboratory data to describe the various rock types. 
Currently, a few tests of the UCS (provided by NIOSH) indicate a significant 
variability in orebody strength based on content of siderite, quartzite and 
argillite. The UCS of the siderite samples averages around 50 MPa (about 7000 
psi) whereas the vitreous quartzite is around 17,000 psi or 115 MPa. To fit the 
HB envelope to the intact rock sample data, the curvature parameter, m;, shown 
in the above equation is required. In the absence of triaxial data on these rock 
types, from which m1 is typically derived, approximate literature values for 
quartzite are used. Here, a value of m1 of 20 is assumed. It should be noted 
that the UCS testing conducted for Gold Hunter falls at the lower end of the 
range for ore types in the Lucky Friday mine as reported by Whyatt, et al, 
1996. They present the following average values of mechanical properties for 
the Lucky Friday mine (Table 1): 
Table 1 Proposed values of rock mass strength and modulus for Lucky 
Friday Mine (Whyatt, et. al., 1996) 
Lucky Ftiday: 
Vitteo~s q1Jamcita f\VJ-425(! ,, 145 sa.300 17,2 2.500 6<;.2 9.o 0.21 
VH1oous qva•ttito frr/1),5100, 5:J.'.Xl ' .. ' . ~ .. 161 23.400 NO NO 7?.5 1 \.1 !{Q 
Vi!recus quartzite (H'v\!-hoalec fracture) 47.50. 151 21.SOO NO ND :.s.2 a.a NO 
Ser1C1t1c quar.::He (fW)-4:ZSO •• , ••• 3M ~S.$,:,0 17.2 2,5':0 S3 l 7,7 0.22 
As seen in this table, the rock UCS values are significantly higher than 
estimated by Pikainis. Thus, it is iikeiy that the UCS for vitreous quartizite 
could be significantly higher than assumed in the Pikalnis report. 
2. Obviously, the strength response for small, intact rock samples does not 
represent the actual strength of the in situ rock mass. The Hoek-Brown 
approach provides for a methodology for adjusting the failure envelope of the 
intact rock to in situ values based on the "quality" of the rock mass. This 
quality is typically expressed in terms of the GSI (Geologic Strength Index) of 
the rock mass, which is based on the degree of fracturing and the coatings on 
fractures. Figure 6 shows a chart illustrating the method of determir•jng GSI. 
Pikalnis (2009) performed an analysis of the GSI for the ore, which was 
confirmed during my visit to the mine in Feb. 2010. The orebody is typically a 
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Figure 6 Apprb,<imate estimate of range of the GS/ for the orebody in 30 Vein. The 
3. 4 In Situ Stress 
rock mass is classified in general as a good quality material with block to 
very blocky conditions and GS! of about 55 to 60. 
The in situ stress state in the Coeur d'Alene district has been reported by Whyatt, et. al. 
(1995) as given in Table 2. This correlation is based on stress measurements at the 4200 
5300 levels of the Lucky Friday as well as the 7300 level of the Star Mine. The measurements 
indicate a er t direction of about N40W and a ratio of of approximately 1.5. The 
Figure (2009) stress 
based on a best-fit back-analysis of the 5900 pillar IRAD stressmeter 
knowledge, the available stress measurements and raise breakouts district-
wide show a range in direction of approximately N20W to N40W (Whyatt, 2000). 
The in situ stress state applied to the 3DEC model was varied fror:n Nl5W to N40W with 
vertical stress component based on 1.2 psi/ft depth and a ratio of cr/ crv of 1.5. 
Table2 Lucky Friday Mine In Situ Stress Estimate (Whyatt, et. aL, 1995) 
stress Mm:1nitude1 Bearing Plunge 
(J ns · • · · • · • · · • · · · · • • 57 2.5 
o.,, . . ....... .. 49 2.2 
o • .. •o •• ... . .. 35 "1.6 
Tns.'e.·1 ...... . ... ... -15 -0.6 
T ns.'\t .... , ... . . . . ~ .. 2 O.! 
T::,rv ........ . ·····. -10 -0.4 
er 1 ~ ... - .. < •••••• 70 3."I N40' w 13' 
02 ... - . ~ . . . . ... 42 "!.8 S41' w 33' 
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Figure 7 Breakout observations at the Lucky Friday and Star Mines 
4 Summary of Model Runs and Analysis 
A series of model analyses were tun for comparison to stressmeter measurements, discing and 
borehole breakout observations. These are summarized below: 
• In situ stress variation 
o Base case model assumes cr1 direction of N40W and cr/ <>v of 1.5 
o Alternative stress model assumes cri direction of NI5W and cr/ of 1.5 
• Strength variation 
o Assume base case stress condition 
o Base case assumes a UCS strength for orebody of 115 MPa (16,900 psi) and 
GSI (or RMR) of 60. This is the "fair to good quality silicified orebody" 
assumption 
o Alternative case assumes a UCS strength of the orebody 115 MPa, but a GSI 
of 50, which is a "poor to fair quality silicified orebody" assumption 
o Alternative case assuming a siderite orebody with UCS 50 MPa (7350 psi) 
and GSI of 50, representing a poor-fair quality siderite. 
0 
4. Stress Variation 
series of plots showing the evolving maximum principal stress (vein-perpendicular) and the 
regions of failed rock are contoured through the center of the 5900 pillar are given in Figures 
8-10 for the base case stress state and silicified orebody strength. As seen in these plots, the 
immediate edges of the pillar as well as the back (and floor) of stopes yield in shear and 
extension as the stopes are mined. This creates a thin "rind" of failed material about five feet 
thick and pushes the stress concentration into the confined regions of the rock mass. This 
failure depth corresponds reasonably well with the slabbing observed in the face of overhand 
stopes which was induced by fracturing in the back of the ·previous stope. This slabbing is due 
to both extension and shear and is a result of the stress concentration from the vein-
perpendicular stresses that arch over the back. This observation from the i:nodel and field 
provides some minor calibration that the strength properties assigned to the mo.~el and the 
softening response are reasonable. The depth of failure may be somewhat overpredicted, 
meaning the UCS of the stronger silicified materials rnay be a bit greater than assumed (115 
MPa). 
As the mining progresses, the depth of..failure within the pillar increases until it reaches a 
thickness about 15 to 20'. This is essentially the depth of spalling or failure that might be 
expected at the completion of Phase III. · I~spection of the stress state shows that the stresses 
are more-or-less symmetric on either side of the 5900 drift - in other words, there is not large 
variation in induced stresses on the east or west side of the pillar, and no large influence of the 
40 Vein can be seen. · 
,.,..-- ... 
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Figure 8 ai regions at mining step 14 (11 '2 ) Stresses are 
in Pa (le6 Pa = 147 psi). At this stage, the stress concentrations are mostly near 
the pillar edges with destressing in the local roof of the 5900 drift. The pillar 
edges and immediate roof of the 5900 drift are yielding (blue =nonfailed, elastic). 
Note the stope backs and floor yield to a depth of approx. 5' with these strength 
properties assumptions. 
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Figure 9 Base case stress state and fai ed regions at mining step 23 (5/2007 - end Phase l). 
Stresses are in Pa (le6 Pa = 147 psi). At this stage, the stress concentrations 
have migrated inward from the failed pillar edges with destressing in the local 
roof of the 5900 drift. Approximately same yielding conditions as previous. Note 
inner core of pillar is elastic. 
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Figure IO Base case stress state an failed regi.ons at mining step 24 ( 3/2008, end Phase II). 
Stresses are in Pa (le6 Pa = 147 psi). The depth of failure in from the edges of 
the pillar have reached about 10 to 15 ', depending on location. The greatest 
stress concentration is formed in a sharp band in from the yielded rim due to the 
confined nature of the pillar core. 
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Figure 10 Base case stress state an failed regions at mining step 25 ( current, end Phase 
Ill). Stresses are in Pa (le6 Pa = 147 psi). The depth of failure in from the 
edges of the pillar have stabilized at about 10 to 15 ', depending on location. The 
greatest stress concentration is formed in a sharp band in from the yielded rim 
due to the confined nature of the pillar core. 
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stressmeter measurements 
stress (i.e., that over and above the pre-existing in situ stress) is plotted as a function date 
, mining step). As seen, the stress is slightly higher (about 1500 to 2000 psi, or about 
10%) on the west side of the pillar than on the east side. The range in stress for all three 
stressmeter locations for the two stress cases are given by the shaded boxes. The base case 
(N40W) indicates induced stresses at the end of Phase III mining ranging from about 12 to 
16,000 psi and about 9 - 11,000 psi for the Nl5W case. The measured stresses fall in this 
same range, with the west gauges fitting the range of the N40W case well and the east gauges 
fitting the N lSW case reasonably well. In general, it is felt that this correspondence is actually 
extremely good, given the typical sensitivity of IRAD stressmeter calibration and results to 
factors such as: 
• Gauge contact area with the borehole wall the calibration and response of the gauges 
is highly sensitive to the match of gauge seating platens to the hole '?!all and the 
resulting contact area. 
• Gauge factor - the calibration factor of the gauges is sensitive to the modulus of the 
rock mass. The high variability bf the rock along the GH boreholes, from siderite to 
vitreous quartzite results in a high variability of modulus. Depending on exactly where 
the gauge is installed, the calibration factors could vary significantly. For accurate 
stress change measurement, the gauges are typically calibrated in the particular rock 
type by installing the g~uges in a large core of the rock and compressing in the 
laboratory. · 
• Orientation - the stress monitored by the gauge is sensitive to axis orientation. As 
demonstrated by Pikalnis, the stress monitored by the stress meter will vary 
significantly with even a few degrees of rotation of the axis of the seating platen. 
For these reasons, the calibration (which was done without attempting to manipulate the 
estimated in situ stress magnitude) is felt to be very good and lends confidence to the 
interpretation that a N40W stress provides a reasonable and conservative maximum stress 
orientation and that the 1.5 max:min stress ratio is also reasonable. I do not think that it makes 
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Figure 11 Prediction of induced stress change at East, West and Top stressmeter locations for two 
cases of the direction of cr1: N40W and N15W. The approximate range of the predictions 
is given by the shaded boxes .. 
.. 
4.2 Comparison of Model to Observations of Hole Breakout and Discing 
4.2.1 Prediction of Failed Regions 
The depth' of failure given by the base case mo.del can be sununarized as follows: 
• The failure depth in th~: pillar reaches a maximum of around 10 to 15' around the outer 
rim of the pillar and stabilizes after the "Phase II" extraction when the pillar is fully 
created by mining (Figure 10). Failure is by extension along the outer edge, and shear 
in the interior confined zone at the rim. Failure in this model would typically mean 
formation of new fractures and shear on existing fractures. Drilling into this zone 
would potentially mean encountering poor core recovery and greater core loss. 
• Yield zones exist above and below the 5900 drift to a depth of about 5' or so. 
• The interior of the pillar remains elastic and is expected to remain elastic. 
Further meaning of this failed zone can be determined by examining the of induced 
strain in the pillar. Figure 12 shows the base case maximum principal strain .............. ""'"" in the 
pillar, contoured to a level 0.05 % which is an approximate level for of 
.. ·--. 
·~---, 
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concrete or rock. As seen, this zone of expected new fracturing is approximately the same 
depth as indicated by the yielded zone. Again, the mean of this zone is that formation of 
newly-developed fracturing or movement on existing fractures can be expected. 
3DEC4. 10 
QOOl ''"' ~ ~ . 1114. 
Slep 1170'2 




# 224.251 lo 152U4 
Y= •12$4.94 to lle.866 
Z.= ·1837.76 to -1203.7' La•r=~~:~~~~~bla) 

















lt;i;c:.a Connlting Group, Inc. 
Minn&apofia. Minnesota USA 
Figure 12 Base case strain levels induced in the pillar. The red region has strain levels 
exceeding 0.5%, w~ich is the approximate level of extensional strain at which 
concrete and µnderground cave mine cracking are observed. This zone roughly 
follows the yield zone ·above and is the region where new fractures might be 
expected. 
Discing and Breakout 
In addition to the damage level observed in the stope backs and floors, damage within the pillar 
was observed from drilling of the east and west GH holes (Figure 13 and 14). A summary of 
the hole observations are: 





30-55{ENO) STRONG DISKING WEST HOLE 
4 
Figure 13 GH West borehdle core. Note moderate to strong discing over entire length of the 
hole, with rubblized_ and lost core below about 50' length. 
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• 
EAST HOLE 
Figure 14 GH East borehole core. Note moderate to strong discing over entire length of the 
hole, with the exception of the final IO' of hole which is in a mostly-undamaged 
condition. 
• Both holes show moderate to strong discing behavior over much of their length, 
although the east hole shows no discing for the bottom 10' or so of the bole. However, 
the end of the hole passes out of the pillar and into the region between the 30 and 40 
veins, which appears to be more silicifi.ed and stronger (Figure 15). 
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Figure 15 Plan view of the 5900 pillar and drift showing west and east observation holes. 
Note that the east observation hole is not centered in ihe pillar and passes out 
through the silicified zone between the 30 and 40 veins. 
• The bottom 5 to 10' of the west hole is strongly disced and rubblized. 
• Both holes remain open and passable to th~. video camera probe. Video shows that the 
west hole has breakouts at the top and botto!)l of the hole for the final half of the hole. 
The east hole has some breakouts in 'the,hole and joint offset from about 30 to 40' 
depth, but the remainder of the hole is circular and in good condition. 
The conclusion from the;e ?tbove points is that although the west hole shows greater damage in 
terms of discing and breakouts, both hQles (with the exception of the end of the west hole) are 
open with only local evidence of intense hole failure or squeezing. 
A number of rest;?archers have studied the stress state and rock properties that result in discing 
of core. The mo'i:;t interesting work are laboratory simulations in which diamond drilling was 
performed into a rook sample subjected to applied biaxial stresses (e.g., Lee and Haimson, 
1993). These studies have led to estimates of the stress conditions that lead to discing and 
borehole breakout for numerous rock types. 
Discing 
Discing of core stubs occurs when the stress relaxation accompanying the drilling results in 
extensional failure of the core stub. The thickness of the discs is indicative of the intensity of 
the stresses. Figure 16 provides a plot of the relationship between the principal stresses that 
result in discing for granite. To understand the stress state in stub, computer models were 
used to simulate the drilling process and estimate the stresses corresponding to tensile failure. 
but this plot some basis for ~VL~k<Lk 
given the stresses, or is there some other ... ,..,.,,.,. ...... ,~ ... 
The stresses for an E-W line through the center of the 30 vein (we did not account for the off-
center East hole alignment), through the 5900 drift and to the R and W extremities of the pillar 
were determined and plotted in the form of the discing predictions in Figure 17. As seen in 
this pillar, the stress conditions in the entire pillar are either in a possible discing condition or 
borderline condition (with the exception of the area immediately adjacent to the 5900 drift). It 
is therefore assumed that the character of the observed discing, which, with the exception of 
the end of the East borehole, is present in most locations, is due primarily to the variability of 
the rock strength rather than regions of stress which anomalously fall below a discing limit. 
The bottom line is that the stress conditions in the pillar appear to be conducive to discing over 
most of its width and are not necessarily related to extensive failure of the pillars. 
Borehole Breakout 
Spalling of the boreholes, particularly the west borehole, has been observed in the digital 
borehole video. The spalling has occurred at the top and bottom of the hole, which is 
consistent with the maximum stress being horizontal and oriented in a vein-perpendicular 
direction. The relationship of spalling in boreholes to stress magnitude and rock strength is not 
certain, and some researchers have concluded that there is rib unique relationship between 
stress and breakout. However, Lee and Haimson (1993) performed compression testing of 
rock samples of granite and limestone with boreholes in the laboratory and defined a range of 
conditions under which breakout occurred. Figure 18 illustrates the relationship of the major 
and minor stresses in the plane perpendicular to the borehole axis under which ·spalling was 
observed for granite and limestone. The stres1, state predicted for the base case along a 
horizontal line across the 5900 pillar in the 30 Vein was determined. This line is at the center 
of the pillar elevation, through the 5900 drift. T])e normalized stresses (normalized by the 
UCS of both quartzite and siderite) are plotted (Figure 19) for positions along this line and 
given in the form of Figure 18. The range of breakout criteria derived from the laboratory for 
granite and limestone are shown on Figure 19. This plot indicates the following: 
• The pillar stress state (N-S and vertical) perpendicular to the borehole is sufficient to 
result in spalling in quartizite in regions in the outer approximately 1h of the pillar. 
• The pillar stress state is sufficient to result in spalling in virtually all of the pillar where 
siderite is present. 
This simple correlation indicates that borehole breakouts can occur in highly silicic rocks, but 
only in the outer approximately 1h of the pillar, whereas breakouts are possible anywhere in 
the pillar in siderite. This generally agrees with observations where spalling occurs in the 
siderite-dominant rocks of the west borehole. 
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Figure 16 Relationship of the principal stresses for which core discing is likely to occur 
(solid symbols). The stress o-z is paral.lel to .. the borehole while the other 
components are perpendicular to the hole. The ~owponent o;n is the average of 
all three components. The blac~ circles are thJrived from laboratory testing. 
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Figure 17 Stress ciinditi.ons from base case model for a line from the west to east pillar 
boundaries plotted as given in Figure 16. Essentially all of the stress conditions in 
the pillar are conducive to potential discing. 
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Figure 18 Relationship between the maximum and minimum stresses perpendicular to a hole 
required for breakout. Three rock units: granite and two limestones are shown. 
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Figure 19 Limits of approximate breakout regions from Figure 18 plotted for stresses along 
an E-W line through 30 Vein, 5900 pillar. The line goes through the middle of 
the vein and the 5900 drift. The stress states indicate the potential for breakout in 
both quartzite and siderite, however, the potential for breakout in the weaker 




Closure of Orebody Across 5900 Drift 
• 
The model was used to estimate the closure across the pillar at the 5900 drift. Figure 20 shows 
the displacement of the hangingwall side of the pillar (in cm). The total closure (hangingwall 
+ footwall displacement) at the location of the 5900 drift is about 1.5" . This can be compared 
to tape extensometer measurements made regularly and reported by T. Williams. The closure 
reported after completion of the Phase HI mining is about 1.3", or roughly the same as 
predicted by the model. The deformation equates to a strain of about l.3"/120" (10' vein 
width), or about 1 % . The exact measurement and comparison is not particularly relevant - the 
important point is that the closures of the orebody are not large, and not sufficient to indicate 
complete crushing of the pillar. 
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Figure 20 N-S aifplacement contours (in cm) of the hangingwall of the pillar. 
Displacements are approximately 1-2 cm (0. 75 "), or a total closure of 2 to 4cm 
(1.5") at the 5900 drift location. Measurements using a tape extensometer 
indicate approximately 1.3" (reported by T. Williams). 
4.3 Discussion. 
The comparison of the model results to observation and measurement are suw..marized below: 
• 5900 Pillar Stresses - the modeled stresses compare quite well with the IRAD 
stressmeter readings. The stress p redictions for the base case (N40W s1 orientation) 
and ratio of sJsv = 1.5, and for the alternative case of (Nl5W s1 orientation) bound 
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stressmeter gauge 
measurement. Since the N40W orientation compares well with past Coeur d'Alene 
district in situ stress measurements as well as numerous raise breakout observations, it 
is recommended that the N40W orientation be used as a basis for future modeling 
analyses. 
• Damage Estimates - The base case orebody strength modeling predicts that a thin 
(roughly 10-15' thick) zone of failure develops around the outer periphery of the pillar 
as a result of the mining. A smaller (about 5' +/-) yield zone develops around the 
5900 drift. This depth of failure correlates reasonably well. with the rubbilized and 
unrecoverable core observed in the west observation borehole that was drilled in the 30 
Vein. The East borehole passes outside the vein ·and thus correlation of failure is not 
certain. The modeling indicates that the interior of the pillar remains elastic and is not 
in a failed state. 
• Core Discing and Borehole Breakouts - . Extensive core discing and breakouts 
(particularly in the west borehole) were observed in the observation boreholes. 
Comparison of stress state to discing or breakouts is an inexact science. Here, we have 
used laboratory-based testing correlations of discing and breakouts to stresses to attempt 
to relate the modeled pillar stresses to observations. It was found that: 
o The pillar stresses indicate that the magi;utudes are sufficient to create discing 
throughout most of the pillar, particularly in the siderite-rich rocks. In other 
words, the presence of discing at the outer regions of the pillar in any rock type, 
but particularly in the siderite, is not unusual or surprising. The fact that 
discing may occur is a natural result of the in situ stresses, but does not indicate 
that the central portions of the pillar have failed - it is simply highly-stressed. 
o The pillar stresses are also sufficient to cause borehole breakouts in the outer 
half of the pillar, particularly in the siderite-rich areas of the orebody. The 
extensive breakouts in the west half of the pillar may be indicative of the lower 
strength rocks encountered in the west side of the pillar. 
• Closure - the closure of the 30. Vein at the 5900 drift correlates reasonably well with 
the model predictions: 
5 Conclusions 
The overall conclusion of the analysis is that the stress state predicted correlates reasonably 
well with the IRAD stressrneter readings, and that damage observed is as expected from the 
stress state. More importantly, the modeling indicates that the 5900 pillar is not currently in a 
failed state. Only the outer 10' to 15' of the pillar has yielded, while the interior is still in an 
elastic state. A question to be asked is whether or not this is unusual, given the potentially 
high induced stresses in the pillar. The answer is no - the 5900 pillar has a width:height ratio 
of approximately 10:1 (100 ft diameter by 10' +I- width). Many empirical studies have been 
performed in which the failure response of pillars in room and pillar mines have been observed 
(Figure 21). Virtually all of the pillars in which failure has been observed occur for pillar 
width to height ratios of less than 2. This makes sense since no pillars are observed to fail for 
such squat shapes. For example, strike or dip-stabilizing pillars in South African gold mines 
although these may 
that pillars in relatively strong and brittle rocks with w:h ratios about 
2 have a confined inner core. The exterior rims of these pillars may fail by spalling, but the 
dilation and bulking of this exterior rim rapidly confines the inner core with the result that it 
remains elastic. Therefore, it is difficult to imagine the scenario that the 5900 pillar would 
actually fail throughout Thus; the pillar will likely remain stressed at or near its current level, 
with the potential for relatively low level seismicity occurring in the highly stressed areas along 
the boundary of failed region along its periphery. This could result· in shaking of the 5900 
drift, but support with dwydag bolts and screen will likely be sufficient to maintain loosened 
material. It is more likely that the foundation of the pillar in argillit\; along its boundaries will 
shear and yield. If fault structures are present, these could produce larger events. 
Based on the calibrations presented in this memo, it is felt that sufficient confidence in the 
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Figure 21 Empirical estimates of normalized pillar strength as a function of pillar width to 
height ratio. Empirical estimates underestimate the pillar strength at w: h ratios 
greater than about 2 due to a lack of data. Martin and Maybee (2000) show that 
pillars in brittle rocks harden and behave elastf:cally for w:h ratios greater than 
about 2 (the shaded band). From Kaiser and Kim (2008). 
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Exhibit 6 
SUBJECT: Pillar 
Modeling of the 5900 drift pillar was conducted in 2004 prior to selecting the dimensions 
for final pillar implementation. These results indicated that a 50 ft pillar would be stable 
with a 1.5 factor of safety. The limitations of this modeling were recognized, and as a 
result, the stability of the 55 ft circular pillar surrounding the 5900 level access through 
the orebody has always been of some concern. Therefore, this pillar was instrumented in 
mid-2005 to detennine stresses in the pillar back and ribs, as well as closure across and 
along this pillar. Instrumentation readings have continued, with the last readings taken 
08/18/2011. The stress data basically shows that the stress increased in the pillar rapidly 
after the pillar was formed, but as mining continued the rate of increase decreased, and 
since 2010 the stress has dropped in the pillar except for a continuing slight increase on 
the east side. The stress gages also responded to bursting in the pillar, the last burst 
occurring in 12/09. While it was clear that nearby mining was no longer stressing the 
pillar, it was known that the pillar was still being loaded by stope closure as a result of 
continued mining in the Gold Hunter. 
Drift closure across and along the 5900 pillar ·was gradual until the 12/09 burst, and since 
has slowly but steadily increased to the 1. 3 inch range. 
Both the stress and closure values agreed well with the computer model simulations of 
mining from the 5900 level in the Gold Hunter. Itasca concluded that the 5900 pillar ,vas 
stable and too big to fail suddenly and violently, behaving more like a stabilizing pillar. 
This conclusion appeared to be confirmed by the observations all along the 5900 pillar 
itself, as well as from inspection of the E and V../ observation boreholes drilled thrnugh the 
pillar. While there was apparent stress deterioration at the back edge along the west end 
of the pillar, as well as very minor stress effects around the 5900 drift, the 5900 pillar vvas 
basically intact, and its appearance had not basically changed since mining began. 
Two of the tlu·ee bursts that were located along the back edges of the pillar did not cause 
observable damage, but the last burst, 1.9 magnitude on 12/09/10, did minor damage to 
the 5900 level drift along the pillar, as well as the to some sections of the back and left rib 
of the chevron drift, just south of the 5900 pillar. This damage consisted of minor 
spalling and shakedown which was all contained by the installed ground support. No 
rehabilitation was required. 
The ground support consisted of a combination of Dywidag bolts and split sets 
was bolts in the back of the 
,-- -··E><~I.B~J·--·--
• < , r 
occunence 2. 8 (USGS) magnitude in 5900 during .,,~.~-a,,~ 
1/16/11, and its resulting extensive and widespread damage, was very much une:x.pt::ctc:ct 
I made an initial visit to the 5900 pillar on 1 6, and a subsequent visit on 11/23. This 
brief report presents my observations and thoughts regarding the cause of the 5900 pillar 
burst, as well as the present stability of the 5900 pillar. 
Mechanism of 5900 Pillat· 2.8 (USGS Magnitude) Rockburst 
At 01:07:26, a 2.8 magnitude rockburst occurred as the last hole of the round from the 
overlying 5500 level underhand stope was blasted. The burst magnitude was detennined 
by the USGS national earthquake center, however, on the nearby Montana Tech seismic 
sensors, the burst appeared to be larger, in the 3.0 range. While the damage from this 
burst blocked off the 5900 access drift, there was also extensive damage to the footwall 
access ramp system all the way up to the 5550 level, but particularly to some of the 5750 
and 5700 sublevel openings. Such widespread damage is not characteristic of a simple 
pillar burst. 
The nmnerical model results did indicate that small bursts around the edges of the pillar 
could be expected with magnitudes upto 2.0. We did have such bursting, with-the lagest 
a magnitude 1.9. The model results also indicated that the only way the pillar could fail 
was if the height to width ratio changed and the pillar lost confinement, in which case a 
foundation failure might occur. The model assumed a 10: 1 width to height ratio. The 
foundation failure would occur out in the walls, rather than in the core of the pillar. And 
further, the model results did not include any geologic structures intersecting the pillar. 
With the observed stress deterioration along the inner and outer edges of the pillar, likely 
in the 10 ft range, the width:height ratio of the in place doughnut shaped pillar is actually 
3.5, assuming a 10 ft. vein thickness. 
The in situ stress in the 5900 pillar area before mining was some 1.2 psi/ ft of depth for 
the vertical stress, and 1.5 times this value for the horizontal stress. The actual vertical 
distance to surface above the Gold Hunter is in the 7000 ft range, hence the vertical stress 
would be 8400 psi, and the maximum horizontal stress, N40°W direction, is 12,600 psi. 
From the stress gages we know that the stress increase in the pillar from mining off of the 
5900 level, taking into account the ore and waste rock modulus values, was also some 
12,600 psi. Hence, the stress in the pillar was very near the unconfined compressive 
strength of the pillar, and any further loss of confinement could lead to a pillar failure. 
It was initiaUy presumed that the 2.8 rockburst in the 5900 pillar a 
pillar since calculations stored strain energy in the pillar, if released 
instantaneously, could generate a burst of this magnitude. However, with a classic pillar 
2 
that most 
failure. type failures occur when the pillar rock is 
the wall rocks, as is the case for Gold Hunter. Shear failures in the wall rocks 
going oul from the edges of the pillar. The [tasca modeling concluded that this failure 
mechanism could occur in the 5900 pillar, as well as the diminishing 5500-5700 sill 
pillar. Favorably oriented structure through the pillar would further reduce the strength 
either pillar 
A 3.8 magnitude sill pillar burst at the Macassa Mine in 1996 was determined to be a 
foundation failure. There was major damage out in the footwall, and only minor 
observable damage along the pillar or out in the hanging wall. In this case the pillar was 
some 200 ft long by some 80 ft high. There \.Vas over 2 inches of closure measured 
across the ovcrcut immediately above the sill pillar. 
Our 2.8 burst did major damage to the pillar, as well as major damage along some 
openings up and to the east along the footwall. The majority of the energy released, as 
well as the resulting damage, was clue Lo instantaneous wall closure over the entire mined 
out area around the pillar, not from the of all the stored strain energy in the pillar. 
For this reason the 5900 pillar is still somewhat intact and partially loaded. The closure 
process is continuing to load this pillar, thus, there is the possibility small strain bursts 
still occurring in this pillar. 
We need lo measure the closure induced by this burst along the 5900 level drift. If none 
of the existing closure points survived, then \Ve can resurvey existing spads in the back 
along the main drift to determine their displacements as a resull of the burst. It is likely 
that several inches of closure across the vein resulted from this burst. 
Stability of 5900 Pillar 
It is apparent that the 2.8 burst in the 5900 pillar did not completely destress this pillar. 
Hence, it is possible that further small bursts could occur in this pillar as it continues to 
be loaded by ongoing \:o..1all closure from continued mining off of the 5900 level. It is also 
apparent that the remaining intact pillar has been significantly reduced in size, hence, the 
amount of stored strain energy now in the pillar has also been significantly reduced. To 
deal with any future bursts, ground support is being installed in and along lhe 5900 pillar 
to contain the effects of any further bursting. 
In addition to the combination of longer Dywidag bolts, split sets. chain I ink mesh and 
cable bolts, back and ribs ll sprayed with 2+ inches of shotcrctc. The addition 
the shotcrete adds 2 more kJ/m 2 lo the 9.J kJ/m 2 to 
Summary 
The 5900 of 2.8 Richter magnitude, was most likely a 
failure since this pillar was not completely destroyed. Deterioration a 
bursts around lhe edges of this pillar resulted in reducing the pillar confinement, and 
hence. its strength. It is not known whether any geologic structure tbrnugh the pillar 
contributed to the occutTence of this burst. 
The large amount of energy released by this burst, as well as the resulting damage, was 
due to the instantaneous wall closure over the entire mined out area surrounding the 5900 
pillar. Wall closure will continue to load the remaining 5900 pillar as mining continues 
in the underhand stopes cmTently being mined below. 
The ground support installed during rehabilitation of the 5900 pillar will contain the 
damage from any further small bursts that might be induced by continuing closure. 
Installing some type of tunnel sets through this pillar, and isolating them from the pillar 
by something like Techfoam, \Viii insure the long term stability of the access through this 
pillar. While I would conclude that the occurrence of another large burst in pillar is 
unlikely, it caimot be totally eliminated. discounted. 
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medical 
worked out well. 
wi\l work out ok. 
This looks pretty ugly - I hadn't heard about it - am in Italy al the moment, returning home on Saturday but 
going to China on Friday - gone for 3 weeks. 
Well, I guess this shows the need for understanding structure in the orebody, although not certain that it 
will ever be known. I think this shows the need to evaluate the conservatism in that sill pillar. I haven't 
heard a word from Hecla since r sent that draft report to them that I also sent to you. I recommended 60', 
but if there is a structure in the thickness is sort of irreievent to a point 
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Don't know if you heard, but with night shift blasting, 1 :07 am, the 5900 pillar was demolished with huge 
burst Am attaching pictures I took yesterday pm, but they don't really show other that the beginning of 
event just before the pillar. Back domed up 15+ ft, looked like carved, the walls broke out 10-15 ft on both 
sides. The muck was huge pickup sized slabs, and no dust Had floor heave on 5500 stope above, as 
well as lots of scattered shock damage 5900 level and sublevels going up. Looks like all instrumentation 
gone, but should have the 60 ft long wall closure measure points of Ted. Burst came with 5500 blast, and 
not good location on MP 250 data, but fair location with the new ESG sys with only 6 stations at some 
distance 
MSHA up yesterday, and they have started repairing, and will go in cautiously as the domed back looks 
almost perfect I expected to see a pile of broken rock - like round. but the huge slabs and no dust, as 
well as the back looking intact, suggest fault initiation through the pillar. 
When I calculated stored SE in 200 MPa doughnut pillar came up with 2.5 - 2.8 max event if SE released 
instantly - did this back in 08 and 09. Terry showed core from an old hole through there and the rock in 
the FW and up to 30 vein looked like really silicified quartzite. Needless to say this does not bode we!! for 
the sill along this stretch of rock. 
I finally went to Dr after laryngitis never went away, and had polyp on vocal cords. When removed was 
l l 
Thursday, November 17, 2011 America Online: WBlake298 
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LUCKY FRIDAY MINE 
November 18, 2011 
1V1E1VIORANDUM TO: John Jordan, Doug Bayer, John Lund, Karl Hartman, Eric 
Carlson, Zach Thomas 
FROIVI: Wilson Blake, Consultant 
SUBJECT: November 16, 2011 Mine Visit Report 
Introduction 
On Wednesday November 16, 2011, I visited the Gold Hunter to review the 2.8 
magnitude rockburst that occurred in the 5900 Pillar during night shift blasting, and 
blocked off the main 5900 level drift, as well as causing damage to openings up to the 
5500 level. 
This summary report presents my observations and thoughts regarding this mine visit. 
5900 Pillar 2.8 Rockburst 
At O 1 :07 :26, the 2.8 rockburst occtmed as the last hole of the round from the overlying 
5500 level underhand stope was blasted. Because of this, the MP 250 system was not 
able to get any location for this burst. From one of the ESG Paladin units the burst was 
located near the 5900 pillar. Based on damage the burst obviously occurred in the 5900 
pillar, as can be seen in the photo below. 
From the size of the muck and the lack of dust it does not appear that this was a classic 
pillar burst where the pillar basically implodes and is pulverized. It also appears that the 
cable bolts in the back along the brow likely limited the damage to the south along the 
Ronne! E. Barrette, etal vs Helca Mining Co., etal Docket No. 43639 30~ of 1172 
from an old exploration hole through the central pillar area showed that the 
footwall rocks are very solid and silicified up to the 30 vein - looking more like 
quartzite than the usual argi1laceous GH wall rocks. There did appear to be some low 
angle structures in the cores, but nothing that pointed to the presence of well defined 
faults running through the core. The observation hole through the east side of the pillar 
also indicated that this part of the pillar was much more solid and competent than is the 
west side. 
Model Results and 5900 Pillar Burst 
From the numerical modeling carried out by Itasca it was presumed that the 5900 pillar 
was too large and too confined for a pillar burst to occur. Because the actual burst 
appears to have been structtu-ally controlled, we may want Itasca to rerun the model with 
structure running through the pillar in order to see if we can replicate the burst We really 
need to better understand why this burst occurred, as it has significant implications with 
respect to mining the main sill - particularly along the more burst prone eastern _portion 
of the sill. ........,_,,., 
5900 Pillar Instrumentation 
We need to recover the instrumentation box since the gage readings up to the time of the 
burst can likely be recovered. The tape extensometer should also be undamaged and 
recovered. If any of the closure points along the walls are still intact, we need to preserve 
them in order to be able to determine the vein and wall closure induced by this burst. 
Rehabilitation 
While it appears that we may have to remove the brow to better be able to stabilize the 
back, this and all the rehabilitation work needs to be done cautiously. We should be able 
to determine the condition of the back and upper ribs by test drilling with the jumbo. We 
obviously need to be able to get at least 2+ inches of shotcrete on the back and walls 
before bolting. It did appear that one of the instrumented cable bolts was sticking out of 
the back. This would have been a 20 ft cable bolt. 
Summary 
The 2.8 burst in the 5900 pillar was not expected and did not appear to be a classic pillar 
Because upper ribs appeared to solid, we assume 
remaining pillar is destressed, hence the rehabilitation needs to proceed with caution. 
And, finally. we need to better understand cause this burst to to 
mining the main sill. 
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Results of an experimental and analytical study of a rock-burst-prone 
pillar at the Galena Mine, Wallace, Idaho, have been used to e>.-plain the 
mechanics of rock bursting. The author has shown that a rock burst will 
occur when t\e following two conditions are satis.Ged: ( l) the average 
stress iu a mine structure -exceeds the strength of the structure, and ( 2) the 
stiffness of the mine structure exceeds the stiffness of the mine loading 
system. It follows that a rock burst can be prevented by ( 1) reducing 
stress in the mine structure to a value below the strength of the structure, 
or by ( 2) reducing sf:i.ffuess of the mine structure to a value below the 
stiffness of the mine loading system. 
As part of a field test to verify this hypothe.5i.s for the cause of rock 
bursting, a burst-prone stope pillar was successfully destressed by blasting 
a single line 0£ long holes in the footwall of the vein. As a result, the pillar 
was fractured and softened, reducing stiffness and stress in the pillar. 
The design of mine structures and mining methods to control rock 
bursting can be determined in the laboratory using the finite-element 
method of stress analysis. The stability of such structures in the field, with 
regard to rock bursting, can be evaluated using the broad-band micro-
seismic technique. 
iii 
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INTRODUCTION 
The phenomenon of rock bursts has been associated with mined 
excavations throughout the world in all rock types and at all depths-on 
the surface in granite quarries in the northeastern United States to more 
than 2 miles below t...l:ie surface in the gold fields of V/itw·atersra.nd in South 
Africa. In almost every burst-prone mine in the world, fatalities from 
bursts have been reported. In addition to hazardous working conditions, 
the loss of production and expense ov.'ing to repairs and cleanup following 
a burst makes the rock-burst problem a major factor in mining economically 
at depth. 
GENERAL CoNCEl?TS 
A rock burst is generally defined as a sudden rock failure character-
ized by the breaking up and expulsion of rock from its surroundings, ac-
companied by the violent release of energy. All rock bursts produce seismic 
waves that propagate outward from their source. Hence, ,vb.ile little was 
known about the basic mechanics of bursts prior to thfa study, a great deal 
of information about rock bursts has been inferred from studies of their 
associated seismic waves. 
Seismic disturbances produced by rock bursts have been recorded at 
seismological stations hundreds and even thousands of miles away. The 
largest bursts have been given Richter earthquake magnitude ratings up 
to 5.5. Besides damage to· surface structures from such large bursts, dam-
age to underground workings is enonnous~ At the Wright-Hargreaves mine 
in Canada, a major rock burst in 1964 caused so much damage to the un-
derground workings that the mine had to be closed (Buckle, 1965). 
Rock bursts have been a severe operational hazard in certain deep 
mines since 1900. Numerous committees and organizations have been 
formed throughout the world to study the problem. The control or elim-
ination of rock bursts bas been the goal of research for over 50 years. But 
little has been determined about basic causes; hence, control measures 
have at best been only partially effective, as is attested to by the number 
and severity of burst$ throughout the world each year. 
1 
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2 QUARTERLY OF THE COLORADO SCHOOL OF Mrm:s 
STA.TE OF THE ABT 
Rock bursts first became a recognized operational problem in the 
Kolar Fold Fieid of India in 1898. By the end of 1903, some 75 rock bursts 
had occurred, resulting in six fatalities and scores of serious injuries. The 
depth of mining at this time was less than 1500 feet below the surface. 
Investigations of these bursts ( Bosworth-Smith, 1903; Smeeth, 1904} led to 
the conclusion that rock bursts were caused by great pressure on pillars 
in a geologic setting characterized by strong rigid pillars and a rigid 
baaging wall which yielded slightly. The piTiar yielded suddenly when 
this pressure reached the strength of the pillar, resulting in a burst. All 
the bursts observed at this time were associated with pillars; so it was 
concluded that where there was no pillar, there would be DO burst. 
The rock-burst problem in the gold mines of the Witwatersrand of 
South Africa began in the early i900s at depths of less than 500 feet. By 
1915 a committee was formed to investigate. Committee members sug-
. gested the concept of domes, zones of fractured rock forming around stopes, 
to account for the observation that the rock around the mined openings 
appeared fractured and broken. They also concluded that in addition to 
supporting load, the domes also transferred load to pillars. Hence, in addi-
tion to the concept of pillar bursting, they suggested that the removal and 
failure of pillars may cause a dome to fail. This concept was introduced 
to explain rock bursts which did DO apparent damage to pillars or other 
mine work'ings. 
During the lat,; 1920s, the theory of elasticity was used to account 
for high pressures ex:isting around mined openings. Jones (1926) used the 
solution for a circular hole in a plate under hydrostatic loading to show 
that the stress at the boundary of the hole is n"lice the applied stress. He 
inferred that stress is concentrated around mined openings and also around 
the domes formed around stopes. Crowle ( 1927) expanded this concept 
to show that fractures develop around excavations because of stress con-
centration, and, if the fracturing is sufficiently violent, it results in a rock 
burst. In addition, he suggested that the fracturing of rock around stopes 
forms the domes. 
Prior to 1930, all conclusions and hypotheses concerning rock bursts 
were based primarily .on observation. Simple theory was introduced only 
to confirm observations. Though the obseivations were certainly correct, 
little effort was made toward understanding the mechanism causing a burst. 
The major emphasis was in modifying mining methods to minimize the 
creation of dangerous burst-prone pillars. During all this time, the number 
and severity of bursting increased. 
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the end of the two main causes rock bursts were general-
ly ( 1) the pressure-dome operators of mines 
where tlie veins steeply, and cantilever theory suimclrte:d 
by operators of mines where the veins were mostly fiat-lying. 
The pressure-dome theory ( Crow1e, 1931; Dinsdale, 1937; Spalding, 
1937) used stress concentrations in the Vlcin:ity of mine openings to account 
for rock bursts. The rock fractures when stress in this concentrated zone 
exceeds the strength of the rock. If the rock is brittle, the fracturing process 
may be violent and result in a srnall rock burst. As these fractures progress 
outward from an excavation, a domeslike area of fractured rock develops. 
This zone is destressed by virtue of being fractured, but a high-stress zone 
exists around the dome in the unfractured rock. Large bursts occur when 
the load supported by the dome is concentrated in pillars or remnants, and 
when two or more domes meet, resulting in a further stress concentration. 
Stope closure results as a consequence of the fracturing of rock within a 
dome. 
The cantilever theory ( Sinclair, 1936; Joseph, 1938) was advanced 
to explain the cause of rock bursts in the rather flat-dipping beds of the 
Witwatersrand. As mining progressed and support was removed over a 
large area, the hanging wall .sagged. The larger and deeper the mined-out 
area, the greater the sag. Bedded layers within the saggmg area acted as 
beams or cantilevers. As sagging continued, layers separated and began 
to fracture in the hanging wail, and small rock bursts occurred. As further 
sag continued, beams were sheared at their support ends, and large bursts 
resulted. Manifestations of these bursts were seen in spalling of support 
pillars or remnants; hence, more than one burst could be observed in a 
single pillar. 
:Both theories were based primarily on observed and measured be-
havior of stope walls and suited to a particular geometry. It is apparent 
that the basic cause or mechanism of a rock burst must be the same, re-
gardless of the particular mine geometry. It is interesting to note that the 
recommended control technique for both theories was identical-prevent 
sag or closure. 
Despite all attempts to control and minimize stope closure-Le., use 
of waste packs, granite blocks, hydraulic £II, etc.-bursting continued and 
became more severe as mines went deeper. This fact was interpreted by 
some as an indication that limiting closure was not an effective means 
of controlling bursting. 
The first mathematical model to explain rock bursting was proposed 
by Weiss (1938), who used elastic theory, experimental results, and what 
he called "elastic hysteresis" to explain the phenomenon of bursts. Basically 
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a time-dependency factor was included in the description of bursts. He 
reasoned that the state of stress around openings depends on both past and 
present loading, ,,,hich accounted for the large accumulations of strains 
and forces necessary to cause bursting. Because of time dependency, a 
single burst did not completely destress an area; it took several bursts 
(aftershocks) over a certain period of time. With this model he could 
account for the cyclical nature of bursting as related to the mining cycle. 
Though this model appeared to describe the observed patterns of bursting, 
it was never accepted by mine operators because in the late 1930s, it was 
felt that mathematics couldn't be used to predict mine behavior. All the 
energy released by a large burst could not be accounted for by the collapse 
of a specific part of a mine structure. Hence, Weiss concluded that the 
major source of the energy must be in the solid rook away from the excava-
tion. 
As a result of this early research, modifications of mining methods for 
particular mines tended to minimize the.rock-burst hazard, the most com-
mon modifl.cation being IongwaD-type techniques which avoided the 
creation of pillars. As mining went deeper, bursting increased in both in-
cidence and severity. By the late 1940s, the South Africans recognized 
that jf the rock-burst problem was to be understood, an intensive research 
program involving both engineers and scientists was necessary. As a result, 
in 1949 the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research ( CSIR) was 
formed. 
During the 1950s this team re-examined the rock-burst problem from 
a mathematician's point of view (Hill, 1954; Roux and Denkhaus, 1954). 
The physical properties of rreks were examined in detail in the laboratory 
(Denkhaus, 1958a), the state of stress e,..isf:ing on the Witwatersrand was 
inferred (Leeman, 1958 ), and the theory of elasticity was used to a greater 
e)..teot ( Denkhaus, 1958b ) . 
The seismic location of rock bursts showed that the bursts were oc-
curring back from the face in solid rock, and calculations of the seismic 
energy released by this bursting indicated that large amounts of seismic 
energy were being released daily (Cook, 1963a). Stimulated by this 
observation, Cook ( 1963b) proposed that the mechanics of rock bursts 
could best be analyzed by an energy approach. He showed that as an 
excavation is made, a .large amount of energy is released by wall displace-
ments toward the opening. He postulated that to control bursting, this 
energy must be released in small enough amounts that it could be dissi-
pated nonviolently. 
Further work by Cook (1965), dealing with the behavior of rock 
sp1cCirnei1s in conventional and stiff implied that rock 
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bursts might be considered as a stability problem in the same way as a 
specimen behaves in laboratory tests. That is, depending on the relative 
stiffness 0£ the spe<'..imen versus the loading system, the specimen will fail 
violently or nonviolently if energy can or cannot be extracted from the 
loading system at failure. A similar b ut more complicated mathematical 
model was proposed by Diest (1965). The concepts suggested by these 
studies appeared to be very promising, since, for the first time, a mechan-
ism was used to account for the two types of failure-violent and non-
·violent. However, there has bet:11 no further published \.vork to advance 
these concepts and apparently there was no attempt to test them in the 
field. 
Cook and others ( 1966) summarized some 15 years of rock-burst 
research in South Africa, concluding that rock bursts are controlled by the 
rate at which energy is released as an excavation is made. They postulated 
that if the energy released is greater than the amount which can be dissi-
pated nonviolently, then this energy is released violently, and a rock bmst 
results. This energy is derived from the displacement of a rock mass as it 
moves towards an opening that is created or enlarged. 
Though the energy approach is certainly valid and energy is un-
doubtedly released as an excavation is slowly created or enlarged, it has 
never been shown that this energy is released violently. If these openings 
were created or enlarged instantaneously, then the resulting release of 
energy would. be violent ( Duvall, 1965 ) . But since the mining of openings 
is a slow process, the energy released daily by instantaneous mining-
induced displacements is far less than the amount of energy released by 
the blasting to create or expand these openings. If this were not so, every 
blast would be accompanied by a rock burst Since closure is a slow 
process, the energy released by displacements resulting from closure will 
be nonviolent There is no doubt that the largest amount of energy released 
by a rock burst is derived from the gravitational or stress field by instantan-
eous displacements towards an opening or broken vohune or rock; but a 
question remains regarding the mechanism· by which this process is started. 
For a specimen in a testing machine, closure of the platens results in 
compression of the specimen, causing strain energy to be stored in both 
the specimen and loading system. By virtue of this closure, an equal 
amount of potential energy is dissipated in the loading system. When the 
strength of the specimen is reached and the specimen fa& violently, it is 
apparent that this phenomenon has been started by the recoil or the release 
of the stored strain energy of the loading system. This suggests that in 
designing mine structures to control bursting, the accumulation of strain 
energy in and around such structures must also be considered. 
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In summary rock bursts have been adequately described and their 
effects known for some 70 years; rock-burst-prone mine structures- i.e., 
pillars, dikes, etc.- have been recognized; and the overall energy balance 
for a total mine system can be detemrined. Yet, the basic mechanics of 
rock bursts are unclear because little research has been directed tow::i.rds 
how a burst actually begins. No study to date has examined the sequence 
of events leading up to bursting, analyzed the stresses induced by mining, 
and determined the relative stiffness of the mine structure and loading 
system for an actual field example. 
SCOPE OF INVESTIGATION 
Study of the basic mechanics of rock bmsts requires a knowledge of 
the sequence of events leading up to and conhibuting to a bmst. To mini-
mize the variables, we must study a rock-burst environment as close to 
i deal as possible : the rock is nearly elastic; the mining method does not 
change; rock bursts do occur; ru:id there has been a burst history. The 
Galena Mine of the American Smelting and Re£ning Company at ·wallace, 
Idaho, was selected for study because it met ahnost all these requisites. 
Previous work in this mining district by the Bureau of Mines ( Blake 
and Leighton, 1970) had established the fact that the broad-band micro-
seismic method could be used to monitor rock-burst-prone mine structures. 
The source location of rock noise events could readily be obtained and 
used to map the location of sb"ess buildup around a stope as a burst was 
approached ( Leighton and Blake, 1970) . Hence, detailed broad-band 
microseismic monitoring of a rock-burst-prone stope began at the Galena 
Mine in November 1969 and continued through 1970. 
As a foundation for analytical studies on the mechanics of rock bursts, 
Brute-element stress-analysis model studies of the mining method at the 
Galena Mine were simulated on a computer. Results were correlated ,vi.th 
results of microseismic studies and observed field behavior ±o insure that 
the computer model agreed with actual field conditions. It was necessary 
to Jook at the geology, the physical properties of the mine rocks, and to 
determine the in situ state of scress so that input data and boundary condi-
tions could be provided for the model. 
The behavior of a rock specimen in both conventional and stilf-testing 
m achines was examined and applied to the observed and calculated be-
havior of an actual mine pillar under load because the geometry and load-
ing of a pillar at the Galena Mine are ahnost identical to the loading of a 
specimen in a testing machine. The relative stiffness of both the mine 
p illar and mine-loading system was detennined. 
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Finally, to complete this study, we interpreted the information as a 
hypothesis for the cause of rock bursts consistent with observed and cal-
culated data, and then tested this hypothesis in both the laboratory and 
field. 
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FIELD AND LABORATORY OBSERVATIONS 
The rocks in the Coeur d'Alene mining district are late Precambrian 
and are pxiroarily Belt series quartzites. They were originally shallow 
water sediments, metamorphosed to quartzi.tes, argillites, and pbyllites. At 
the Galena Mine, the host rock for the mineralized veins is the Revett 
formation, which consists mainly of thickly bedded to massive quartzites 
(Kesten, 1961). . 
GEoLOGrc SE'IT.!Nc 
As seen in figure 1, the dominant structural feature in the district is 
the Osburn fauJt zone. At the mine, the major structural feature is the 
Polaris fault zone. In addition to this major faulting, extensive minor 
bedding-plane fauJts are present in the silver vein aiea. ( See surface 
geology in figure 2 and a cross section through the main silver vein in 
figure 3.) 
The silver vein lies within a zone of parallel fractures some 300 feet 
in \Vidth. The vein material is predominantly siderite, the ore being 
argentiferous tetrahedrite and minor amounts of chalcopyrite. The vein 
is continuous over a horizontal distance of some 800 feet and a vertical 
extent of some 3000 feet, and is about 6 feet in width. This sheet-like body 
dips at an angle of some 70 degrees. 
For this study the geologic factors of importance are the thickly 
bedded to massive character of the Revett quartzite and the fact that the 
silver vein is situated in a highly fractured zone-on both local and regional 
scales-and that this fracturing is principally parallel to the silver vein. 
Rocx: PBOPERTIEs 
Extensive laboratory testing of rocks at the Galena Mine was done 
by Chan ( 1970 ), who divided the Revett formation into five main groups, 
as follows: 
group 1 - homogeneous, fine-grained massive quartzite 
group 2 - argillaceous, fine-grained thin-bedded quartzite 
group 3a - highly mineralized, medium-grained quartzite 
group Sb - low-mineralized, coarse-grained quartzite 
group 4 - homogeneous, medium-grained quartzite 
9 
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Figure 2.-Surface geolagy at the Galena Mine ( <>1ter Kesten, 1961). 
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Figure 3.-Vertical cross section throµgh silver vein at the Galena Mine ( after Kesten, 
i961) . 
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ROCK-BURST MECHANICS 13 
Results of uniaxial compressive tests are summarized in table I, and 
typical stress-strain curves are shown in figure 4. All rocks failed violently 
when stress in the rock exceeded its strength; however, the rocks of groups 
2 and 3b failed less violently than the rocks of groups 1, 3a, and 4. The 
compression machine used was a conventional hydraulic pres, - a "soft" 
testing machine. 
T.A13LE 1. - Physical properties of Galena A,firte -rock ( after Chan, 1970 ) 
Mean Mean modulus of Mean uniaxial 
Number of Poisson's elasticity oompressive 
Group specimens ratio ( v) (E ), x 10• psi strength (<re) , psi 
l 28 0.29 7.63 38,100 
2 12 0.27 L67 12,000 
3a 12 0.24 6.24 11,600 
Sb 12 0.28 1.78 15,300 
4 16 0.25 6.17 21,800 
Results of tria....ial tests on the group 1 rocks are summarized in table 2. 
As expected, the ultimate strength and modulus of elasticity increase mark-
edly with increasing confinement 
TABLE 2. - Physical properties of Galena Mine rock with confinement 
( after Chan, 1970 ) 
Mean modulus 
Number of Connning Mean ultimate of elasticity 
Group specimens stress, psi strength (<Tc), psi (E), X 10° psi 
1 28 0 3-3,100 7.63 
1 3 1,500 38,400 10.20 
1 2 2,000 46,600 22.45 
1 1 4,000 60,900 
Zn situ seismic velocities were determined over travel distances up to 
2000 feet The average P-..,vave and S-wave velocities were found to be 
19,400 fps and 12,200 fps, respectively. These values correspo_nd to an 
in situ Young's modulus of 11.5 x 10• psi and a :Poisson's ratio of 0.19. 
Elasl:ic moduli based on the seismic velocities were considered to be best 
estimates of the wall rock moduli at the Galena Mine smce they represent 
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RoCK-BUJ:lST MECHANICS 15' 
the entire block of rock between measurement points and fell within the 
range of values determined from laboratory tests. 
In summary, this quartzite wall rock is hard and brittle, and behaves 
primarily in a ]inear elastic manner. In addition, it is a competent and 
high-strength rock that fails violently in conventional, "soft," testing ma-
chines. Though the vein rocks are lower in strength, they also fail violently. 
IN Sr.ru STRESS 
Ageton ( 1967) used the overcore stress-relief method to determine 
the state of stress at a depth of 4000 feet in the Galena Mine. He found 
that 
(Ir_ =· -11,200 psi" 
er, = - 11,000 psi 
C1'z = - 8,900 psi 
Try = + 2,600 psi 
'T'yz = + 1,200 psi 
7'= = + 500 psi 
The virgin. rock stress could not be inferred from these figures s.-ince this 
te.st was performed in a high-stress zone created by mining. However, 
these results do suggest the presence of a high horizontal stress. To de-
termine the in situ stress, we measured overcore stress-relief away from 
the influence of the mined-out portions of the silver vein. 
A site was selected on the 4300 level ( some 6000 feet below surface ) 
3000 feet east of the silver vein. Measurements were to be made in three 
holes to determine the complete state of stress. However, owing to severe 
core discing, usable results were obtained for only one bole. These results 
gave a verti.cal stress of -7300 psi and a horizontal stress of -6500 psi. 
The vertical stress agrees well with the calculated overburden stress of 
-7100 psi, but the horizontal stress is greatly in excess (by approximately 
4100 psi) of that which can be accounted for by the Poisson's ratio effect. 
Based on these data and field observations, the stress field at the 
Galena Mine was interpreted to be essentially hydrostatic, and it was in-
ferred that the mine is in an active tectonic horizontal stress £eld. 
0 The minus sign will be used to denote compressive stress, 
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MINING METHOD 
The mining method at the Galena Mine is an overhand horizontal 
cut-and-fill system. A vertical longitudinal projection of the silver vein is 
shovm in figure 5. Stoping progresses upward from one level to another 
by a series of horizontal cuts. Each cut is mined by a series of 8-foot 
rounds, some 12 feet high. Mining in most stopes is on a single shift basis 
and the mining cycle consists of slushing and roof bolting, drilling, and 
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Figure 5.-Vertical longitudinal projectio.n of the silvec vein at the Galena Mine. 
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and the piIJar bursts. 
A staggered or starrstep mining method at present is used to :reduce 
the size of bursts and minimize the resulting hazard and damage. This 
stoping sequence minimizes the mining-induced stress concentrations by 
spreading out small pillars along a diagonally advancing front which 
avoids the higher stresses created by a long horizontal fiat-back pilla:r. 
This technique has allowed mining to continue and production to be main-
tained, but bursting still occurs as each pillar reaches a critical burst 
geometry. 
Though stope closures have not been measured, good estimates of 
closure can be made by observing the squeeze on sill drift timbering in 
mined-out areas. In an area on the 3000 level, which has been mined out 
for at }ea!,t 7 years with a mined-out a:rea of some 1000 feet by 500 feet, 
the sill drift is still open and passable, and the squeeze on drift timbering 
is less than l foot, indicating the highly elastic nature of the Galena Mine 
wall rock. 
RoCK-BURST HISTORY 
Rock bursting was flrst reported at the Galena Mine in 1956 when 
the top part of the silver vein was being mined upward from the 2400 level 
to the 2200 level, and the £rst .flat-backed pillar was created. Bursting has 
continued to date with 128 large damaging bursts. To be reported as a 
large burst, enough damage must be done so that the burst area can be 
located and the damage mapped. A loss of production usually accompanies 
large bursts. Small bursts and bumps, which may occur almost daily with 
the blasting, and large bursts, which produce no visible damage to mine 
workings, are not reported because they cannot be located. 
Rock bursts also occur when geometric or geologic features concen-
trate stress in mine structures and this stress exceeds the strength of the 
structure. Of the 128 damaging bursts reported, some 90 have been classed 
as pillar bursts because the damage was concentrated in or associated with 
a pillar. Figure 6 is a plot of the number of piJlar bursts with respect to 
pillar size. It is apparent that when pillar size is reduced below 60 feet, 
an initial burst geometry is reached; and a critical btust geometry is 
reached when. the pillar size is reduced below 40 feet. 
No bursts have been reported or detected from old workings because 
the mining method results in essentially 100 percent extraction. Little if 
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Figure 6.-Incidence of damaging rock bursts. 
Ronnel E. Barrette, etal vs Helca Mining Co., etal Docket No. 43639 
150 
HECLA 009260 
336 of 1172 
no has ever been reiXlrl:ed 
Most bursting occurs along wit.1-i the mine blasting. A burst occurs 
when the change in geometry brought about by blasting produces a critical 
burst geometry. With electric blasting, bursts usually occur within a second 
or two after start of the rou.11d and almost always before the last delays 
of the round are fired. This feature further emphasizes the highly elastic 
response of the rock at Galena Mme. 
Strain energy is stored in the rock, owing to the gravitational and 
tectonic stress field acting on the rock at depth at the Galena Mine. When 
an underground excavation is made, both the stress and the strain energy 
per unit volume are concentrated in rock surrounding the opening. For the 
geometry of a pillar, where two or more openings are approaching each 
other, the stress and strain energy are further concentrated. The pillar fails 
when the average stress in the pillar exceeds the strength of the pillar. For 
the hard, brittle quartzites at the Galena Mine, this failure is usually sud-
den and violent, and results in a rock burst accompanied by release of 
large amounts of energy. 
H 009261 
The rnicroseismic method of detecting instability in underground 
mines, developed by the U. S. Bureau of Mines in the early 1940s ( Obert 
and Duvall, 1945), relies on the fact that as rock is stressed, strain energy 
is stored in the rock. The buildup of strain energy is accompanied by 
small-scale dispiacement adjushnents that release small amounts of seismic 
and, sometimes, acoustic energy. These small-scale disturbances, micro-
cracking, shearing, sliding and crushing of crystal grains, which can be 
detected with the aid of special geophysical equipment, are ci!Ied rnicro-
seisms or rock noises. 
MICBOSEISMIC MET:ann 
Early applications of this technique were based on counting rock 
noises generated within an entire rock structure, rather than studying 
specilic sections of that structure. A recent study by the U. S. Bureau of 
Mines (Blake and Duvall, 1969) has resulted in a new, broad-band micro-
seismic system ( fig. 7). This system consists of accelerometers as geophones, 
low-noise preamplillers, high-gain ampliliers, and an FM magnetic tape 
recorder. The associated test and analysis equipment consists of an oscillo-
scope, direct-v..:ri.te oscillograph, and a programmable electronic desk calcu-
lator. The :frequency response of the system is fl.at from 2 to 20,000 Hz; 
the noise level is less than 2.0 µv, and the dynamic range, including manual 
set attentuation, is greater than 100 db. Signals ,vith acceleration levels 
as low as 2 µ.g can be detected. 
Rocle noise source locations in the field have been more qualitative 
than quantitative, primarily because of an insufficient number of geophones 
and low recording speeds. Rock noise source locations can be calculated 
by a number of methods ( Leighton and Blake, 1970) provided that the 
seismic velocities, geophone coordinates, and arrival times of P- and S-
waves are 1.'1lown. 
Basically, three methods may be used to locate the source of a rock 
noise event. Two of the methods give unique mathematical solutions, and 
the third results in an approximate or best-fit solution. The mathematical 
solutions are based on ( 1) differences in first arrival of P-waves at flve 
geophones, and (2.) the travel ti.me differences of S-P-wave arrivals at 
four geophones. By using the standard distance equation 
21 
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Figure 7.-Broad-band microseistnic system. 
where 
a1, bi. c1 ~ i'h geopbone coordinates, 
d1= distance from source to ith geophone, 
x, y, z = unlcnown source coordinates, 
and the velocity-arrival time relationships 
di = V\'t}' (P-wave method) 
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and P- and S-wave velocities in direction f:rom source 
to each geophone, 
tf = relative times of the first arrival of the P-wave at each geophone, 
Atr" = differences in times of arrival of the S,wave and P-wave at. 
each geophone, 
three linear independent equations can be obtained and solved for the 
unknown. :x, y, z source coordinates. The approximate solutions are based 
on trial and error, iterative type procedures when Jess than the required 
number of geophones for an exact solution is used, and a least squares pro-
cedure when more than the required number of geophones is used. 
A :field study in the Coeur d'Alene district (Blake and Leighton, 
1970), using this new mforoseisrnic system and source location techniques, 
showed that rock noise source locations could be accurately calculated in 
three-dimensional space, and that cumulative plots of source location 
densities delineated and mapped areas of increasing stress. At the Galena 
Mine, it was found that these areas of inferred hlgh stress were potential 
rock-burst zones (fl.g. 8). The numbers in figure 8 refer to the number 
of rock noises located at a particular point. These numbers have been 
contoured to show rock noise somce location densities, indicating zones 
of inferred high stress. Besides locating potential rock-burst zones, analysis 
of data suggested that the microseisr:nic method might be used to study 
the sequence of events leading up to bursting in burst-prone mine struc-
tures. 
MICROSE1SMIC FIELD MoNITOBING 
A stope, which was approaching an initial pillar-bmst geometry, was 
selected for study. Figure 9 is an isometric projection of the Galena Mine, 
indicating the stope, 40-185 E, and the location of geophones. Micro-
seismic monitoring of this stope began in November of 1969, when the 
stope pillar was 60 feet thick One small burst had occurred wjfu the blast-
ing in September of 1969, when the pillar was some 80 feet thick. From 
the reported damage, and from spalled rock on the west wall of the raise 
and along the 3700-level drift west of the raise, the burst source location 
was inferred to be west of the stope in the solid rock. No damage was re-
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ported in the stope or along the sill drift 
Field monitoring procedures consisted of recording daily during the 
·working week from 2:00 to 2:45 p.m. Day shift mine blasting was at 
2:20 p.m. Seismic velocities were computed from the daily blasting, using 
shot-time contactors. Analysis procedru·es consisted of scanning the record-
ed tapes to determine where the data were located, making expanded time-
sca1e oscillographic records of recorded events, calculating rock noise source 
locations using the desk computer, and plotting coordinates of located 
events. An event, to be located, had to be detected and recognized on at 
least five channels. A typical record of a rock-noise event and its location 
analysis is shown in flgme 10. All the data analysis was perfo1med under-
ground and kept c1ment. In addition, the stope and sill drift were in-
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Figure 10.-Typical microseismic record and location analysis. 
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Two are 
longitudinal vertical projection and a cross section through the center of 
the stope-so that the rock uoise source locations can be seen in three di-
mensions. The pillar size was reduced from 60 to 36 feet, indicated on 
figure 11 by dashed lines. These data indicate that the pillar had not yet 
reached a critical burst geometry. The zones of inferred high stress are 
around the bottom of the stope and away from the stope \Valls. t~a indi-
cations of a stress buildup in the pillar were detected or observed. 
During the latter part of February 1970, while the stope was being 
slushed out and backfilled with sand, no locatable rock noises were detect-
ed during recording times. This is usual at the Galena Mine and indicates 
the high degree of elasticity of the rock. That is, rock noises are generated 
during and immediately after blasting because of the change in geometry, 
but equilibrium is quickly reached; hence, few rock noises are generated 
during slushing and sand.filling. 
A comparison of data from seismic velocity surveys on February 2 
and March 4:, 1970, given in table S, did suggest that stress in the pillar 
had increased because of its reduced size. As expected, those geophone 
locations in the immediate pillar in-ea showed the largest velocity increases. 
TABLE 3. - Seismic r;elocities, 40-135 E stope 
Feb. 2, 1970, Mar. 4, 1970, 
Geophone velocity, fps velocity, 
1 19,699 20,101 
2 18,403 20,406 
s 19,397 20,519 
4 20,221 
5 20,419 21,325 
6 20,424 20,535 
7 contactor 0 contactor 
0 A shot-time contad:or was used to put a spike on the tape wheo the velocity survey 
charge was detonated. 
An 8-foot backstope round was pulled in the back 30 feet of the pillar 
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pillar 
visual indications of stress in the 
The back part of the started popping audibly on the afternoon 
of March 5, 1970. Output from the geophones close to the stope indicated 
that the slope was becoming unstable; hence, the miners were removed 
from the stope and held out. At 6:45 a.m. on the next day, March 6th, a 
bms-t occurred in the back part of the m IDJS stope. rne en:eccs of 
this burst in the stope and along the sill drift over the pillar-typical of 
the damage resulting from a small pillar burst-are shown in figure 13. 
35d,--------------. 
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Figure 12.-Rock noise source locations, March 4, 1970, 40-135E, with relative 
intensity contours. 
SEQUBt';'CE OF EVENTS LEADING UP TO BURSTING 
Tbe behavior of the pillar in 40-lSo"E stope, as it was mined to a 
critical burst geometry, was almost identical to the behavior of the four 
other stope pillars that have been monitored at the Galena Mine since 
1988-all of which burst. Hence, based on rnicroseismic monitoring, a 
dennite sequence of events has been observed to take place prior to a 
pillar burst at the Galena Mine. 
009270 
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ROCK-BURST MECRANICS 31 
"When a stope pillar is greater than 75 feet io thickness, little rock 
noise is generated by blasting. The locatable events are scattered around 
the stope area. As the pillar is reduced b e1ow 60 feet, reaching an initial 
burst geometry, the rock noises generated by blasting tend t o concentrate 
around the bottom of the stope and out around tlie slope wails at about 
stope height, obvious zones of high stress concentration. As the pillar size 
is reduced to a critical burst geometry, below 40 feet, the number and 
magnitude of rock noises generated by blasting increases. Minor bursting 
may occur around the bottom and unmined end of a stope. Up until this 
time, · few rock noises have had their origin in the pillar area. Once the 
pillar reaches a critical burst geometry, some 35 feet, most of the rock 
noises are now generated from the immediate pillar area. The pillar almost 
always bursts during this cul 
These data suggest that the average stress in the pillar increases only 
gradually until the pillar size is reduced below 40 feet, when average 
stress in the pillar increases greatly. The £act that rock noises do occur 
prior to this inferred large stress increase in the pillar suggests that small 
localized areas around the stope are under a high stress because of geologic 
or geometric effects. This pattern is consistent \Vith the observations on 
damaging bursts with respect to pillar size, as shown in figure 6. 
HECLA 009272 
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Finite-element stress-analysis computer model studies were made of 
the mining method to gain insight into the stress distribution around a stope 
pillar. 
The finite-element technique is based on the displacement or stiffness 
method of analysis developed by structural engineers for the aircraft in-
dustry ( Clough, 1960). A continuous solid is modeled by a mesh of a 
finite number of elements interconnected at corner or nodal points. This 
physical idealization of a solid as an assemblage of finite elements involves 
no mathematical approximation. The only approximation is in assuming 
a displacement function for each element. The usual procedure is to use 
a linear displacement function which results in plane sections remaining 
plane after deformation. The finite-element solution does converge to the 
exact solution as element size is reduced to a point. 
Derivation of the finite element matrix equilibrium equation 
..,. ..,. 
(£) = [k] (u) (4) 
has been sh.own to be a linearization of the Navier displacement equilibri-
um equations of classical elasticity (Blake, 1966). In this equation, nodal 
~ ~ 
point forces ( f) are related to nodal point displacements ( u) by the stiff-
ness matrix of the system [k]. Equation ( 4) is simply a generalization 
of the one-dimensional force-spring-displacement relationship 
f = kx. (5) 
Once geometry and material properties are defined for each element, 
this equation is solved, taking into account initial and boundary conditions 
for a particular problem. Solutions are in the form of nodal point stresses 
and displacements and element stresses. 
T.he method achieves its great versatility from the fact that each 
element can have completely different material properties, and, in addition, 
any stress-strain relationship may be used. Thus, nonhomogeneitie.s and 
anisotropies are easily taken into account. Finally, since the stiffness matrix 
:is completely general, any geometry or shape can be modeled. 
33 
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A large-scale, high-speed digital computer is required, owing to the 
large number of elements normally required to adequately model most 
practical problems. A CDC S800 with 65K word storage was used in this 
study. 
Sn.1UL"-TION OF 1VfINING IN 40-135E STOP£ 
The mining of 40-135E stope was simulated on the computer because 
data from microseisrnic monitoring had shown a characteristic sequence 
of events leading up to rock bursting. The stope cross section and the .finite 
element idealization are shown in figure 14. Material properties for the 
vein and wall rock were based on the work of Chan ( 1970) and on field 
measurements. Properties of the sand backfill were based on a study by 
Nicholson and Busch ( 1968). Material properties for the model are given 
in table 4. 





Compacted sand backfill 
Young's modulus 











Based on the in situ stress determination and the influence of the mined-out 
portion of the silver vein in the vicinity of 40-135E stope, a hydrostatic 
stress of -7500 psi was used as the stress boundary conditions for the 
model. Uniform displacements were applied to the boundaries of the 
model which produced this stress state. A plane strain section across the 
vein was considered to be representative of the way in which a stope is 
subjected to load because of the geometry of the silver vein. 
The model stope was mined in a series of ££teen IO-foot cuts. Each 
cut was backfilled with co~pacted sand, and blasting fractures were simu-
lated in the stope walls -and back prior to beginning the next cut. ( Material 
properties used and the extent of the fractured zone surrounding this stope 
were based on seismic velocity surveys through fractured rock around 
other stopes and mined openings at the mine.) The material properties of 
the model stope were changed before each computer run. 
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36 QUARTERLY OF THE CoLORADO SCHOOL OF MINES 
Results from this simulated mining of 40-135E stope are shown in 
.figure 15. The maximum principal stress u.,,.r and the average stress 
er in the pillar are plotted against pillar thiclmess. :Both the maximum 
stress and the average stress in the pillar do not significantly begin to in-
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Figure 15.-Variations of stress in the J)illar with mining. 
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crease until the pillar size is less than 50 feet, and the highest stresses 
occur when the pillar thickness is some 35 feet. As the pillar size is reduced 
to less than 20 feet, both stresses decrease rapidly, owing to the blast-
fractured zones joining. Comparison of these result$ with figure 6 indicates 
that the model results agree with the observed .field behavior of a pi!Jar. 
Ma,,.'imum .shear stress contours foe the critical 35-foot pillar are 
shown in figure 16. In addition to the obvious high stress concentration 
in the pillar area, note that the stress is also concentrated around the 
3700 Level ~ 
4000 Level 
Figure 16.-Maximum shear stress contour plots for 30-foot pillar, 1000 psi contour 
interval. 
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bottom of the stope and out around the stope walls. The agreement of 
these data with the rock noise source locations for this stope is also readily 
apparent ( figs. 11 and 12) . 
Small failures occur when the maximum p1incipal stress in and around 
the pillar e.~ceeds the strength of the rock locally. These failures generate 
rock noises and small rock bursts. A large failure occurs and results in a 
rock burst when the average stress in the pillar exceeds the strength of the 
piliar or of a large portion of the pillar. Based on the unconfined com-
pressive strength of the rock, pillar bursting will begin when the pillar size 
is reduced below 50 feet. It is apparent from results shown in table 3 that 
confinement will increase the strength of the rock in the pillar, but little 
£eld data regarding detailed material properties of the pillar were avail-
able; hence, no attempt was made to model the effects of confinement on 
the pillar. 
It is interesting to note that the maximum stress computed for the 
sand.fill is only -850 psi. Thus the sandfi.Iling, while helping to minimize 
the damage from a rock burst, does not cany enough load to reduce the 
critical high stresses created in the pillar, and, therefore, has little effect on 
reducing the incidence of bursting. 
The data from both microseismic monitoring and finite element model-
ing agree well ·with the observed behavior of stope pillars at Galena Mine, 
and explain the sequence of events leading up to bursting. However, these 
results only confirm what was already obvious-when the average sttess 
in the pillar exceeds its strength, the pillar bursts. 
Something else must be considered-the re1ath1e sti.Jfness of the pillar 
and the loading system at failure-to detennine why a pillar fails violently 
instead of nonviolently. 
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CONCEPT OF MINE STIFFNESS 
In recent years it has been recognized that to interpret results correctly 
for rock specimens loaded in a testing machine, the properties of the testing 
machine itself must be considered. Many of the modes of failure observed 
i,.,. failed test specirnens are a .result of the characteristics of the testing 
machine and are not inherent rock properties. These additional effects 
must be eliminated to detenniue the true rock response. 
EXPERTh1:ENTAL RESULTS ON TEST SPEC!MENS 
A normal testing machine consists-typically of many elements (platens, 
cross-heads, screv;'S, frame, hydraulic system, etc.); each contributes to 
the overall properties of the machine, and, in turn, affects the specimen 
being tested. The most important characteristic of a testing machine is its 
stiffness, that is, the rigidity of the loading system, taldng into account all 
its components. Recent studies by Cook aod Hojem (1966) and Wawersik 
( 1968) have shown that the behavior of rocks tested in conventional testing 
machines was surprisingly different from the behavior of the same rocks 
tested in a rigid or stiff testing machine. Rocks that failed violently in 
conventional or soft testing machines were found to fail nonviolently in a 
stiff testing machine. This result has led to an examination of the effects of 
relative stiffness of the specimen and loading system on specimen behavior. 
Since a rock specimen and a testing machine are made up oE basically 
elastic members, elastic strain energy is stored in each as a specimen is 
loaded by a testing machine. The amount of strain energy stored in each is 
inversely proportional to its stiffness, i.e., the softer of the nvo stores, the 
greater amount. The strain energy per unit volume in fue specimen is 
given by 
where 
w = strain energy stored 
c; = stress 
k = stiffness 
(6) 
a and l = cross-sectional area and length of the specimen, respectively 
89 
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When the applied stress reaches the specimen strength, it is the relative 
stiffness of each that determines the mode of failure-violent or nonviolent. 
(See .6g. 17.) 
For case a, where the stiffness of the specimen is greater than the 
stiffness of the loading system, /k.j> !kij, violent failure occurs when 
stress in the specimen reaches its strength because there is sufficient strain 
energy available in the loading system to continue to load the specimen; 
hence, this recoil of the machine destroys the specimen. Such is the case 
when Galena Mine rocks are tested to failure in a conventional or soft 
testing machine. 
For case b, where, jk1 1>!k./, a nonviolent failure occurs because 
the stored strain energy available is not sufficient to deform the specimen 
further until additional load is applied by the testing machine. 
The stiffness of a mine pillar and the loading system at the mine were 
studied since the geometry and loading of a stope pillar at Galena Mine 
are essentially identical to the geometry of a specimen loaded in a testing 
machine. The results of the .6nite element computer model studies, stresses 
and displacements were determined for every element and nodal point in 
the model; these results were used to compute the stiffness of the pillar 
and loading system as the pillar was mined." Remember that the only 
boundary conditions used in the model were the constant displacements 
applied to the model boundaries. 
PILLAR STIFFNESS V ERSUS LoA.DI"NG SYSTEM STIFFNESS 
By using the stresses and displacements from the simulated computer 
mining of 40-135E stope, the stiffness of the stope pillar for a unit length 
was calculated by 
(7) 
where 
f1 ::;;; total force on the pillar 
u1 = resulting average pillar displacement 
The force on the pillar was obtru.ned by swnming the stress in all elements 
acting on the pillar, determining the average stress acting on the pillar, 
and multipl>iing this average stress by pillar length to obtain the total force 
~ Lack of data on the complete stress-strain curve for Galena Mine rocks resulted in 
assuming that their complete stress-strain curve is symmetric, 
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42 QuART.EBLY OF THE CoLOI\..illO SCHOOL OF MINES 
f1 acting on the pillar. Nodal point displacements along the pillar length 
were summed, and the average pillar displacement a1 was determined. The 
pillar sillfness kll was computed in this manner for every 20-foot increment 
of piUar size. One pillar configuration and the resulting pillar compression 
and stope wall closure are shown in figure 18. The computed pillar stiff-
ness is given in units of Ib/in. per inch of stope length because the com-
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Figure 18.-Compression of pillar a.rid stope wall displacements. 
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total 
A W = 0, because of the constant displacement conditions on 
the modeL Thus the stiffness of the loading system· can be ca1cclated from 
the relationship 
Af f1 - f2 
k1 =-- =---
AU U1 - U2 
(8) 
where 
fi and U1 = force and displacement previously determined for the 
rock pillar 
fz and u2 = force and displacement:, determined in the same manner, 
fur the sand-filled pillar 
See figure 18 for the resulting displacements for the sand-filled pillar. The 
loading system stiffness was also computed for every 20-foot increment of 
pillar thickness and is given in units of lb/in. per inch of stope length. 
This manner of computation results in the loading system stiffness having 
a negative slope that conesponds to the unloading system stiffness. 
The relationship of the pillar stiffness kl> to the loading system stiffness 
jk1 I as the pillar was mined is shown in figure 19. The stiffness of the pillar 
is greater than the stiffness of the loading system until the pillar size is 
reduced to less than 20 feet-where the effect of the simulated blast frac-
tures serves to soften the pillar. 
These data indicate that the pillar-loading system stiffness relationship 
is unstable tmtil the pillar size is reduced below 20 feet In other words, 
a burst will occur in the pillar ro:ea any time the average stress in the 
pillar exceeds the strength of the pillar, until the pillar size is reduced 
below 20 feet. The aforementioned relationship can occur more than 
once-depending on the geometry of the pillar-because the pillars are 
roughly 100 feet long, which explains the occurrence of more than one 
burst in a pillar. That this is the case at the Galena Mine is apparent from 
observations on bursts. 
EFFECT OF GEOLOGY 01'1" MlNE ST1FFNESS 
The calculated stiffness of the pillar and mine loading system repre-
sent upper limits of stiffness since the £nite element results are based on 
a.r1 elastic anaiysis. The effects of folding, faulting, iointing, fracturing, 
inhomogeneity, and :inelasticity will all tend to reduce the stiffness of 
H 009283 
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both the pillar and mine-loading system. The effect of connnemeut has 
not been considered in this study. The mine-loading system involves a 
much larger volume of rock; as a result, its stiffness will be affected to a 
greater extent because the system will probably contain a larger number 
of stiffness-reducing features. This will also be true for any mine structure 
and mine-loading system stiffness relationship. 
- . ... ·· ········- ···-~ 
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MECHANICS OF ROCK BURSTS 
Sufficient information has nov., been obtained to deduce the mechanics 
of rock bursts and to present a hypothesis for the cause of rock bursting 
consistent with field observations of these phenomena. 
HYPOTHESIS FOR THE CAUSE OF Rocr BURSTING 
As mine structures are created by the excavation of underground 
openings, they disturb the gravitational and tectonic stress fields, resulting 
in stress and the strain energy per unit volume being concentrated in the 
mine or rock structure surrounding the opening. V\/ben stress in the rock 
sh11cture reaches the strength of the rock, the rock fails, owing to geometric 
and geologic effects or because of depth, etc. If the rock structure is stiffer 
than that of the applied loading system, available stored strain energy in 
the loading system instantaneously loads the rock structure further, causing 
it to fail violently in the form of a rock burst. Since a rock burst fractures 
a volume of rock, which is instantaneously destressed, and so thought of 
as an opening being created, a large volume of rock is instantaneously 
displaced towards this opening, resulting in energy being released suddenly 
and violently. 
The fact that stress in the rock exceeds the strength of the rock is 
necessary, but is not in itself sufficient to cause a rock burst. In addition, 
the stiffness of the rock or rock structure must exceed the stiffness of the 
loading system so that the available stored strain energy of the latter is 
released io destroy the structure. 
This hypothesis applies not only to hard, brittle rocks under high 
stress, but also to soft, brittle rocks under moderate stress which suggests 
an explanation for such things as coal bumps. Though pillars have always 
been associated with rock bursts, they are just the most prominent geometry 
of any number of rock-burst-prone geometries, such as the headings of 
shafts, raises and drifts, remnants, longwall faces, drift intersections, etc. 
A field test to confirm this hypothesis for the cause of rock bursting 
was carried out at Galena 11.iue. 
FIELD TEST OF BURST HYPOTHESIS 
After burst damage to the stope, sill drift and raise was repaired and 
47 
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the mining of the remaining pillar in 40-135E stope reslli'Tied, · data from 
microseismic monitoring indicated that another potential burst zone had 
developed in the central part of the pillar. The geometry of the pillar, 
now some 30 feet in thickness, and rock noise source location densities 
are shown in figure 20. These data and past experience in monitoring 15 
bursts at Galena lv:line indicated that .further mining, that is, reducing 
pillar size to increase stress in the pillar, would result in another rock burst. 
If the hypothesis developed for the cause of bursting is correct, then 
this potential burst could be prevented by reducing the average stress in 
the pillar to a value well below the strength of the rock in the pillar, or by 
reducing pillar stiffness to a value less than the stiffness of the loading 
system. It would appear that destressing the pillar by fracturing would 
affect both desired results. 
Work in South Africa by Hill and Plewman ( 1957) bad indicated 
that destressing was effective in controlling rock bursting. More recent 
work :in South Africa by Cook and others ( 1966), however, implied that 
de.stressing is not an effective means of controlling rock bursting. This 
observation was based on seismic monitoring of destressing rounds which 
indicated that all of the seismic energy detected was due to explosives. 
They postulated that for destressing to be effective,, a larger amount of 
seismic energy would be released, indicating that strain energy from the 
stress field was involved which reduces the stress and the energy available 
for bursting. 
Strain energy from the stress field is released any time a blast occurs 
because instantaneous creation or enlargement of an opening causes dis-
placements towards that opening, although the volume of rock is u,sually 
small. Thus, the strain energy released is Jess than the energy released by 
the explosive itself; hence the strain energy is not usually reco~ed. If 
we use the results of Duvall and Stephenson ( 1965 ), the seismic energy 
released by detonating a cubic foot of explosive is l.4 x 107 ft-lb, whereas 
the amount of seismic energy released from the stress £.eld ( for an assumed 
modulus of rigidity of 4.0 x 10° psi, a vol\.)l!le of rock of 5.0 x 1()3 :ft3 and 
a hydrostatic compressive stress of 7500 psi) is 1.0 x 10' ft-Jb, an order of 
magnitude less than the energy from the explosive. 
Destressing of the pillar in 40-1S5E stope was simulated in the oom· 
puter model by red~cing the elastic modulus of the ve:in rock from 
5.75 x 10° psi to 1.0 x 10• psi ( determined by seismic velocities in fractured 
rock). The resulting maximum shear stress contours, which indicate a 
large reduction in the pillar stress concentration, are shown in figure 2.1. 
( See fig. 16 for comparison. ) The value of the maximum principal stress 
in the pillar has been reduced to -9900 psi, and the average stress in the 
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Figure 21.-Mai.imtun shear stre.<:s contour piots for 30-foot pillar, 1000 psi contour 
jnterval. 
pillar has been reduceq. to - 6~00 psi. These data indicate that fracturing 
the pillar- is certainly effective in reducing stress in the pillar. 
The stiffness of the pillar prior to destressing was 7.8 x 10° lb/in. per 
inch of stope Jength, and the absolute value of tl,ie stilfne55 of theJoading 
system WBS 3..4 X 10'' lb/ in. per inch of stope ]engt.11 V,hich indicated the 
pillar was burst prone. After d1:Stressing, tfie stiffness of the pillar was 
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reduced to 2.8 x 10" lb /in. per inch of stope length, which indicates that 
the pillar-loading system stiffness relationship is now stable, and, as a 
result of destressing, the pillar is no longer burst prone. 
Based on these results, the pillar in 40-135E stope was destressed by 
blasting a series of 20-foot long holes, 11~-inch-diameter, drilled in the foot-
wall of the vein on 5-foot centers. These holes were loaded within 5 feet 
of the sill and 3 feet from the collar with AN prill and fired with milli-
second delays. See figure 22 for the pillar and destress hole pattern. 
Seismic veiocity surveys through the piliar were carried out to de-
termine the effectiveness of the destress round in fracturing the pillar. Since 
seismic velocity is proportional to the effective elastic modulus of and to 
the stress level in the rock, any decrease in seismic velocity would indicate 
a decrease in elastic modulus, hence a softening of the pillar and a cor-
responding reduction in stress level. Though seismic velocity is also in-
versely proportional to the density of the rock, the effect of density changes 
is small compared to changes io effective elastic modulus and stress level. 
The seismic velocity survey shot holes ( fig. 22) were loaded with a 
half stick of 45-percent dynamite and a shot-time contactor, and were 
detonated. These blasts were recorded, the seismic velocities from each 
shot location to each geophone were computed, and, based on these data, 
a seismic velocity contour map of the pillar was compiled. This survey 
was repeated after the destre.ss round was fired. The re.rul.ts of these semnic 
velocity surveys are shown in .figure 23. The reduction io seismic velocity 
produced by destressing indicates that the pillar has beeu fractured and 
its effective modulus and stiffness have been r educed; therefore, it is in-
ferred that stress in the pillar has also been reduced. The bigh stress acting 
on the pillar area has been transferred to a low stress acting over a large 
area-spread out around the stope and in the sandfill. 
Though no closure pins were instaJled in the stope or sill drift over 
the pillar, an order-of-magnitude approximation of sill drift closure from 
the destress round could be obtained by inspecting the squeeze on timber-
ing along the sill drift. Subsequent to the March 6, 1970 burst, the drift 
had been retimbered, and the new posts, caps, and wedges showed no 
signs of taking any load prior to the destress round. As a result of destress-
ing, posts were punched up into caps and the blocks and wedges on the 
caps showed up to 0.5 inch of closure. This amount of closure agrees 
with the predicted closure for this location from the computer model, 0.25 
inch. The pillar compression and stope closure from the computer model-
ling of the. destressiog are shown in £gure 24. A large amount of stored 
strain energy from the pillar area bas been released nonviolently because 
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Figure 24..-Compression of pillru- and slope wall closures resulting from destressing. 
of this closure. Insufficient data on the actual closure and the two-dimen-
sional character of the model precluded calculating the amount of energy 
released by destressing. 
The success of destressing :is attested to since the pillar was mined to 
completion without incident. No bwnps or bursts occurred, and the few 
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In addition to confuming the hypothesis developed for the cause of 
rock bursting, the results also show that to be effective in controlling or 
eliminating bursting, the factors contributing to bursts must be controlled 
or substantially morlified. Those techniques th.at have been successfol in 
minimizing bursting, namely long-wall techniques and destress:ing, have 
resulted in modifying stress in the structure and the relative stctfness rela-
tionship of the structure and the loading system. 
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SUGGESTIONS FOR MINE DESIGN 
The procedures developed in this study can be used to design mines 
or mine structures so that rock bursting can be controlled. Plane stress/ 
strain finite element stress analyses can be used to model mine structures 
and mining methods adequately and economically because rock bursts 
are almost exclusively associated \:Vith tabular-like ore bodieS. Since 
stresses and displacements are obtained for every point in the structure, 
these data can be used to find the average stress in the structure and the 
stiffness relationship of the structure and the loading system to determine 
if the structure ·will be burst prone. 
The data needed to develop a £mite-element model for a new mine 
can be obtained from diamond drilling. The geometry and extent of the 
orebody can be delineated by drilling. The physical properties of the 
ore and wall rocks can be determined from laboratoiy tests on core speci-
mens in both conventional and still testing machines, including whether 
or not specimens fail violently in conventional testing machines. The in 
situ state of stress can be inferred from a structural analysis of the drill 
cores and estimated from hydrofracturing tests in the bore holes. These 
data can then be used for the model properties, boundary and initial condi-
tions. Different mining methods and mine structures can be simulated by 
this computer model, using a trial-and-error approach to determine mine 
structures and mining methods which, in theoiy, are not burst prone. In 
addition, the effectiveness of different support systems for various mining 
methods can be evaluated in the same manner. 
For the steeply dipping, sheet-like veins of the Coeur d'Alene mining 
district, bursting could be readily controlled by mining these veins from 
their bottom up, using a stair-stepped longwall-type heading. If and when 
stress ahead of the face exceeds the average strength of the rocks, the face 
could then be destressed by blasting to conb:ol bursting. For existing mines, 
where present mining methods may not be changed or modifled eco-
nomically, bursting in burst-prone mine structures can be controlled by 
destressing these structures. However, to destress successfully, the destress 
hole must be in the right place ( where the stress is concentrated) and the 
rock sufficiently fractured. These zones of high stress can be located by the 
broad-band microseismic technique. 
In addition to pillar destressing, destress blasting ahead of the face 
in development headings, shafts, raises, and drifts is now being successfully 
and routinely performed in the mines of the Coeur d'Alene mining district. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
When the average stress in any mine srtucture is excee<led, the struc-
ture fails. Whether this failure is violent or not depends on tbe relative 
stiffness of the mine structure and mine-loading system. For the case of 
structure stiffness greater than loading system stiffness, the failure is violent 
and results in a rock burst. In other words, the stored strain energy in the 
loading system is released instantaneously at failure and thru; drives the 
structure to violent destruction. A rock burst fractures and destresses a 
large volume of rock which can be thought of as the instantaneous creation 
of an opening. The instantaneous displacements of the rock mass towards 
this opening cause additional energy from the gravitational and tectonic 
stress :field to be released violently. 
Rocks will burst in any rock structure when the following two condi-
tions are satisfied: ( 1) stress in the rock structure exceeds the strength of 
the structure, and ( 2) stiffness of the rock structure exceeds stiffness of 
the loading system. A rock burst can be prevented in any rock structure-
the inverse of our hypothesis- by the following: ( 1) reduce stress in the 
rock structure to a value below its strength, or ( 2) reduce stiffness of the 
rock structure to a value below the stiffness of the loadmg system. The 
two most effective means of rock-burst control to date-longwall-type 
mining systems and destressing by blasting-have been successful because 
they minimize the creation of high-stress zones, and they reduce the stress 
and stiffness of rock-burst-prone mine structures, respectively. 
Broad-band microseismic monitoring provides quantitative informa-
tion about the behavior of a rock structure under load. It is an invaluable 
tool in detecting, delineating, and estimating the stability of potential 
failure zones in rock. structures. In deep mines, zones of inferred high 
stress can be pinpointed in three-dimensional space. Though the rock 
bursts during this study had their foci in these inferred high-stress zones, 
not all of these zones experienced bursts. 
The furite-element method of stress analysis can be used to model the 
behavior of mine structures under load, and to simulate mining methods. 
The reslllting stresses and displacements computed by this technique can 
be used to detennine and to design mine structures and methods which 
can control rock bursting. 
While the results of this study have been based on an analysis of rock 
bursting in an ideal geometry and particular environment, we suggest 
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that the hypothesis developed and presented for the cause of rock bursting 
applies to both bard and soft rock environments, and thus explains both 
rock bursts and coal bumps. 
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Now that a general model for the mechanics of rock bursting has been 
developed, additional studies deal1.'1g with specialized of the :rock-
burst phenomenon should be carried out to develop further this model. 
More extensive fleld and laboratory testing of mine rocks is necessary 
so that the material !lloperties used in fulite elen1eut rnodels ate 1riore 
realistic. In situ deformation moduli should be determined at critical 
points in mine sb:uctures so that the effects of conflnernent can be included. 
To conflrrn the computer results for the behavior of particular mine 
structures, both stresses and displacements should be monitored in and 
around burst-prone mine structures as mining progresses. These data 
should be used as boundary conditions for the models where discrepancies 
ex:ist between calculated and measured behavior. 
If we use a more detailed finite element model of a rock-burst-prone 
structure, it should be possible to model the effects oE a burst and compute 
the energy released. This number can be compared to calculations-ob-
tained from seismic data-of the actual energy released. From these data, 
we can determine the volume of rock in a burst 
Modes of failure initiation in mine structures have never been exam-
ined completely. Insight into the modes of failure of mine structures 
under multiru..iaJ loading can be gained by using stiff testing machines 
and the complete stress-strain curves for model mine structures. Results 
of such studies could also be used to reftne further the computer models. 
Finally, while this \vork has been concerned only with rock bursts in 
hard rocks, these results should be extended to include coal bumps. 
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November 29, 2011 
The pillar surrounding the 5900 main drift at the 30 vein location sustained major damage after 
a large rockburst that occurred at 1:07 a.m. on November 16th. The burst caused approximately 
12 feet of the back to fail and damaged both ribs. 
Repair of the area is planned in 2 stages. The primary or initial stage is to bolt and shotcrete 
the area. The long-term or secondary stage is to install a steel tunnel liner through the vein 
area of the drift and fill the void above and around the forms with Techfoam. 
The initial stage of repair has been completed. 12 ft dywidags have been installed in the back 
on a 4ft x 4ft pattern and 20 foot cable bolts were installed on a 6 ft x 6ft pattern. Wire fencing 
was installed with 4ft and 6ft with splits sets. The ribs have been wired and bolted with 8 ft 
dywidags on a 4ft x 4ft pattern, and 6 ft and 4ft split sets. The entire area was then shotcreted 
to a depth of 2 to 3 inches. The amount of ground support that has been installed is far more 
substantial than the original support installed when the drift was driven in 2005. 
The secondary long term repairs are still being engineered, but in general, a steel tunnel liner 
will be installed through the area (approximately 35 ft in length). The tunnel liner that is being 
considered is typically used for highway construction. Once the liner is installed and the ends 
sealed, Techfoam will be blown in from the ends or through ports in the liner to fill the void. 
This Techfoam is a foamed concrete type product that has an approximately 25 psi compressive 
strength. The Techfoam will be able to absorb any wall squeeze and cushion any potential 
damage from rockbursting without compromising the steel tunnel liner. 
The rockburst in the pillar is classified as a foundation failure, and not a classic pillar burst 
Wilson Blake's 5900 Drift Pillar memo). The burst likeiy caused closure across the 30 vein in the 
mined out areas above and below the 5900 level. The constant stress from closure is the 
contributing factor that is believed to have caused the pillar to burst. Although the pillar is still 
intact and is still carrying some load and stress, it is believe the majority of the stress was 
dissipated with the large rockburst and it will take months or years for the pillar to gain more 
stress that could cause any major rockbursts. In addition, the pillar is now smaller in size so it 
cannot carry the same load that caused this rockburst. 
was 40 on of fall to assure areas near 
the rockburst zone are stable. 12 ft dywidags were installed on a 4 ft x 4 ft pattern in the back 
and 8ft dywidags were installed on a 4ft x 4ft pattern in the ribs. 
The area of the rockburst is nov,1 stable and the mine \Voutd like to resume production. Final 
engineering of the tunnel liner should be complete by December 2nd. Fabrication and delivery 
is expected to take 2 weeks from the order date. Installation is expected to take 2 to 3 weeks, 
depending on Techfoam availability. The stage 2 long-term support should be complete by 
January ih. 
The stress meters that were originally installed in the pillar are no longer working since the 
rockburst. 6 new stress gauges will be installed, 2 in the back and 2 in each wall. The gauges 
will be installed inside 3 in diameter drill holes. The gauges in the back will be placed at 10 ft 
above the drift and the gauges in the ribs will be at a depth of 20 ft. The gauges are NX4300 
stress meters. We have 3 gauges on site and will be installed by Friday, December 2°d. The 
other 3 gauges are on order and will be shipped December ih. As soon as the other gauges 
arrive they will be instafled. In addition to the stress gauges, closure points will also be re-
established. Closure will be measured east-west across the drift and north-south across the 
vein until the tunnel liner is installed. 
A data collector will be used to gather the data from the stress meters. The original data 
collectors were destroyed in the rock burst and it is unknown at this time when a new data 
collector will be ready. The gauges will be read with a hand held meter once a month until the 
data collector is functional. Data from the data collector will be downloaded and analyzed 




December 1, 2011 
3 NX 4300 stress meters are being installed in the 30-vein pillar around the 5900 
main drift. An initial reading will be taken on dayshift, December 1st_ Since the 
stress meters monitor increases in stress, it is expected that the initial reading will 
be zero, or close to zero. Another reading will be taken on night shift December 
1st and again on dayshift December 2nd to establish a baseline. The frequency of 
taking readings can be determined based on the results of the stress meters. It is 
expected the stress will build slowly over time, and may take weeks or months to 
show any measureable increase in stress. 
We request the K order be modified to allow travel through the drift starting 
Friday, December 2nd to allow the services to the mine to be re-established. 
Power cables, water lines and compressed air lines need to be re-installed to 
provide services to the mine. Once the services are reconnected, the mine plans 
to resume production. 
The tunnel liner will be installed as soon as possible after it arrives on site. 
In addition to gathering stress data, the area will be visually inspected every shift 
by the underground supervisors. 
Ma ir 
December 2, 2011 
The 3 stress gauges have been installed into the 5900 main drift pillar. Readings were taken 
and the gauges show a small increase in stress, which is expected. We will continue to take 
readings every shift for 1 week. If the gauges indicate no appreciable build up of stress, then 
the gauges will be read once a week. The readings will be reviewed daily by mine personnel 
and our rock mechanics consultant. 
The rockburst area is now secure. Mine services such as chilled water, power and compressed 
air need to be restored through the area so the mine can be properly ventilated and cooled. 
Once the utilities are in place and operational, MSHA will evaluate the readings again prior to . 
using the 5900 main drift for normal travel. 
Because this rockburst was triggered during the designated blasting time, travel through the 
rockburst area will not be allowed until all the rounds have been shot. This is a precautionary 
measure, as we do not expect another rockburst. The mining crews will wait at the 5900 refuge 
chamber, which is on the north side of the rockburst area until 10 minutes after the rounds are 
blasted. There will be no travel through the rockburst area from light up time until 10 minutes 
following the last round. going off. We are also investigating going to a centralized blasting 
system, which would take some time to implement. 
The Con Tech tunnel liner was ordered on December 2 and is expected to arrive in 12 to 14 
days. The process of installing the liner will begin as soon as the materials arrive onsite. The 
Techfoam pumps and product are standing by, and will be ordered 1 week prior to use. 
Exhibit 12 
Bayer 
December 2, 2011 Update 
The pillar surrounding the 5900 main drift at the 30 vein location sustained major damage after 
a large rockburst that occurred at 1:07 a.m. on November 16th. The burst caused approximately 
12 feet of the back to fail and damaged both ribs. 
Repair of the area is planned in 2 stages. The primary or initial stage is to bolt and shotcrete 
the area. The long-term or secondary stage is to install a steel tunnel liner through the vein 
area of the drift and fill the void above and around the forms with Techfoam. 
The initial stage of repair has been completed. 12 ft dywidags have been installed in the back 
on a 4ft x 4ft pattern and 20 foot cable bolts were installed on a 6 ft x 6ft pattern. Wire fencing 
was installed with 4ft and 6ft with splits sets. The ribs have been wired and bolted with 8 ft 
dywidags on a 4ft x 4ft pattern, and 6 ft and 4ft split sets. The entire area was then shotcreted 
to a depth of 2 to 3 inches. The amount of ground support that has been installed is far more 
substantial than the original support installed when the drift was driven in 2005. 
The secondary long term plan will involve installing a steel tunnel liner through the area 
(approximately 28 ft in length}. The tunnel liner is a 2 flange system that bolts together. The 
corregated panels are 0.253 inches think and the liner will be 151 wide by 14'-02" high. Once 
the liner is installed and the ends sealed, Techfoam will be blown in from the ends or through 
ports in the liner to fill the void. This Techfoam is a foamed concrete type product that has an 
approximateiy 25 psi compressive strength. The Techfoarn will be able to absorb any wa!! 
squeeze and cushion any potential damage from rockbursting without compromising the steel 
tunnel liner. The liner will be installed as soon as it arrives on site. Approximately delivery date 
is December 14th. Completed installation with the foam is estimated to take S to 8 days. 
The rockburst in the pillar is classified as a foundation failure, and not a classic pillar burst {See 
Wilson Blake's 5900 Drift Pillar memo). The burst likely caused closure across the 30 vein in the 
mined out areas above and below the 5900 level. The constant stress from closure is the 
contributing factor that is believed to have caused the pillar to burst. Although the pillar is still 
intact and is still carrying some load and it is believe stress was 
dissipated with the large rockburst and it will take months or years for the pillar to gain more 
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which he as unlikely to occur. To insure long-term stability the 
drift through the pillar a permanent steel tunnel liner and Techfoam will be installed. 
The drift was also re-bolted for 40 feet on either side of the ground fall to assure the areas near 
the rockburst zone are stable. 12 ft dywidags were installed on a 4 ft x 4 ft pattern in the back 
and 8ft dywidags were installed on a 4ft x 4ft pattern in the ribs. 
The stress meters that were originally installed in the pillar are no longer working since the 
rockburst. 6 new stress gauges will be installed, 2 in the back and 2 in each wall. The gauges 
will be installed inside 3 in diameter drill holes. The gauges in the back will be placed at 10 ft 
above the drift and the gauges in the ribs will be at a depth of 20 ft. The gauges are NX4300 
stress meters. We have 3 gauges on site and were installed on December 15\ The readings 
taken on December 2°d indicate a small increase in stress, which is expected. We will continue 
to take readings every shift for 1 week. If the gauges indicate no appreciable build up of stress, 
then the gauges will be read once a week. The readings will be reviewed daily by mine 
personnel and our rock mechanics consultant. The other 3 gauges are on order and will be 
shipped December ih. As soon as the other gauges arrive they will be installed. In addition to 
the stress gauges1 closure points have been re-established. Closure will be measured east-west 
across the drift and north-south across the vein until the tunnel liner is installed. 
A data collector will be used to gather the data from the stress meters. The original data 
collectors were destroyed in the rock burst and it is unknown at this time. when a new data 
collector will be ready. The gauges wiH be read with a hand held meter until the data collector 
is functional. Data from the data collector will be downloaded and analyzed approximately 
every 60 days. 
The rockburst area is now secure. Mine services such as chilled water, power and compressed 
air need to be restored through the area so the mine can be properly ventilated and cooled. 
Once the utilities are in place and operational, MSHA will evaluate the readings again prior to 
using the 5900 main drift for normal travel. 
There are 6 power cables that need to be spliced and re-energized. Electricians will work from 
each side of the rockburst area, splice new cable to one end, pull the cable through the 
rockburst area, then splice the other end. Workers will limit their time in the rockburst area. 
Other utilities such as water and air lines will be reconnected using 6 inch HOPE pipe. These 
pipes are temporary and will be pulled through the area and connected on both and hu 
on the rib. Once the tunnel liner is in place, the permanent steel pipe lines will re-installed. 
chamber, which is on north side of the rockburst area until 10 minutes the 
rounds are blasted. There will be no travel through the rockburst area from light up time until 
10 minutes following the last round going off. We are also investigating going to a centralized 
system, which would take some time to implement. 
Exhibit 13 
bu 1r 
· Doug Bayer 
December 6, 2011 Update 
The 5700 level of 54 ramp that was damaged from the rockburst on 
November 16th has been repaired with 12 ft dywidag bolts on a 4 ft x 
4ft pattern and 20 ft grouted cable bolts on a 6 ft x 6 ft pattern. 
Because the span of the sublevel is wider than the original drift size 
when the level was developed, 10" x 10" timber posts will be installed 
near the original rib line. The timbers will be placed on 5 ft centers and 
secured to the rib and or back. Girts will also be installed between the 
posts. The inside corner of the ramp will have posts installed as well as 
the old substation cutout along the opposite drift. The old muckbay 
that angles off the sublevel will be filled with waste rock as tight to the 
back as possible. This waste muck will be installed to eliminate 
exposure to persons in that area. 
Travel through this area of 54 ramp will be limited to the crews working 
on the electrical lines and the required timber repair crews. The ramp 
also needs designated as a secondary escapeway, so emergency travel 
· will be allowed. 
The burst area on the 5900 main drift has been monitored for 
ovem with osu si ce m d non 
0 0 a 
me 
factors indicate th the pillar stable and not 'loading, up. 
The pillar will continue to be monitored. Closure measurements will be 
taken with the survey instrument twice a day. The stress gauge 
readings will also be downloaded twice a day at the same time. 
Persons traveling through the area will be required to visually inspect 
the drift before proceeding through. If the visual inspection shows the 
shotcrete is cracking or taking weight, miners will be removed from the 
area and no travel will be allowed until the tunnel liner is installed. 
Likewise, any closure measurements that indicate closure above the 
normal error factor will result in the drift being shut down to travel. 
Any significant changes in closure or the visual inspection will be 
reported to MSHA. 
Limited travel through the area is required in order to resume some 
mining activities in the Gold Hunter area of the mine. Travel through 
the area will be via vehicle traffic, no foot traffic will allowed until the 
tunnel liner is complete. Travel will include: crews traveling to and 
from their work site at the start and end of shift, a level nipper 
delivering required supplies to the work areas, and truck haulage which 
would be approximately 3 trucks making 10 trips per shift. 
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8 Judicial District of the State ofidaho, in and 
9 for the County of Kootenai, said cause being Case 
10 No. CV13-8793 in said Court. 
11 (Whereupon, Deposition Exhibit No. l was 
12 marked for identification.) 
13 MR. ROSSMAN: Let the record reflect this is 
14 the time and place for the deposition of John Jordan in 
15 the case of Barrett, et al., versus Hecla Mining 
16 Company, et al., Case No. CV 13-8793, case filed in the 
7 District Court for the First Judicial District, State 
18 of Idaho, County of Kootenai. 
19 
20 AND THEREUPON, the following testimony was 
21 adduced, to wit: 
22 JOHN JORDAN, 
23 having been first duly sworn to tell the truth, the 
24 whole truth, and nothing but the truth, relating to 
25 said cause, and 
7 
1 EXAMINATION 
2 QUESTIONS BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
3 Q. Mr. Jordan, I know you've been deposed at 
4 least in the last year a few times, huh? 
5 A. Yes. 
6 Q. How many times have you been deposed in your 
7 life? 
8 A. I think the three that --
9 THE WITNESS: Has it been three? 
10 MR CLARY: I don't remember. 
11 THE WITNESS: Yeah. 
12 BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
13 Q. Well, we know you were deposed by MSHA in the 
14 Marek--
15 A. Yes. 
16 Q. -- MSHA litigation. 
17 A. That's correct. 
18 Q. You were deposed by Marek's counsel in the 
19 civil litigation? 
20 A. That's correct. 
21 Q. Is there any other deposition? 
22 A. No. I believe this is the third. 
23 Q. So prior to 2014 you have not been deposed 
24 before? 
25 A. No. 














































knowledge or recollection you may have that may relate 
to this case. Okay? 
A. I understand. 
Q. The court reporter is here. You're under 
oath just as though you're testifying in court. The 
penalties of perjury apply equally in a deposition as 
they would if you were testifying before a judge. Do 
you understand that? 
A. I understand. 
Q. With the court reporter, if you can keep in 
mind a few things. Most importantly, please try to let 
me finish my question before you answer. In natural 
conversation we talk over each other, but that doesn't 
work very well for our court reporter, and it doesn't 
give us a very readable transcript. Okay? 
A. Okay. 
Q. Always give me an audible response if you 
can. A shake of the head or an uh-huh or uh-uh 
9 
don't read very well. All right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. If you need a break at any time, I'm happy 
oblige you. I don't expect your deposition to take too 
long, and we have another one scheduled this afternoon. 
Okay? 
A. Okay. 
Q. All right. How did you prepare for your 
deposition? 
A. I spoke with Mr. Ramsden. 
Q. Was anyone else present? 
A. Mike Clary was present briefly. 
Q. Anyone else? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you review any documents in preparing for 
your deposition? 
A. I reviewed one report from Wilson Blake. 
Q. Which one? 
A. I believe the date was November 25th of 2011. 
Q. And did you review that report during your 
conference with Mike -- the Mikes? 
A. I believe we did, yes. 
Q. Okay. Did you review any other documents in 
preparing for your deposition? 
A. 














































A. Perhaps that was the date. I ... 
Well, I'll represent there was one on the 
8th and there was one on the 25th. Do you recall 
which one it was that you read? 
A. I believe it was the 25th. 
Q. Okay. Did you read his December 27th report? 
A. I did not read that in preparation for this. 
Q. Okay. Outside of your meeting with Mike and 
Mike, did you do anything to prepare for your 
deposition? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you speak with anyone else? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you go back to Hecla and review any 





1979, a bachelor of science in mining engineering, 
and master science, 1986, from Montana College of 
Mineral Science and Technology. 
Q. And then give me a general description of 
your work history between '86 and going to work for 
Hecla. 
A. Just generally I have worked as both an 
engineer and supervisor, and supervisor of engineers, 
over that period of time. 
Q. Do you have any specialized training in rock 
mechanics? 
A A little. Not much. 
Q. Describe for me the extent of your training 
in rock mechanics. 
A. I took a graduate level course in numerical 
modeling when I was in my graduate program. 
Q. What is numerical modeling? 
A Numerical modeling is a computerized 
technique where you utilize computer models to simulate 
conditions. 
Q. When a model is developed can the data be 
manipulated to modify the output of the model? 
A. If the input to the model is not correct, the 
output of the model will not be correct 
If the input of the model can the 
www rnmcourt.com 
8 geometry of the openings that you're 
9 Q. Physical being the 
1 0 A. The dimensions of the room, yes. 
11 Q. -- dimensions, which would a 
12 width-height ratio? 
13 A. Width.,height ratios. 
14 Q. I notice the Itasca modeling that was done in 
15 the spring of 20 l O utilized some data from stress 
1 6 monitoring --
1 7 A. Yes. 
18 Q. -- was that your understanding? How was that 
19 data utilized, to your understanding? 
2 0 A. To my understanding, that data was utilized 
21 to compare to the prediction of the model and use that 
2 2 as a means of validating its correctness. 
2 3 Q. And once a model is developed, is the -- some 
2 4 of these input factors, such as physical geometrics of 
2 5 the room that's involved -- if those ,.,11,•«F,'-, 
Page 13 
1 to closure or some other incidence, can the model still 
2 be utilized? 
3 A. The model can be modified to reflect the new 
4 conditions, yes. 
5 Q. So where did you work before Hecla? 
6 A. Immediately before Hecla I worked at the 
7 Galena Mine. I was mine superintendent for one year 
8 and general manager for a year. 
9 Q. When was that? When did you work for Galena? 
10 A. 2004 to 2006. At that time it was owned by 
11 Coeur d'Alene Mines. 
12 Q. And when did you go to work for Hecla? 
A. In June of 2006. 
Q. To what position were you hired at Hecla? 
A Chief mining engineer. 
Q. How long did you work in that 
1 7 A. 2006 until 2009. So three years. 
18 Q. And where did you go from there? 
I 19 A. I became mine superintendent. 
2 O Q. How long did you work in that position? 
21 A Approximately a year. 
2 2 Q. So through about 201 O? 
2 3 A. Until 2011. 
I 2 4 It was late in 2009, probably September of 
I 5 when I became the mine So was 
4 s 10 to 13) 
4/6/201 
8 
9 Chief mining _.,,_, .. ·--· 
10 responsibilities? 
A. I supervised the group. 11 
12 During that time period, approximately '04 to 
13 '06 -- excuse me -- '06 to '09, did you have any 
14 engineers employed with Hecla that specialized or 
15 focused in rock mechanics? 
8 
9 
assessment or evaluation 
interactions the consultants that we used. 
Q. Okay. Was there ever any 
0 5900 pillar performed or prepared in-house? 
l A. I don't believe so. 
Paqe 
12 Q. So any modeling that was done on the 5900 
13 pillar during your employment with Hecla would have 
14 been done by an outside consultant? 
15 A. Yes. 
1 6 A. I wouldn't say that she was a specialized l 6 Q. Was there ever any investigation or 
1 7 rock mechanics, but Lisa Harding -- or Camey was our l 7 assessment, internally at Hecla during your employment, 
regarding any rock mechanics issues relating to the 18 senior mining engineer, and she oversaw rock mechanics 18 
19 and mine ventilation. 
2 0 Q. Lisa Camey? 
21 A. I believe Camey, yes. 
22 Q. What was her background and training in rock 
2 3 mechanics? 
24 A. She had a bachelor's degree from the 







did, and she had worked in the Coeur d'Alene mining 
district for her entire career, at Bunker Hill, 
Sunshine, and she was working as -- in that area. So 
she had a fair amount of hands-on experience to it 
6 
She was the mining engineer tasked with rock 
mechanics at the time that I started at the Lucky 
Friday. 
Q. So outside of a bachelor's degree in 
engineering, did she have any specialized education or 




11 A. I don't know that. 
12 Q. You felt she had some experience in that 
13 area? 
14 A. Yes. 
15 Q. 'What did you understand to be the extent of 
1 6 her experience in that area? 
1 7 A. The general engineering that -- experience 
18 that anyone would get in that role. 
1 9 We would use consultants for things that 
2 0 exceeded the general understanding that most mining 
2 1 engineers should have. 
2 2 Q. Did Lisa have any more training, education or 
2 3 experience in rock mechanics than any other engineer 
2 4 employed with Hecla at the time? 
25 to my knowledge. 
19 5900 pillar? 
2 O A. We monitored the instrumentation. We would 
2 1 download the data from the instruments and then send 
2 2 that off to the personnel for interpretation. 
2 3 Q. When you say download the data from the 
2 4 instruments, I assume you mean stress monitoring 
2 5 gauges? 
Page 17 
l A. Stress monitoring gauges and -- and our 
2 rockburst monitoring system. 
3 Q. And with the rockburst system, are 
4 you referring to the seismic assessment 
5 A. Yes. 
6 Q. -- (unintelligible) monitoring? 
7 A. Yes. 
8 MR. RAMSDEN: Let him finish his question 
9 before you stait your answer. That way it will go more 
10 smoothly. 
11 MR. ROSSMAN: I appreciate that it's -- it's 
12 difficult I understand. 
13 BY MR. ROSSiviAN: 
14 Q. What were your -- how did your 
15 responsibilities change when you became mine 
16 superintendent? 
1 7 A. I was supervising a larger group, and it 
18 would include hourly people as well as salaried staff. 
19 Q. So outside of engineering, who did you 
2 0 supervise? What types of employees did you supervise? 
21 A. At what time? 
2 2 Q. As you're a mine superintendent for that year 
2 3 in '09-'l 0. 
2 4 A. Okay. The -- I had the shift bosses -- the 
5 s 14 17) 
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2 
8 They would to Kine 
9 was the maintenance supervisor --
10 maintenance superintendent I belive was his title at 
11 the time. And Mike Akker (phonetic) was the electrical 
12 superintendent. 
3 How would you describe your overall 
4 responsibilities as mine superintendent? 
15 A. Primarily responsible for scheduling and 
1 6 execution of mining activities. 
1 7 Q. And what did you say Doug Bayer's job title 
1 8 was at that time? 
1 9 A. He was general mine foreman. 
2 0 Q. How would you describe his overall 
21 responsibilities? 
2 2 A. Execution of mining activities. He would 
2 3 assist in developing the schedules. And then once the 
2 4 schedules were published then it was Doug's 
2 5 to see that were carried out. 
l Q. Did Doug report directly to you? 
2 A. Yes. 
3 Q. Did you have overall responsibility for 
4 safety of miners? 
5 A. Certainly. 
19 
6 Q. How would you describe your responsibilities 
7 in the area of safety? 
8 A. I'm not -- I'm not sure I -- certainly the 
9 mine safety is the responsibility of every individual 
1 0 in the mine. And mine would be to see to it that 
11 the -- our operating rules and regulations were 
12 followed. 
13 Q. Were you responsible for developing a safety 
14 manual? 
1 5 A. I was part of the process of developing the 
1 6 safety manual, yes. 
1 7 Q. What part of that process did you -- were you 
1 8 involved? 
1 9 A. Essentially review and approval. 
2 0 Q. So during the period oftime that you've 
2 1 worked with Hecla from '06 to the present, you've 
2 2 understood that there was a safety manual in place at 
2 3 the facility? 




8 the ground. 
9 What's the purpose 
0 A. It's to support the ground. 
11 Q. To protect the miners? 
12 A. Protect the miners. That's all part of the 
13 process. 
14 Q. Did Hecla have any ground control policies or 
1 5 procedures manual? 
16 A. Yes. We had a ground control -- I'm not sure 
17 if it's -- ground control plan. 
18 Q. Plan. And was it your responsibility to 
1 9 ensure that that plan was implemented? 
2 o A. Yes. 
21 MR. ROSSMAN: Mike, due to logistics, I 
2 2 didn't bring extra copies of everything. It was just 
2 3 too much stuff So I can hand it to you for review, or 
2 4 if you have access to your production, we can take a 
2 5 break. Whatever need to do. And I can 
1 the Bates number. 
2 MR RAMSDEN: Well, let's just go as we're 
3 going and make copies as we need. 
MR ROSSMAN: Okay. 4 
5 (Whereupon, Deposition Exhibit No. 2 was 
6 marked for identification.) 
7 BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
8 Q. I'll show you Exhibit 2, which is entitled 
9 Rockburst Plan. And it's DOL 781-M-A, 0578 Bates 






A. Yes. I know what this document is. 
Q. What is that document? 
A. That's our rockburst plan. 
Q. What's the purpose of that rockburst plan? 
A. It is a requirement for mines which have 
16 seismic activity. The MSHA regulation requires that 
1 7 you will develop and maintain a rockburst plan, the 
18 purpose of which is to describe the methods that will 
19 be used to mitigate rockburst hazards in the mine. 
20 Q. This is something that you understood to be 
21 required by MSHA? 
22 A. Yes. 
2 3 Q. And you had responsibility as the mining 
2 4 superintendent ... 
2 5 At the time this one was 







in you were vice 
manager of the mine? 
11 Q. And did you have responsibility for 
12 implementation of this particular plan? 
13 A. Yes. 
14 Q. Did you have responsibility to ensure that it 







Q. -- properly and effectively? 
A. Yes. 





Q. So ifwe look at page 0580 of this particular 
document, it references the 5900 level or pillar where 
main access from the Silver Shaft intersects the Gold 
2 4 Hunter 30 vein. That's the first full paragraph. 
25 Is there a reason that 
?age 3 
1 was specifically addressed in this document, to your 
2 knowledge? 
3 A. Yes. It helps to explain the seismic 
4 monitoring system. 
5 Q. Okay. It says a monitoring program is being 
6 conducted at that level. Do you know what monitoring 
7 program that was referencing in April of 2011? 
8 A. The stress -- stress gauge instrumentation. 
9 Q. As well as the seismic? 
10 A. Yes. 
11 Q. So there was stress monitoring ongoing as of 
12 April 1st, 2011; is that correct? 
13 A. Yes. 
14 Q. And there had been stress monitoring ongoing 
15 at the 5900 level since about 2006; is that correct? 
16 A. It pre-dated me. It ... 
17 Q. Do you know what the purpose of stress 
18 monitoring was at that particular level? 
19 A. As stated, the object of the monitoring is to 
20 identify the change in load. 
21 Q. Were you monitoring all levels of the mine 
22 where activity was being performed? 




Because we a 
we needed to monitor the nrr,on'" 
7 
8 at that particular 
A. Yes. 
Q. And it's your testimony that the reason that 
they performed that modeling had nothing to do with 
12 concerns about stability of that particular pillar? 
1 3 A. Not necessarily stability of the pillar, but 
1 4 the response of the pillar. 
15 Q. What do you mean by that? 
1 6 A. How would the pillar respond. 
1 7 Q. Respond to what? 
18 A. To mining going on around it. 
19 Q. Mining above and below that pillar? 
2 0 A. All around the pillar, yes. 
21 Q. Were there concerns about how that pillar 
2 2 would respond to mining above and below 5900? 
2 3 A. The work that had been done prior to 
2 4 construction of that pillar, the -- prior to the design 



























purpose of the monitoring was to continue to verify its 
stability. 
Q. Okay. So before that pillar was created, 
there was some work to determine whether or not it 
would be stable? 
A. That's my understanding, yes. 
Q. What is your understanding as to the extent 
of that work that was performed to determine the 
stability of that pillar before it was constructed? 
A. I have no direct knowledge of that work. It 
occmTed before I started to work for Hecla. 
Q. Have you read any --
A. It was -- it was done by Itasca. I know 
that. 
Q. So Itasca did some evaluation of the 
pillar the stability pillar before it was 
constructed? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you know when that pillar was constructed? 
A. It was started in 2005, I believe, possibly 
2004. 
Q. When was it finished or completed? 
A. It wasn't completed until 2006, late in the 
year 
In 201 was that pillar important to 
7 s 25) 
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9 
1 0 How was that? 
11 A. From 2900 -- or 4900 -- pardon me -- you 
1 2 could travel up and vie had ramps that would conr1ect 
13 between the 4900 main level and the 5900 main level. 
14 Q. So through 4900 there were ramps to connect 
1 5 to the 5900 level? 
16 A. Yes. 
1 7 Q. Was there any way to carry out mining 
1 8 activity at the Gold Hunter vein without at least some 
1 9 access to the 5900 pillar? 
20 A. No. 
21 Q. So it was very important to Hecla? 
2 2 A. Yes. 
2 3 Q. In order for Hecla to perform its business --
2 4 mining business in the Gold Hunter vein, there had to 
2 5 be some access to the 5900 --
A. Yes. 
Q. -- pillar? 
day that pillar was not nns>r<:>t,na 
affected the mining revenue of the company, correct? 
A. And the paychecks of the mine employees. 
Yes. 
Q. In Exhibit No. 2, the Rockburst Plan, there's 
7 
7 There's some -- at least the 
8 Lucky Friday Mine, there's some risk or concern 
9 about rockburst, correct? 
0 A. At every mine in the Silver there is 
some seismic level of activity. 
12 Q. So how did Heda determine when a general 
13 rockburst risk became a hazard warranting corrective 
14 measures? 
15 A. As I said, we would review the seismic data 
16 from the rockburst monitoring system, the seismic 
1 7 network, and we looked at it on a daily basis. 
18 Q. You say we looked at it on a daily basis, 
19 who? 
20 A. Hecla. 
21 Q. Who at Hecla would be responsible for 
2 2 reviewing the seismic and stress data on a daily basis? 
2 3 A. Zac Thomas was doing that. And Jeff Parker 
2 4 also would review it. They would have to -- at the 
2 5 start of 
1 before the crews went underground. 






A It was just a listing of what the seismic 
activity had occurred the past 24 hours. 












a section titled Corrective Measures. Do you know what i 8 
that means? 9 
Q. Would they issue a report on stress 






Q. What is that? 
A. Those are the means that we would use to 
13 mitigate rockburst hazards. 
14 Q. So if a rockburst hazard developed, one of 
15 these four options could be utilized to address that 
16 concern? 
1 7 A. Yes. 
18 Q. And one of these four options could be 
1 9 utilized to protect the safety of the miners and 
2 0 employees working in that area? 
21 A Yes. 
22 Q. How did the company determine when a 
2 3 rockburst hazard existed? 
24 A Well, that's a very 
2 5 We rely on our monitoring system to monitor the 
WWW. 
10 Q. So each shift Zac Thomas or Jeff Parker would 






MR. RAMSDEN: Each shift or each day? 
THE WITNESS: Each day. 
MR. ROSSMAN: Okay. 
16 BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
17 
18 
Q. When was that policy initiated? 
A. When I got there in 2006 that was our 
1 9 practice. 
20 Q. So one of the things that Hecla would look to 
2 1 in determining whether or not a rockburst hazard 
2 2 existed waJTanting co1Tective measures was to look at 
2 3 seismic data on a daily basis? 
4 Yes. 









you review it on a basis? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What was Zac Thomas's job title? 




8 A. Yeah -- yes. 
9 Q. But generally blasting can affect the 
10 rockburst potential at the level of the blasting, 
11 correct? 






Q. What was Jeff Parker's job title? 13 Q. It also can affect the stress levels at areas 
A. Also mine planner. 14 below that particular level where the blasting 
Q. So what would you look to in this seismic 15 occurred? 
data component of your evaluation, of whether there's a 1 6 A. Yes. 
rockburst hazard, to determine whether or not a hazard 1 7 Q. Hecla knew that? 
































A. Primarily what we were looking for would be 19 Q. And, in fact, the November 16, 2011, blast 
rockbursts to occur with our blasting that would 2 0 was determined ultimately in December of 2011, or 
indicate that there's been an adjustment to the new 2 1 believed by the consultants, to have been a fault-slip; 
state of -- the new geometry after a blast. 2 2 is that correct? 
Q. Blasting certainly can affectthe propensity 2 3 A. Yes. 
for a rockburst at a particular level, correct? 2 4 MR. RAMSDEN: You're talking about a 
Q. And that's because, as you said, changing the 
geometry of that particular --
Right. 
Q. -- shelf? 
A. You take -- taking something that was in 
equilibrium and disturb the equilibrium. 
Q. And that equilibrium disturbance can affect 
not just the shelf at which the blasting is occurring 
but also other areas of the mine, correct? 
A. Typically what you're going to see is the 
burst is going to occur adjacent to the blasting. That 
release of energy will trigger -- is -- is what's 
causing the new geometry, and it's also sending 
transient levels of energy through the rock. 
Q. To other levels? 
A. No. To the area adjacent to where the mining 
is going on. 
Q. And as that geometry at a particular shelf is 
modified, that can affect the stress transfer at a 
level below that particular shelf where the blasting 
occurred; is that correct? 
MR. RAMSDEN: Object to the form. What's a 
shelf? 
.MR. ROSSMAN: or a would 


























MR. ROSSMAN: Okay. Let me rephrase the 
question. 
BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
Q. The rockburst that occurred on November 16th, 
2011, was believed by consultants, at least as of 
December of 2011, to have been a fault-slip at or near 
the 5700 level, correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And they believe that fault-slip had been 
triggered by a blast? 
A. I don't recall that conclusion. 
Q. Do you recall the rockburst being in close 
time proximity or temporal proximity to a blast at the 
5700 level? 
A. All blasting at the mine was carried out at 
the end of the shift or during a mid-shift blasting. 
We were doing mid-shift blasting in 20 I 1. So all 
blasts would occur in fairly close to the same time. 
So there would have been blasting in multiple 
locations. But there was no blasting at the time that 
we were working on the installation of the -- the 
liner. 
Q. Let me clarify. 2011 there were two 





A nrl rlirl Y"U 
1 3 being in close time proximity to blasting at the 
1 4 5700 levei? 
15 A. Yes. 
16 Q. Was it your understanding or belief, based 
1 7 upon the consultant's input, that the blasting had some 
1 8 on that burst? 
9 A. That wasn't the interpretation that I went 
20 on. 
21 Q. What was your understanding as to the cause 
2 2 of that burst? 
2 3 A. The burst on November? 
24 Q. Yes. 
2 5 MR. RAMSDEN: November 
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1 THE WITNESS: November 16th. It was my 
2 understanding at that time that what we saw was stress 
phenomena. 
4 MR ROSSMAN: 
5 Q. What is that? 
6 A. As stress loads up, rock will reach the 
7 conditions that it can tolerate. And if it is -- and 
8 under some sets of conditions, that can leave -- it's 
9 called a strain burst, which is a situation where the 
10 rock moves and releases that strain, as opposed to a 
1 fault-slip which is a different condition. 
12 Q. So originally foilowing the November 16th 
1 3 rockburst, you believed it was a strain burst or a 
14 foundation failure? 
15 A. Strain burst is what I believed it was. 
1 Q. Did you ultimately develop an understanding 
1 7 that the consultants believe that was erroneous? 
18 A. In December after the second burst, yes. 
19 Q. You understood that in December after the 
2 0 second burst the consultants now believed that the 
21 November 16th burst was instead a fault-slip? 
22 A. Yes. 
And did you develop an understanding in 
of 2011 as to what cause 
WWW. 
10 A. 
1 So as 
12 But not--
13 THE WITNESS: Should I ... 
14 MR ROSSMAN: Go ahead. 
15 MR. RAMSDEN: Go ahead and answer. 
16 THE WITNESS: Not necessarily the blasting on 
1 7 5700 level; blasting in various locations. 
8 BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
19 Q. Blasting at various locations, one or more of 
2 0 which may have contributed to that strain burst? 
21 A. Yes. 
2 2 Q. Did you ever develop an understanding as to 
2 3 what particular contributed to that strain 
2 4 burst? 

























Q. So as of December 14, 2011, your 
understanding as a general manager of the mine -- your 
belief was that the November 16th burst had been 
caused was a strain burst or a foundation failure? 
A. Yes. 
MR. RAMSDEN: I'll object to the fonn. 
BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
Q. Strain burst? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that that strain burst had been caused or 
contributed to by blasting at -- at one or more 
different levels? 
A. The mining excavation process. 
Q. Including blasting? 
A. Including blasting. 
Q. You said there was mid-shift blasting going 
on in 2011. What does that mean? 
A. Halnvay through the shift, miners, if they 
had a round -- if miners had a round that was ready to 
be blasted, they could blast it. 
Q. And were there any-- well, strike that. 
Originally when you answered a prior question 
you said there was blasting at the end of each shift --
A. Yes. 
-- historically at 











Q. When blasting was occurring, knowing that it 
may cause or contribute to stress phenomena or 
potential rockbursts in the mine, were there any safety 
precautions or steps taken to protect miners during 





MR. RAMSDEN: Object to the form of the 
question. Go ahead and answer. 
THE WITNESS: We11, it's unclear to me if 
you're referring to the blasting or to the the 
2 2 se1sm1c. 
2 3 BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
2 4 Q. I'm speaking more to the risk of rockbursting 
2 5 or se1srn1c v!H-1.l!p:,v,>, 
1 A. We would initiate the blast at a specific 
2 time such that the process of igniting, lighting the 
fuses, would allow enough time for people to travel 
4 before the blast went off, to the 5900 or 4900 main 
5 level from the workplaces. 
6 Q. As to protect them from the blasting itself, 
7 correct? 
8 A. From the blasting itself and also the 
9 consequences as -- as I said, the consequences of the 
1 0 seismic activity that results from excavation is 
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11 typically very adjacent to the blast area. So we would 
12 travel out of the area where the blasting was going to 
13 occur, the areas where there would be a high 
14 probability of a seismic event. 
15 Q. So ifthere was blasting above or below or 
1 6 around the 5900 pillar, would there be any steps taken 
1 7 at the 5900 pillar to ensure the safety of miners? 
18 A. At that time, no. 
19 Q. You say at that time, no. Has there been at 
2 O some point? 
21 A. We have initiated a remote blasting system. 
2 2 Q. What is that? 
2 3 A. It's one that allows us to travel to the 





0 You said that in determining whether or not 
11 there's a rockburst hazard warranting corrective 
1 
12 me::ic:;nrP:c:; yon won Id also evaluate the management of 
i 1 3 energy or the rate of energy release? 
14 A. We would review the rate that the energy was 
1 5 being released, yeah. 
16 Q. What kind of data would you get in that area? 
1 7 A. Simply the number of events. 
1 18 Q. Number of what events? 
j 1 9 A. Seismic events. 
· 2 O Q. So that relates back to the seismic 
2 1 monitoring? 
22 A. Yes. 
2 3 Q. Is there a particular number of seismic 
2 4 events that would constitute a level of concern for 
2 5 corrective measures? 
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1 A. No. It would be more the frequency with 
2 which they were occurring. But there was no specific 
number that ... 
4 Q. And then you also said you take into account 
5 observations by supervisors? 
6 A. Supervisors and miners, yes. 
7 Q. How would -- what kind of miner or supervisor 
8 observation program was in place? 
9 A. When an event was detected, we would inform 
1 0 the supervisors that there had been an event between 
11 shifts, or with the previous blast, and give them an 
12 approximate location where that was. And we would ask 
13 them to go in and review the area, just take a look and 
1 4 see if there are any hazards that exist there. 
15 Q. What would they be looking for? 
16 A. They'd be looking for broken bolts, places 
1 7 where rock had bagged the wire, if -- if that's 
18 something you could understand. If we saw that the 
1 9 cyclone fence we put in had dropped and was full of 
2 0 loose rock, then we would attribute that to rockburst 
21 or the seismic activity. 
2 2 Q. Look for cracks in shotcrete? 
2 3 A. Yes. If there was shotcrete in the areas, 
you look for loose rock? 
1 (Pa 38 
9 
10 There's a standing rule that if miners feel 
uncomfortable from the -- the noise or the activity, 
1 
8 A. That's correct. 
You mentioned this -- .. ~· .. ·-
1 0 data or these reports would be posted in 
11 supervisor's office, correct? 
they get out of there. On occasion, if we were on the 12 Yes. 
surface and a lot of information -- a lot of seismic 13 Q. Did general miners at the company have access 
14 activity was detected on the monitoring network, we 14 to the supervisor's office? 
15 
16 
would call down and find a supervisor and have him go 15 A. Yes. 
into area and pull the miners out 16 Q. Did they have access to these seismic 
1 7 Q. So you said there was a standing rule that if 1 7 reports? 
18 a miner's uncomfortable based upon what they're 18 A. Yes. 
observing that they're to leave the mine? 19 Q. At the 5900 level as well as the 5700 level, 19 
20 A. That they're to leave the area, yes. 2 0 11 and 14 stopes, there was a monitoring program in 
21 Q. Leave the area. 21 place for stress monitoring, correct? 
22 How long was that standing rule in place? 2 2 A. Yes. 
23 
24 
A. That goes back to the days when I was mining. 2 3 Q. Would reports be prepared from that stress 
Every miner has the right to withdraw from an area if 2 4 monitoring? 
1 Q. Was it acceptable for mining supervisors or 
2 management to ridicule or harass an employee who felt 
3 uncomfortable 
4 A. No. 
5 Q. -- with the observations at a particular 
6 level of the mine? 
7 A. No. 
8 Q. Was that done? 
9 A. Not to my knowledge. 
10 Q. Would there be any documentation of 
11 observations by miners or supervisors of stress 
12 activity at a particular level? 
1 3 A. Occasionally there would be -- yes, that they 
1 4 would write it on -- no. There was actually a 
1 5 rockburst -- a seismic inspection report. 
16 Q. So there was a seismic inspection report 
1 7 that --
1 8 A. If there was some seismic activity -- I'm 
1 9 sorry. I didn't let you finish. 
2 O Q. There was a seismic inspection report that 
2 1 someone who was responsible for assessing seismic 
2 2 activity could prepare? 
2 3 A. If we identified in the pre-shift there 
2 4 was an area to be inspected, then the supervisor 
5 be tasked with inspecting that and 
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1 The data was downloaded periodically, and 
2 until it was downloaded, we had no means ofreviewing 
it. So it would have to downloaded eveiy to 
4 six months; I'm not sure what the frequency was. And 
5 then that would be sent to Spokane to NIOSH and they 
6 would -- they would translate the instrumentation 
7 results for us. 
8 Q. Okay. On November 16, 2011, the burst at the 
9 5900 level damaged or destroyed most of the stress 
10 monitoring equipment, correct? 
11 A. That's correct. 
12 Q. And new stress monitoring was installed on 
13 December 1st, 2011, correct? 
14 A. Sometime around that period. 
15 Q. NIOSH was not interpreting that data; is that 
16 
7 A. Because we were utilizing that as part of the 
18 process, we were -- I think we were interpreting that 
1 9 ourselves. 
2 0 Q. Who was interpreting that at --
21 A. Zac Thomas was doing the instrumentation. 
2 2 Q. Zac Thomas would actually take the reader 
2 3 down and read the -- or retrieve the raw data each 
But when he 





1 2 A. On a computer. 
13 Q. So someone with access to the computer, if 
14 they knew particularly where to look, they could locate 
15 that information? 
1 6 A. I suppose, yeah. 
1 7 Q. Did Hecla ever distribute or disseminate to 
1 8 miners any instructions or directions on how to access 
19 that data? 
2 0 A. No, not that I'm aware of. 
21 Q. Did they ever tell the miners during December 
2 2 of 2011 that they had access to that data? 
2 3 A. Not that I'm aware of. 
2 4 Q. Were you reviewing that data? 
2 5 A. I would look at the data. 
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1 Q. How often? 
2 A. Daily. 
3 Q. What was the purpose of looking at that 
4 A. To see if there were any changes that 
5 deviated from what our expectations for the rock 
6 behavior were. 
7 Q. Was there some documentation somewhere that 
8 identified what your expectations were for stress 
9 changes at that level during that period oftime? 
10 A. I don't believe so. 
11 Q. Did you have an understanding as to what the 
12 normal stress changes were, or acceptable stress 
13 changes were, during that time period at that level? 
14 A. Yes. We would expect to see a steady 
15 increase in stress. We would expect to see some change 
16 as time progressed, because that's sort of the way 
17 rocks behave, but we would not expect to see sudden 
18 changes of an irregular magnitude in either direction. 
19 Q. \Vhat would sudden changes of an irregular 
20 magnitude indicate? 
21 A. It would depend on -- if it was a negative 
22 change, it would indicate that something had slipped; 
23 if it was a positive change, it would indicate that 
24 stress was building up. 
25 That would be a concern? 
be a movement 
stress in the portion of the borehole that it sat in. 
need to understand that these 
1 0 are very location-specific. They are telling you 
what's happening at that one spot 
Q. A.'1d if there's a difference in the geology 
8 
13 the rock at the level of the instrumentation as opposed 
1 4 to the rest of the wall or particular area of 
15 monitoring, it may not give an accurate indication of 
1 6 the stress at that area; is that correct? 
1 7 A. That's correct. 
18 Q. So is it important, for safe monitoring in a 
1 9 particular area, to obtain reliable data by having 
2 0 multiple monitors? 
2 1 A. The most reliable data that we have at any 
2 2 time is the seismic data. That gives us the best 
2 3 understanding of what's going on. 
2 4 Q. But you also have stress data for a reason, 
2 5 correct? 
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1 A. Yes. 
2 Q. That is to identify sudden or unexpected 
3 changes in stress at a particular area? 
4 A. Yes. 
5 Q. And the best way to assess, given the 
6 geological deviations or variations at a particular 
7 area, would be to have multiple areas of stress 
8 monitoring, correct? 
9 A. We had multiple stress gauges installed, yes. 
10 Q. The more stress gauges, the better or more 
11 accurate understanding you would have of the stress 
12 changes at a particular location, correct? 
13 MR. RAMSDEN: Object to the form, foundation, 
14 speculation. Go ahead. 
15 THE WITNESS: Me or him? 
16 MR. R.Al'v1SDEN: You. Go ahead and answer. 
17 THE WITNESS: Would you state that again. 
18 MR. ROSSMAN: Let's have her read it. 
19 (Record read as requested.) 
20 THE WITNESS: At a particular location or --
21 or -- each gauge is going to tell you the conditions 
22 that that gauge sees. More gauges are going to give 
23 you different answers. I would say if you have too 
24 many, no, it wouldn't be a because 
you're going to get conflicting information to the 
13 s 4 6 o 49) 
10 
done? 
1 3 information would be seismic data -~ 
14 A. Yes. 
5 in assessing the risk of a rockburst? 
16 A. Yes. 
1 7 Q. Had you read any studies indicating that 
1 8 historical seismic activity is the best indicator of 
1 9 the risk of a rockburst? 
2 0 A. I can't cite a specific study. But I believe 
2 1 that that would be the conventional wisdom. 
2 2 Q. At Hecla have prior rockbursts always 
2 3 correlated to an increase in seismic activity leading 
2 4 up to a burst? 
2 5 MR. RAMSDEN: to the form, foundation. 
1 THE W1TNESS: The -- I'm struggling to --
2 seismic activity and rockbursts are the same thing. 
3 yes, you -- if you have more rockbursts, you 
4 more seismic activity. It's correlating one thing to 
5 itself. 
6 BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
7 Q. Were you seeing increased seismic activity 
8 leading up to the November 16, 2011, burst? 
9 A. No, we were not. 
10 Q. Were you seeing increased seismic activity 
11 leading up to the December 14, 2011, burst? 
12 A. I do not believe we did, no. 
13 Q. You had had three prior rockbursts at the 
14 5900 pillar before November 16, 2011, correct? 
15 A. Yes. 
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16 Q. Prior to any of those rockbursts had you seen 
1 7 seismic activity leading up to the burst? 
18 A. Not that I'm aware of 
19 Q. So you were aware in December of 2011 that 
2 0 there had been three prior bursts in addition to the 
21 November 16th burst at the 5900 --
2 2 A. There had been multiple level bursts, yes. 
2 3 rv[R. RAMSDEN: Let him finish his question 
2 4 you start your answer. 
2 5 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry. 
WWW. 
level? 
A. One had caused damage. 
One other than the November 16th burst? 
A. The November 16th burst was the one that 
13 Q. And you understood or -- you understood while 
14 working at Hecla in December of 2011 that there had 
15 been a long history of rockbursts at the Lucky Friday 
16 silver mine? 
1 7 A. Certainly. 
18 Q. And as compared to other mines in other areas 
19 of the world that that was an area where there was an 
2 0 increased level of rockburst activity or seismic 
1
2 1 activity? 
22 MR. RAMSDEN: Object to the form, foundation. 
23 Go ahead. 
2 4 THE WITNESS: The Lucky Friday vein, which we 
2 5 were not mining -- we were in the Gold Hunter 
1 area. The Lucky Friday vein located in a different 
2 host rock, the revett formation, had a very long 
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history of large and seismic events, much more 
4 frequent than what we saw in the Gold Hunter. So 
5 certainly I was aware of that. 
6 BYMR. ROSSMAN: 
7 Q. And the 5900 pillar was located -- or 
8 provided access to the Gold Hunter --
A. Yes. 
10 Q. -- shaft or the Gold Hunter mine through the 
11 Lucky Friday Mine, con-ect? 
12 A. Yes. 
1 3 Q. You understood that as of April of 20 i I the 
14 company was aware that large seismic events had been 
15 picking up in the previous couple years; is that 
16 c01rect? 
1 7 A. What's a large seismic event? 
18 MR. ROSSMAN: Let me pull out a document and 
1 9 talk about it. 
2 0 (Whereupon, Deposition Exhibit No. 3 was 
21 marked for identification.) 
....22 BYMR. ROSSMAN: 
Q. I show you Exhibit No. 3. And that is --
looks like a document obtained Wilson Blake. It's 
Bates page 'Wl3LAKE298. It's an e-mail from Wilson Blake 
0 
seismic events have up over the last seismic events were 
0 " Do you recall receiving that e-mail? A. I really can't tell you. 
l A. I don't recall that exactly what we 
2 e-mail Q. Did company do 
13 Q. When you received this e-mail, you would have A. We continued --
1 4 read the e-mail, correct? Q. -- in response to recognition that seismic 
15 A. Yes. events were increasing in frequency and size? 
16 Q. And you would have certainly been aware of 16 A. We continued to monitor our seismic release 
rates. Whether Zac Thomas -- at that point I was 
general manager, and I wasn't dealing with the 
1 7 the content of this e-mail, correct? 17 





Q. And Wilson Blake was an outside consultant 




specifics of who was doing what I'm surprised that 
Ron Krusemark isn't on here but -- on this distribution 
2 1 but -- because he would have been the chief engineer at 
that time. 




Q. So your testimony is that the company 
continued to monitor seismic events after receiving 
this e-mail? 
2 4 and information in planning its mining activity, 
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A. Yes. ) 1 A. Yes. 
Q. And they relied upon his input and I 2 Q. And after recognizing that seismic events 
inf01mation in developing safety protocols I 3; were increasing in · and the company 
procedures, correct? continued to monitor seismic is that correct? 
A. That's correct. A. Yes. And I'm sure we started to calculate 
Q. And so will you agree that on April 4, 2011, 6 the seismic energy releases as well. 
he's telling you there's no question that there were 7 Q. Is that something that you're testifying it 
large seismic events really picking up over the last 8 was not being done prior to April of 2011? 
couple of years? 9 A. I do not know what the practice was. 
A. That's what it says. 1 O Q. Do you know if the company did anything in 
Q. Was that your understanding? 11 response to its recognition that seismic events were 
A. No. I would say that it was my understanding 12 increasing in frequency and size in April of 2011? 
13 that we recognized that there was an increased 13 A. I don't recall exactly what was done. 
14 frequency of events and that they were getting larger. 14 Q. Did you ever develop an understanding as to 
15 Something in the 1. 0 range he references would not be a 15 what was causing an increased size and frequency of 
16 event. l 6 seismic events? 
1 7 Q. Okay. So as of April 4, 2011, you'll agree 7 A. No. 
18 that you were recognizing, based upon the input of 18 Q. Did you initiate any analysis, investigation 
Mr. Blake, that there was an increased frequency of 19 or consultation bv outside consultants to determine 
2 0 seismic events at the -- 2 0 what was causing the increase in size and frequency of 
19 




Q. -- mine; is that correct? 
A. Yes. And it appears that he is rpcr,rr,m,,n 
22 
23 
A. We had ongoing relationship at that time with 
Wiison Blake, with Mark Board and with Scott Carlisle. 
we start calculating seismic energy release rates. 2 Q. Were ever a to 























activity goes hand in 
in the Coeur district 
Okay. What do you mean by that? 
A. When you mine in the Coeur d'Alene district, 
you will have some seismic activity. 
Q. You understood that in 2011, correct? 
A. Yes. 
(Whereupon, Deposition Exhibit No. 4 was 
marked for identification.) 
BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
Q. I show you Exhibit No. 4. I don't see a 
Bates page on this. But can you tell me what your 
understanding, if anything, is as to what this is? 
A This would be a long section of the 11, 14, 
12, 15 and 16 stopes. 
Can 
Up at the top under the word out" 
there's a 5200-10 stope. I assume that's the -- what 
we to as the 10 stope? 
A. Yes. 






A That is the area that had been excavated from 
4900 in the Gold Hunter 30 vein. 
9 Q. So it had already been excavated or 
10 thoroughly mined; is that correct? 
11 A. Yes. 
12 Q. And there was -- in 2011 was there mining 
13 activity at the IO stope? 
14 A 2011. Yes. 
15 Q. And then there's a big section titled -- that 
6 says "mined out" in the middle of the page. What is 
1 7 that referring to? 



















still there -- on the 
about 5,000 
Okay. Is :1n :1rP:1 -- 1c: 14 on 
this particular document? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And is that the 555-14 Cut #4? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And is the 11 stope the area that says 
550-11? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And those areas were being mined in 2011, 
correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. At the 30 vein? 
A. Yes. 
Is it fair to had known 
ol 
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1 for many years that the 5900 access, or at least since 




A. In what period of time? 
Q. 2011. 
6 A. \Vhen we had the rockburst in November, that 
7 was really the first time that we felt generally that 
8 that -- up until that point the behavior that we 
9 observed in the pillar conformed to what our 
10 expectation would be. We did not expect that we would 
11 have a large magnitude rockburst event in that -- in 
12 that pillar. 
13 Q. And the reason you did not expect that is 
14 because of the Itasca modeling that was done in the 
15 spring of 2010, conect? 
16 A. I believe it was done back in 
l 7 Q. Okay. There was modeling done in 2004; is 
1 8 that correct? 
19 stopes that I previously mentioned, 11, 14, 12, 15 and 19 
2 0 16. So that is the area that had been completed. 2 0 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you know who did that? 
A. I believe it was Itasca. 21 Q. So the area all around this 5900 pillar had 21 
2 2 been mined out? 22 Q. Did you know Itasca or Mark Board did some 
23 A. Yes. 2 3 modeling in 2010? 
24 Q. 24 A. recall the specifics 
5 " What is 1 2 




MR. ROSSMAN: Let's go back on the record. 
BY MR ROSSMAN: 
Let's start with Exhibit No. 5 in front of 
you. 
A. Okay. 
Q. Appears to be a technical memorandum from 
18 Mark Board at Itasca, dated March 22nd, 2010; is that 
19 correct? 
2 0 A. Yes. 
21 Q. Now, do you now recall this particular 
2 2 modeling being done? 
2 3 A. No, I do not This was 2010 was when I 
2 4 would have been mine superintendent. So I wouldn't 
2 5 have had on it. I was 
63 
1 at the time, but it wasn't something I was focused on. 
2 Q. Well, in early 2011 you became general 
3 manager at mine, correct? 
4 A. Yes. 
5 Q. And at that point in time did you make an 
6 effort to review modeling that had been done for the 
7 5900 pillar approximately a year earlier? 
8 A. No, I did not. 
9 Q. So is it your testimony that you don't recall 
10 ever reviewing this modeling documentation? 
11 A. I don't recall it. It wouldn't surprise me 
12 if I had looked over it orobablv at about the same ' , 
13 level that I just did. I would have glanced through 
14 it. 
15 Q. Would it surprise you if you never reviewed 
16 it at 
17 A. It wouldn't surprise me. 
18 Q. So you don't recall as you sit here today 
19 reviewing this documentation? 
20 A. I do not. 
21 Q. Okay. He references in the second paragraph, 
22 first sentence, "A previous study of the stressmeter 
23 data and pillar failure observations was conducted by 




10 Why, ifyou 
11 modeling done in 2010 
2 P,ik,ilni<: /& A<:<:oriate<:? 
13 A. Rimas Pakalnis is a very -- we were not very 
14 happy with the types of reports that he was giving us. 
15 He would send us a whole bunch of pictures and 
16 printouts but no accompanying assessment that we could 
1 7 follow. So we finally decided that Itasca would be a 
1 8 better group to use. 
19 As you can see, this is a very well-developed 
2 0 report. It's clear and understandable. 
21 Q. Mark Board, did you understand he was the 
2 2 individual performing the modeling? 
23 A. Yes. 
2 4 Q. And was he -- he was not an employee of 
2 5 at that in time? 
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1 A. He was not at that point. 
2 Q. He is now? 
3 A. He is now. 
4 Q. When was he hired? 
A. I think it was in 2012. 
6 Q. Why was he hired? 
7 A. To improve our abilities to geotechnically 
8 assess -- to do geotechnical assessments of our mines. 
9 Q. Why was there a determination that Hecla 
10 needed an in-house rock mechanics specialist to do that 
11 work in 2012? 
12 A. We had had some difficulties in 2011, 
13 primarily at our Lucky Friday Mine, but also at our 
14 Greens Creek operation. And we felt that we needed to 
15 have that expertise in-house. 
16 Q. And the difficulties at the Lucky Mine 
17 included the November and December rockburst at the 
18 5900 pillar? 
19 A. That's correct. 
20 Q. What incidence did you have at the -- did you 
21 say Green Creek? 
22 A. Greens Creek. 
23 Q. Greens Creek. 
24 A. I was not at Greens I 
25 don't know the 
7 0 
So my "'""'''m,,1-, 
1 0 what was looking at 
1 you know what the risks were that were 
12 identified by Mr. Board in his modeling of pillar 
13 failure at the 5900 level in December of 2011? 
14 A. December of 2011. He identifies in -- I 
15 believe it was in this one, three failure modes. And 
16 those are the failure modes that would be associated 
1 7 with any excavation in rock. So ... 
18 Q. What did you understand those failure modes 
19 to be? 
2 0 A. Strain bursting, fault-slip and pillar 
2 1 punching was the third one. 
2 2 Q. And in December of 2011 did you understand 
2 3 what his conclusions were regarding the stability of 
2 4 the 5900 pillar from his modeling? 
2 5 A. Did I understand his conclusions in here? 
1 (Indicating.) 
2 Q. Yes. 
A. No. 
4 Q. Did you know what his conclusions were? 
5 MR. RAMSDEN: Objection --
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6 THE WITNESS: I don't even recall reading it. 
7 MR. RAMSDEN: I'll object. He didn't even 
8 say he read it, so ... 
9 MR. ROSSMAN: Right. 
1 o BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
11 Q. Okay. And if you hadn't read it, had anyone 
J. 2 told you what Mr. Board's conclusions were regarding 
13 the risk of pillar failure at the 5900 pillar? 
14 A. Not that I recall. 
15 Q. In December of 2011 you're a general manager 
6 mine, correct? 
1 7 A. Yes. 
18 Q. One of your responsibilities was for the 
1 9 safety of personnel within the mine, correct? 
20 A. Yes. 
21 Q. And there had actually been a study regarding 
2 2 the safety from pillar failure at the 5900 level 
2 3 conducted in 201 O; would you agree? 
2 4 A. I would agree that it was conducted. I was 
5 not aware that it was conducted. 
you're telling me that you 
even anybody you what 
10 were within this documentation? 
1 A. That's correct. 
1 2 Q. A nrl <:n i<s it fair tn s:~y ynn h~rl nn irlPs1 
1 regarding the risk of pillar failure at the 5900 level? 
14 A. No. It's not fair to say that. 
15 Q. How did you know what the risk of pillar 
16 failure was at the 5900 level in December of201 l? 
1 7 A. We were monitoring it seismically. And I 
18 have -- at that point I had some 30 years of experience 
19 working in the Silver Valley. So I thought I 
2 0 understood it. 
2 1 Q. And you didn't think modeling performed by a 
2 2 rock mechanics specialist was important for you to 
2 3 understand at that point in time? 
2 4 MR. RAMSDEN: Object, argumentative. Go 
2 5 ahead and answer. 
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THE WITNESS: I wasn't aware of it. 
2 BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
Q. Was somebody responsible for telling you that 
4 modeling had been done at that --
5 A I'm sure that it -- it had been done. And 
6 I'm sure I was aware of it. But, no, I had a lot of 
7 things that I had to be aware of. And I had people 
8 that I could utilize to review material like this and 
9 tell me this is an issue that needs your attention. 
10 Q. Whose responsibility was it to be aware of 
11 and incorporate, act upon, the modeling data and 
12 conclusions developed by Mr. Board? 
13 A 2010 would have been Cindy Moore was the 
14 chief mining engineer at that time. And she would have 
15 told me, John, here's something we need to talk about. 
16 Q. Was there someone at Hecla that was 
1 7 responsible for knowing and understanding the modeling 
18 that had been done in 2010 for the 5900 pillar? 
19 A. In 20 l O Lisa Camey was still working. 
2 0 Q. I guess -- let me rephrase the question. 
21 Was there someone in December of201 l that 
2 2 would have been responsible for knowing and 
2 3 understanding the modeling at the 5900 level? 
2 4 A There was no one specifically charged with 
2 5 that. 





on the first page 
conclusion the analyses" and this is 
of the paragraph. "The conclusion from the 
indicate that the pillar is yielded around its 
periphery, but that the interior of the pillar remains 
13 at an unyielded, elastic state." 
14 A. Yes. 
15 Q. Did you have that understanding at any point 
6 in time? 
1 7 A. Yeah. 
18 Q. How did you develop that understanding? 
1 9 A. Looking at the core -- he shows some pictures 
2 0 in here -- in one of these of core. And that is 
21 exactly the conclusion that you would reach from 
2 2 looking at those pictures. 
2 Q. Show me what you're referring to, if you 
2 4 would, please. 
2 5 A. It's in Exhibit 7. 
1 Q. Okay. What page are you referring to? 
2 A. 25. 
3 Q. And what about that coring on page 25 would 
4 indicate to you the conclusion of Mr. Board that I 
5 identified from Mr. Board's report? 
6 A. The discing in the 10 to 30 and the discing 
7 in the 30 to 55. 
8 Q. What does that indicate to you? 
9 A. That the conditions in the 30 to 55 are 
l O similar to what he refers to down here in your -- the 
l conclusion from the analyses in the middle of that ... 
1 
12 MR. RAMSDEN: And when you say "down here," 
13 you're referring to Exhibit 5. 
14 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry. To -- yes, to the 
15 sentence that you called out. 
16 BY r...1R.. ROSSivf,1\N: 
1 7 Q. Okay. Had you ever seen those pictures of 
18 the coring that was done in 201 O? 
l 9 A. I've seen -- I saw the core as it was coming 
2 O out. 2010, that -- I would have been mine 
21 superintendent. And I recall looking at that core as 
2 2 the hole was being drilled. 
2 3 Q. Do you recall developing any or 
2 4 understanding at that point in time? 
5 A. Not a full understanding of it, no. 
mn,prc•r,;,r,r, much 
mmmg like myself 
l O Q. And that's the company retained someone 
1 like Mike Board is so that it can rely upon his 
2 PYpPrtis:P? 
3 .A. Yes. 
MR. RAMSDEN: Mark Board, right? 
MR. ROSSMAN: Mark Board. 
BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
7 Q. You mentioned earlier that the geometrics of 
18 a particular pillar can affect its stability, correct? 
19 A. Yes. 
2 0 Q. Do you know what Mr. Board concluded to be 
21 the width-height ratio of this particular pillar in 
2 2 March of2010? 
2 3 A. No, I don't. 
2 4 Q. Did you ever understand what the width-height 
2 5 was in March -- or in this 5900 
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1 pillar at any time? 
2 A. Well, ifl gave it any thought, it would be 
3 about three-and-a-half-to- I. 
4 Q. Okay. Did you give it any thought at any 
5 point in time? 
6 A. Not that I recall. 
7 Q. And why do you believe it would be 
8 three-and-a-half-to- I? 
9 A. Because the orebody would be roughly l 0 
l O thick. And you would have about 35 feet of unyielded 
11 material around it. So that's just a top-of-the-head 
l 2 calculation. 
13 Q. Do you know what it was at the time of the 
1 4 modeling? 
l 5 A. It would have been the same. 
16 Q. If you'd look at Exhibit No. 7, 
1 7 A. (Complying.) 
18 Q. This appears to be calibration of the 5900 
19 pillar numerical model, dated March of 2010, by 
2 0 Mr. Board; is that correct? 
21 A. Yes. 
2 2 Q. Look at page vi. 
2 3 A Is that different from 
2 4 Q. I think probably a very similar 
2 5 document, but r do different. 
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see the sentence that starts with "it is" and then 
italicized 
A. Yes. 
1.3 Q. Okay. It says, "It is expected that a pillar 
14 of this dimension should have an elastic core. As 
15 discussed in the document, the pillar has a 
16 width:height ratio of around 8 to l 0: I." Do you see 
1 7 that? 
18 A. Yes. 
19 Q. So he was concluding a width-height ratio of 
2 O 8- to 10-to- l; is that correct? 
21 A. Yes. 
2 2 Q. And that's what the width-height ratio was as 
23 of March of 2010, correct? 
2 4 A. Evidently. And evidently I calculated in my 
2 5 head wrong. 
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1 Q. Okay. I want you to look-- let's go back to 
2 5 real quickly. Well, before we go there, stay at that 
3 same page. I apologize. 
4 A. Okay. 
5 Q. I want to ask you if you agree with this 
6 statement. He says right after identifying the 
7 width-height ratio of 8- to 10-to-l, he says, 
8 "Experience at other sites and research studies have 
9 shown that pillars with width-height ratios in brittle 
1 0 rocks become elastic for width-height ratios greater 
11 than about 3." 
12 Did you ever have that understanding? 
13 A. No. I'm not familiar with the research 
14 that's been done on width-to-height ratios. 
15 Q. Did you know at what width-height ratio of 
16 the 5900 pillar it was at of failing? 
17 A. No. 
18 Q. Did you ever know that? 
19 A. No. 
2 0 Q. Did anyone ever tell you that? 
21 A. No. 
2 2 Q. If you could look at Exhibit No. 6, please. 
2 3 A. (Complying.) Okay. 
2 4 Q. This is an Sum'Tiary 
2 5 apparently. It starts on page 
0 approach will continue to create a pillar 
11 vertical height (and decreasing width to 
12 will rrmrP.ntrl'lte vP1n-pPrpPnr1irnlar drP<:<:Pc 
1 3 within the pillar." 
1 4 Do you know what that means? 
15 A. Yes. 
16 Q. What is your understanding of what that 
1 7 means? 
18 A. This is a different pillar. This is the 
1 9 pillar above the -- that's this pillar here. 
2 0 (Pointing.) 
21 Q. Okay. So you believe he's referring to the 
2 2 11 stope? 
2 3 A. I know he 
2 4 Q. All right. If you could look back at Exhibit 
25 No. 5. 
1 A. (Complying.) 
2 Q. That's the first report by l\11.r. Board. 
A. Okay. 
4 Q. Can you tum to page 18, please. 
A. (Complying.) Okay. 
6 Q. You'll agree that this assessment within 
7 Exhibit No. 5 is focused on the 5900 pillar, correct? 
8 A. It appears that that's the case, yes. 
9 Q. Okay. There's three bullets in the middle of 
1 0 that page. And he's talking about stressmeter 
11 calibration results. 
12 In the first bullet he says, "stressmeter 
1 3 calibration and results to factors such as: Gauge 
7 
14 contact area with the borehole wall - the calibration 
15 and response of the gauges is highly sensitive to match 
1 6 of gauge seating platens to the hole wall and the 
1 7 resulting contact area." 
18 Do you know what he's saying by that? 
1 9 A. Yes. And it's what I referred to 4 5 minutes 
2 0 ago that there's only a very small portion of each 
2 1 gauge that is actually in contact with the rock. Okay. 
2 2 And you're inferring the behavior of that small area to 
2 3 the behavior of everything around it. So that -- that 
match will very -- very the output 
gauge. 










































gauge seating platens are the insert that 
into the borehole in the wall to house the 
monitoring gauge; is that --
That's what I would interpret it to. I 
don't -- I'm not real familiar with all the jargon for 
instrumentation. 
Q. The company had been monitoring at the 5900 
level since as long as you had been there, correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Stress monitoring? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And they'd had a lot of problems with the --
with the monitoring gauges that had been installed, 
correct? 
A. Well, you know, it seemed that way to me. 
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Although, those who had worked with stress monitoring 
seemed to feel that, you know, that's just the 
way they are. They're -- they don't live for a long 
time, and they're -- they're kind of difficult to work 
with. So I was led to believe that it wasn't unusual. 
Q. And from those individuals did you understand 
that there are a lot of factors that can affect the 
accuracy of a monitoring gauge? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And a lot of those factors depend upon, not 
just the equipment, the effectiveness of the equipment 
itself, correct? 
A. Which equipment? 
Q. The monitoring gauge itself 
A. That those are big factors, yes. 
Q. The monitoring gauges can be -- can be 
variable in their effectiveness --
A. Yes. 
Q. -- is that your understanding? 
And you understood that in '11, correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And it also can be affected by manner in 
which the platens were installed in the boreholes 




9 in bullet 2, he 
1 says, high variability of the rock along the GH 
1 boreholes, from siderite to vitreous quartzite results 
12 in a high variability of modulus." 
1 3 Do you know what that means? 
14 A. Yes. 
15 Q. What? 
1 6 A. Modulus is the ratio of stress to strain. 
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1 7 Strain is movement within the rock. So the modulus 
18 defines how much stress is required to induce a single 
19 unit of strain in an elastic medium. 
2 O Q. Okay. And your understanding from reading 
1 2 1 this is that Mr. Board was opining that there's a 
2 2 high -- because there's a high variability of the type 
2 3 of rock in the boreholes that that can affect the 
2 4 variability of the modulus? 










Q. Then he also says, "The stress monitored by 
the gauge is sensitive to axis orientation." Do you 
know what that 
A. I'm not sure what axis he's referring to. It 
appears that he's talking about the axis of the 
instrument itself. But he could also be referring to a 
stress axis, the axis of the borehole. And I think 






Q. To summarize his opinions, or your 
understanding at the time in December of' 11, you knew 
there were a lot of factors that could affect the 
13 accuracy of a stress monitoring gauge? 
14 A. Yes. 
15 Q. Do you know who installed the stress 
16 monitoring gauges the November 16th 
17 A. Yes. 
18 Q. Who? 
19 A. Zac Thomas. 
20 Q. What's Zac'sjob title? You might have told 
21 me. 
22 A. Mine planner. 
23 Q. Do you how he those gauges? 
2 A. I don't 
25 Do you know how he boreholes? 
78 to 81) 
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Show you Exhibit No. This appears to be 9 
10 
11 
from Wilson Blake, dated November 30, 2011, 0 
regarding instrumentation. You're not 1 
12 on this ~-m::iil. Rnt w::int tr. >1Sk yr,11 if 
13 you understand what he's saying here. 
14 He says in the third -- fourth sentence down, 
15 "Don't if could schedule DD with the likely press 
16 for production, but maybe room on side of drift if it 
1 7 broke out similar to back. All other holes could be 
18 drilled with Jumbo." 
19 So do you know what he's referring to when he 
2 0 says "could schedule DD with the likely press for 
2 1 production"? 
2 2 A. Diamond drilling is what the DD is. 
2 Q. Okay. 
2 4 A. I'm not sure when he's talking about the 
2 5 likely press for 
1 Q. Then he said, "All other holes could be 
2 drilled with Jumbo." What's jumbo? 
3 A. Jumbo is a 
4 Q. And a percussive -- the jumbo drill is not a 
drill? 
6 A. That's correct. 
7 Q. Do you know what Mr. Thomas's training and 
8 experience is in stress monitoring? 
9 A. Very little. What he learned he learned on 
0 the job working with Ted Williams from NIOSH. 
11 Q. Did he work at NIOSH? 
12 A. Did who work at NIOSH? 
13 Q. Mr. Thomas. 
14 A. No. 
15 Q. He worked as Heda's representative when 
16 Mr. Williams deal with the monitoring? 
1 7 A. Correct. 
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18 Q. Do you know if anybody assisted Mr. Thomas in 
1 9 installing the monitoring gauges? 
2 0 A. I think it's possible that Jeff Parker may 
21 have. 
2 2 Q. And so from prior experience with utilizing 
2 3 stress monitoring at different levels, you understood 
2 4 that there was a pretty high rate with a lot 
2 5 these gauges, correct? 
2 issues that ~'"1r. Board has identified could could 
be a culprit in there. 
Q. And so you say when you're getting data back 
that is not what you would expect, what kind of data 
1 6 would you see that you may not expect? 
1 7 A. You could see erratic data moving in one 
18 direction or the other. 
1 9 Q. Anything else? 
2 0 A. That would be the thing that I would look at. 
21 Q. What about negative data? 
2 2 A. Negative data indicates a change in stress 
2 3 from a positive situation to a negative situation. 
2 4 That can occur. 
2 5 What does that mean to 
Page 8 
1 A. It means that it is now in a more tensile 
2 state than it was. 
3 When you tensile, what does that 
4 A. Well, compression is when you squeeze things 
5 together, and tension is when it comes back apart. So 
6 a tensile state -- a tensile change is a negative. Or 
7 it might be the other way around. It's simply a 
8 convention. But tension is the reverse of compression. 
9 So you can have zones in rock that are in 
1 0 tension. Rock is not as strong in tension. But the 
11 concerns that we have in rockbursting are primarily 
12 compressive stresses. So if you've seen a tensile 
13 behavior in a gauge, that means that the stress is now 
14 reduced from the time that when it was originally 
1 5 installed. 
6 Keep in mind these only measure relative to 
1 7 the time before, basically. It will tell you what has 
18 changed since the last time. It doesn't give you an 
19 absolute number that relates to the state of stress 
2 0 because you don't know what the state of stress is. So 
2 1 what you're getting from the gauge is the changes in 
the state of stress. 
Q. So it doesn't matter what number 
>VV'-"'·M at 
That's all we can measure is 
22 82 t 85) 
no. 
0 Do you ever recall to November 6, 
1 informed anyone that someone had 
as to the stability of the 5900 pillar? 
A. No. Could I see that memo? 
If I brought it, you certainly can. 
(Brief pause.) 
MR. ROSSMAN: I don't have the memo itself. 
7 But let's mark this. 
18 (Whereupon, Deposition Exhibit No. 10 was 
19 marked for identification.) 
2 o BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
21 Q. Exhibit No. 10, that's a letter written by 
2 2 the law firm of Jackson-Kelly to special investigator 
2 3 for the Mine Safety and Health Administration, dated 
2 4 November 8, 2013. Have you reviewed this letter? 
2 5 A. I have not reviewed this. 
Q. Did you know that Hecla retained outside 
7 
2 counsel to defend it in the MSHA proceedings after the 
3 14th 
4 A. Yes. 
5 Q. -- 2011 citations? 
6 MR. RAMSDEN: You need to let him finish his 
7 question before you start your answer. 
8 BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
9 Q. Were you involved in any way in working with 
10 Jackson-Kelly in defending that litigation? 
11 A. Yes. 
12 Q. \Vhat involvement did you have? 
13 A. I was deposed, went to the hearing, testified 
1 4 in the hearing. 
15 Q. Okay. If you look at the six1:h page of this 
statement out of context and uu,'iL'1t·e1rnr,•tPt1 
Well, the for Jackson-Kelly 
emphasizing that what Mr. Blake was in that 
report was the stability of the pillar as 
opposed to the short-tenn stability. Would you 
A. That's what he says, yes. 
MR. RAMSDEN: He who, Jackson-Kelly or Blake? 
THE WITNESS: Jackson. 
1 7 MR. ROSSMAN· The attorney on behalf of 
18 Jackson-Kelly. Karen Johnston. It's a she. 
19 BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
2 0 Q. I want to ask you some questions about --
21 who's Phil Baker? 




Q. Do you report to Mr. Baker? 
A. No. 
Q. \Vho do you report to? 
A. I report to Larry Radford, the chief 
AhcwM,~r, officer. 
Q. And Mr. Radford reports to Mr. Baker? 
A. Yes. 
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6 (Whereupon, Deposition Exhibit No. 11 was 
7 marked for identification.) 
8 BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
9 Q. Exhibit No. 11 is an edited transcript, 
10 Bates page DOL 0457. Edited transcript of a conference 







Q. You ever read this transcript? 
A. No. 




A. (Complying.) Okay. 1 7 A. No. 
Q. It's referencing-- or this attorney for 18 Q. If you could look at page 0464. 
Hecla is referencing an April 5th, 2010, report from 19 A. (Complying.) Okay. 
20 Wilson Blake, where he stated, "I do have some doubts 2 0 Q. In the middle of the page, under Phil Baker, 
21 about the stability of the 5900 drift pillar." 21 second paragraph, he says, "We would not to you 
22 
WWW 
Do you ever recall reviewing that memo? 2 2 that the rock burst is any way related to this 
A. The April 5th memo? 2 3 specifically." He's referencing the rockburst on 
2010. 24 December 14,201 L 
25 "In it doesn't have 











1 3 connected. 



















Q. Okay. So what do you understand that he's 
referring to when he references "the shaft"? 
A. The shaft would be the silver shaft. 
Q. Gold Hunter? 
A. No. The Lucky Friday silver shaft. 
Q. And that does not include the 5900 pillar? 
A. No. The 5900 pillar is some 4 to 5,000 feet 
away. 
Q. Do you know what he's referring to when he 
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I 1 A. The rockburst that occurred in either 
I , 
November or December. 
At the 5900 
A. Yes. 
5 Q. He says, "And when you say you're concerned I 5 
6 with the rock burst, the rock burst incident only 
1 
6 
7 happened because we had a haulage way that was going : 7 
8 through the 30 vein, which we had mined around, and had / 8 
9 created a pillar, and it was known that that pillar 1 9 
I 
1 0 would have the potential to burst." i 10 
11 Did you know that the pillar in December [ 11 
12 of -- or in November of 2011 had the potential to I 12 
13 burst? ~ ,,· 13 
14 A. All pillars have a potential to burst in a 14 





And you understood that at the time? j 6 
A. Yes. , 1 7 
Q. You understood that in December as well? j ~ 8
9 A. Yes. 
1 Q. And the company had known that since the 2 0 
21 creation of the pillar, correct? 1121 
22 A. Yes. 22 
2 3 Q. And then he says, "And the thing that ended 12 3 
2 up happening was we ended up not being able to , 2 
5 when that burst I 2 5 
Assessment. And then there's a form here that 
identifies -- on the page, identified 
the mitigation. 
A. Yes. 
Q. And on the subsequent pages there's a risk 
assessment worksheet. Have you ever seen this form 
before? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Where did you see that fonn? 
This is a fairly standard form that is used 
by -- throughout the mining industry for performing 
risk assessments. 
Q. Okay. This says at the bottom right comer 
on the second page, printed 1/12/2012. Was this form 
utilized by Hecla prior to that date? 
A. This would have been created probably prior 
Page 9 
to the date t.1-iat it was -- of this printing. 
Has there ever a point in time that you 
that did not have these 
worksheets? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What point in time? 
A. Prior to beginning the process with 
Symatation (phonetic). this is a form that they 
utilized and we liked the way it was done, so we 
adopted a similar process. 
Q. When did Hecla start working with Symatation? 
A. I think that was in 2008 or 2009. 
Q. So sometime after working with Symatation, 
Hecla started developing these risk assessment 
worksheets? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you have any involvement in development 
of these sheets, these assessments? 
A Not in the development of the process, no. 
But I was involved in this risk assessment. 
Q. What is a risk assessment? 
A It's a process where you bring multiple 
people in to review the risks that might be associated 
any process then input as to 
what the possible. consequences, the likelihood of the 
4 90 9 
a 




H(lw ic: thM rid, utilized? 
A. assess what the risk after the control 
measures are implemented will be. 
Q. There's an initial risk ranking and then 
1 6 there's a post control risk ranking; is that correct? 
1 7 A. Yes. 
18 Q. So if you look at page 2 of3, this appears 
19 to relate to some of the work that was being done in --
2 0 or at least after the December 14th burst. But No. 8 
2 1 says, "Concrete shaft liner breaking up below the 5900 
2 2 station has been identified." Do you know what that 
2 3 means? 
2 4 A. Yes. 
2 5 What does that mean? 
1 A. They identified some fractures in the 
2 concrete in the shaft liner below 5900 station. 
3 That was after the 14th 
4 A. Yes. 
5 Q. And it's talking about operational impacts. 
6 Do you know what that means? 
7 A. Yeah. 
8 Q. What? 
9 A. What that refers to is an operational impact 
10 would be something that reduces or impacts your ability 
11 to operate the shaft. In this particular case, the 
12 impact would be that you'd have to stop hoisting and 
13 repair those cracks. 
1 4 Q. And by stopping hoisting how does that affect 
15 the operation? 
1 6 A. It shuts the operation down. 
7 Q. And that has a revenue 
18 A. Certainly. 
19 Q. And that was a consideration or -- or one of 
2 0 the factors that was addressed in this particular 
2 1 assessment; is --
2 2 A. One of many, yeah. 
1
2 3 Q. One many was the impact --
I 2 4 that mitigating that hazard 
5 cause? 
once Hecla 
1 O hazards would warrant 
1 assessment? 
12 This \Vas 
13 done. 
14 Q. So it's your --
assessment that Hecla had 
15 A. The first assessment that Hecla 
16 had done. 
1 7 Q. Your testimony is there was never a formal 
8 risk assessment done before January 12, 2012? 
1 9 A. Whatever the date was when this was 
2 0 performed. 
21 Q. How did Hecla perform risk assessment prior 
2 2 to this date? 
2 3 A. The Lucky Friday was not performing risk 
2 4 assessments prior to that date. Not formal risk 
2 5 assessments. 
1 Q. Clarify formal risk assessments. What do you 
2 mean? 
A. A formal risk assessment is through 
this process. An informal risk assessment would be a 
5 miner walking into an area and saying, oh, there's a 
6 broken hose. If I tum the valve on, it would whip 
7 around and hit me. So I need to repair the hose. 
8 He's assessed the risk, and he has identified 
9 a mitigation measure and then he performs that 
1 O mitigation. Once that's been perfonned, the risk is 
11 lowered. 
12 Q. Did you as general manager in 2011 perform 
13 infonnal risk assessments similar to what we have on 
1 4 this document? 
7 
15 A. We would. But we would never have documented 
16 it to the same extent. That's one of the values that 
having a formal risk assessment process does is it 
18 documents; it assigns responsibilities for who will 
1 9 execute what and when. 
2 0 Q. So prior to January 12, 2012, the company 
21 performed these types of risk assessments; it just was 
2 2 more of an informal process? 
2 3 A. That's correct 
And the infonnal process included the same 
of considerations that we've talked about 












Who was involved in 
A Myself, Doug Bayer, John Lund, Wilson 
Q. Anyone else? 
A I'm sure there were many others, but we 
didn't document it, so I can't go back and identify all 
the players. 
Q. Was Phil Baker involved? 
A I don't believe so, no. Not -- he would have 
2 0 been involved by being briefed as to what we were ... 
21 
22 
Q. Was Larry Radford involved? 
A Larry would have been involved, yes. 
23 Q. Was this a particular meeting or was this 
2 4 a how was this handled? 
2 
1 Q. Are there e-mails related to these meetings? 
2 A Possibly. I don't recall every e-mail that 
have been floating around. 
4 Would there have been calendaring 
5 documentation to identify this meeting? 
6 A What? 
7 Q. Did you keep a calendar? 
8 A Not a formal calendar, no. 
9 Q. Would there be any way to identify when this 
10 occurred -- or this series of meetings? 
11 A It would have been after the -- after the 
12 event and before we started implementing the repair 
13 plan. 
14 Q. Okay. What was discussed, to your 
15 recollection, in this risk assessment? 
16 A What we would need to do to repair 
17 damage. What we wanted to install as a -- you know, a 
18 long-term mitigation process. That was the process 
19 where we came up with the idea of installing the tunnel 
20 liner and the Tekfoam surrounding it. 
21 Q. Were there discussions regarding operational 
22 impacts of the 5900 pillar being shut down? 
23 A. There were some considerations given to the 
24 operational impacts. But there was a clear recognition 
be to operate the tunnel 
of ground control measures taken? 
A Yes. cable the 
12 instrumentation. There was a lot of work that needed 
13 to be done then. 
14 Q. At some point the decision was made to 
restart mining of the 10, 11 and at least 14 stopes 
during that rehabilitation process, correct? 
7 A CotTect. 
8 Q. Who made that decision? 
9 A That was -- we submitted -- we were operating 
2 0 under an order -- I think that's correct, Mike -- from 
2 MSHA that controlled what we could and what we couldn't 
22 do. 
2 3 So once we had completed phase l of the 

























go back mining until the tunnel liner arrives. And 
then once the tunnel liner arrives we will stop all 
operations and nrr,,...c,.,,ti 
0 
Q. Who was responsible for communicating with 
MSHA during that 103(k) process? 
Primarily it was Doug Bayer. 
Q. Anyone else? 
A The safety manager at the time, Scott 
Hogamier was also communicating with them. 
Q. Were you communicating directly with MSHA? 
A Not -- yeah, we were communicating directly. 
They had a presence on site, and we did a lot of 
talking back and forth. 
Q. You say they had a presence on site, what 
does that mean? 
A. They had an that was much on 
site every day. 
Q. Do you know who that was? 
A For a while it was Scott Amos. And at times 
I remember that Rod Gust was there. 
Q. Do you know what Mr. Amos or Mr. Gust were 
doing at the site? 
A They were inspecting, looking at the various 
ensuring that we were complying with our 
plan. 




9 9 And the rrtAmnr~ 
10 And do you know -- were you aware 1 0 were one of the 
11 were documenting each time they nP,c+r.,n-r.,sri an 
inspection? 1 
13 A. Yes. 







Q Did you read it entirely? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you understand it? 
A. To the extent of my ability to do so. 1 5 observed the monitoring data that was being obtained 
1 6 from the 5900 pillar during rehabilitation? 
17 
18 
A. I don't personally know that. 
16 Q. Okay. \Vhat was the purpose of this memo, to 
1 7 your understanding? 
18 A. To document what had happened and to give us 
19 
20 
Q. Were they shown Wilson Blake's memoranda 
during that time period? 
A. They had access to all of our data. 
21 Q. You say they had access to your data, what do 
2 2 you mean by that? 
1 9 guidance as to whether or not our proposal to put a 
drift liner in with Tekfoam would be a practical or 







23 A. I mean they have the right, the authority to 
2 4 tell us to produce this. 





did you understand that Hecla had some responsibility I 1 
to communicate information to MSHA? j 2 
A. Yeah. j 3 
4 MR. RAMSDEN: Object, legal conclusion. Go I 4 
5 ahead and answer. 5 
6 BY MR. ROSSMAN: I 6 
7 Q. \Vhat did you understand Hecla's 7 
8 responsibility to be? 8 
9 A. To produce the information that they I 9 
l O requested. I 1 0 
11 Q. Did you understand that Hecla was responsible j 11 
12 to accurately and honestly communicate with MSHA? ! 12 
13 MR. RAMSDEN: Object to the form. 113 
14 THE WITNESS: Yes. 14 
1 5 MR. RAMSDEN: Legal conclusion. i 15 
1 BY .MR. ROSSMAN: J 16 
17 Q. Was it your testimony that when the 
18 monitoring was established after the November 16th 
1 9 burst that the only thing the stress monitoring was 
2 0 evaluating was change in stress? 
21 A. Yes. 
22 Q. So the stress monitoring wouldn't tell you 
2 3 what the level of stress was at the time the 
2 4 were installed? 











mitigation measure to implement. 
Q. Did you ask Mr. Blake to provide -- to opine 
or provide input to the company regarding the 
rehabilitation --
A. Yes. 
Q. -- efforts that were going to be made? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. And did Mr. Blake -- do you believe Mr. Blake 
understood that that was one of his responsibilities? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And was Hecla relying upon Mr. Blake's input 
in that area? 
A. Yeah. Wilson has a long relationship with 
Hecla. And we have -- we put a lot of credibility in 
his opinion. 
Q. Were you relying upon -- or was he providing 
opinions regarding the safety of that pillar during the 
rehabilitation process? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was Hecla 
A. Yes. 
upon those? 
Q. He was not employed by Hecla, correct? 
A. Well, he was a consultant that we used. 
Q. But he was not employed by Hecla? 
A. He was not a Hecla employee, no. 
Q. He says in the third sentence, "The 
limitations of this" -- he's to the 2004 
modeling. "These results indicated that a 50 ft pillar 
would be a 1.5 factor of 






12 He said these --
13 A. -- output --
14 Oh, I'm sorry. Were you finished? 
15 
16 Q. Can you finish? 
17 A. I don't know if the factor of safety was a 
18 specific output of the subsequent studies. 
19 Q. Then it says, "The limitations of this 
20 modeling were recognized, and as a result, the 
21 stability of the 55 ft circular pillar surrounding the 
22 5900 level access through the orebody has always been 
23 some concern." Do you agree with that statement? 
24 A. Not -- not entirely, no. 
25 So with Mr. Blake's statement 
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1 that the stability of that pillar was always of some 
2 concern? 
3 I don't think that it was always a 
4 concern. It got to be a matter of concern when we 
5 started having these major rockbursts that were 
6 occurring adjacent to the opening rather than in the 
7 interior of the pillar where we had anticipated there 
8 would be some yielding. 
9 Q. He seems to indicate there were concerns as 
10 far back as 2004 given the limitations of the modeling 
11 that was done. You disagree with that? 
12 A. I do. 
13 Q. Okay. He says, in the middle, it says, "Both 
14 the stress and closure values." 
15 A. And where are we at? 
16 Q. The third paragraph down. 
17 A. Third paragraph. Okay. 
18 Q. He said, "Itasca concluded that the 5900 
19 pillar was stable and too big to fail suddenly and 
20 violently, behaving more like stabilizing pillar." 
21 A. Yes. 








































He said, ''We did have with the 
.9." nnrlPr<:tririrl th;it >i<: wcc11? 
A. Yes. 
Q. He said, "The model results also indicated 
that the only way the pillar could fail was if the 
height to width ratio changed and the pillar lost 
confinement, in which case a foundation failure might 
occur." Did you understand that in December of201 l? 
A. No, I did not. And to this point I still do 
not understand foundation failures very clearly. 
Q. Okay. He says, "The model assumed a 10: 1 
width to height ratio." You said you read this memo, 
con-ect? 
A. Yes. 




And did you model u.0..:,cu,,v~ 
a width-to-height ratio in reading this memo? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And did you understand that Mr. Blake is 
telling you from the modeling that if the 
height-to-width ratio changed and the pillar lost 
confinement the pillar could fail? 
MR. RAMSDEN: Object, foundation, calls for 
speculation. 
THE WITNESS: Yes. But I don't see anything 
in here that tells me that the height-to-width ratio is 
different. 
BYMR. ROSSMAN: 
Q. Let's look at the next paragraph. "With the 
observed stress deterioration along inner and outer 
edges of the pillar, likely in the 10 ft range, the 
width:height ratio of the in place doughnut shaped 
pillar is actually 3.5, assuming a 10 ft vein 
thickness." 
Do you that he's you that it's 
now 3.5 width-to-height ratio? 
what 
So now he's 
















pillar had substantially changed 
16th of 2011? 
I didn't that at that time. 
Did you understand that the modeling that had 
done was based upon a width-to-height ratio 
A. I didn't understand that, no. 
Q. Was there any discussion m these risk 
assessment conferences about there being a substantial 
vu,,u11";'-' in the width-to-height ratio of the pillar? 
A. This risk assessment doesn't have anything to 
do with this. (Pointing.) 
Q. Were you involved then in the decision to 




Q. And in doing so did you understand that the 
2 dimensions of that pillar had substantially changed? 
A. I did not, no. 
4 Did you understand that the modeling that had 
5 done in 2010 was based upon entirely different 
6 dimensions than existed at that time? 
7 MR. RAMSDEN: Object to the form. 
8 THE WITNESS: No. And, in fact, I'm not sure 
9 what the import of this ratio is. \\That they're talking 
1 0 about is if it gets below whatever number he said, 
11 you'll have a foundation failure. That has never 
12 OCCU1Ted. 
13 BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
14 Q. Okay. You're trying -- by having modeling 
15 you're trying -- one of the things you're trying to do 
1 6 is predict when a foundation failure -- when or if a 
7 foundation failure may occur, correct? 
18 A. Or other mechanisms, yes. 
19 Q. Or other mechanisms. And one of the factors 
2 0 that the modeling assumes in detennining when or if a 
2 1 foundation failure will occur is the width-to-height 
2 2 ratio of the pillar? 
2 3 A. So they say. 
4 Okay. did you 
2 5 crews down into the 5900 level that the dimensions --
WWW 
A. I did not 
Did you it 
A I did not. .i-.. 12 
1 3 Did you ask any of the engineering 
14 consultants employed Hecla what that means? 
1 A. No, I did not. 
1 Q. Did you understand after the November 16, 
1 7 2011, burst that the pillar was still under stress? 
1 8 A. My understanding would have been that once a 
1 9 large burst occurs, it is de-stressed to some extent. 
2 0 Stress is never gone entirely. But the stress would be 
21 reduced. And the conventional wisdom in effecting 
2 2 rockburst repairs is you do it as soon as possible 
2 3 because that is the least likely time for it to burst 
2 4 again. 
2 5 understood or 
pillar had been de-stressed as a result of the 
2 November 16 burst? 
3 A. Reduced in stress, yes. 
11 
4 Q. Even though the dimensions of that pillar had 
changed? 
6 A. The dimensions hadn't changed remarkably. 
7 Q. So going from a 10-to-1 width-to-height ratio 
8 to a 3. 5 is not substantial in your mind? 
9 A. The pillar was still the pillar. It's the 
1 0 same pillar that we looked at in the section. It's 
11 still there. So I don't know what Wilson is talking 
12 about there. The pillar is still the same pillar. 
13 Q. And that was your understanding when you sent 
1 4 crews into the --
15 A Yes. 
16 Q. -- pillar to perform the rehabilitation 
1 7 project? 
18 A. Yes. 
19 Q. It was the same as it was before? 
2 0 A. Yes. 
21 Q. If you'll look at page 2 of Mr. Blake's 
2 2 November 25th repmt, Exhibit No. . If you look 
2 3 under Mechanism of 5900 Piliar that section. 
24 
2 paragraph down, he 
the pillar was near 
10 A. I recalled summary on the back end 
said that the occurrence another 2.8 magnitude 
1 burst is very unlikely. Can't be totally eliminated, 
13 but it's quite unlikely. That's the big thing that I 







2011 that Mr. Blake was calling 
modeling based upon the November 16th burst? 
A. Yes. That's -- that's 
Q. Did you ask for any additional modeling? 
A. I don't know if we commissioned Itasca to do 
15 Q. Okay. So let's focus on the question I'm 15 that or not. 
16 asking. My question is did you understand that prior 16 Q. I'll represent I haven't seen any 
1 7 to the November 16, 2011 burst, Mr. Blake believed that 1 7 documentation representing additional modeling after 
18 the stress in the pillar was very near the unconfined 18 November 16, 2011. Do you recall there being such? 
19 compressive strength of the pillar? 19 A I do not 
20 A. No, I didn't This is written November 25th, 2 0 Q. Do you recall discussing whether or not to 
21 which is after the burst 21 have Itasca do further modeling? 




November 16th -- 2 3 Q. Do you recall making a decision not to do 
A. Okay. 2 4 further modeling? 
Q. -- that the strength -- stress in the pillar 2 5 A. No. I don't recall that either. 
was very near its compressive strength? 
MR. RAMSDEN: Object to the form, 
mischaracterizes what the report says. Go 
answer the question. 
5 
and 
l Q. He says why this burst occurred has 
2 significant implications with respect to mining the 
3 mam 











THE WITNESS: I don't recall being concerned Q. What do you understand by the words "mining 
10 
about that issue. 
BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
Q. Do you believe that the November 16th burst 
to some extent may have de-stressed the pillar? 
A. Yes. 
11 Q. Did you take any steps to detennine how much 
12 the pillar had been de-stressed? 
13 A. There's no means to do that. 
14 Q. Mr. Blake was calling for additional modeling 
1 S of the pillar; do you recall that? 
6 No. I don't recall that. 
1 7 MR. ROSSMAN: Okay. Let's look at ... 







A. That means -- if I can to that ... 
Q. The map? 
A. That long section. There we go. 
Q. What exhibit is that? 
A. Exhibit 4. 
Q. Okay. 
13 A. He's referring to this block of ore. 
14 (Indicating.) 
15 Q. Which stopes? 
16 A. 11 and 14. 
1 7 Q. Okay. So he's he's will you 
18 (Whereupon, Deposition Exhibit No. 14 was 
19 marked for identification.) 
20 BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
18 agree, that the company needs to better understand why 
19 the November 16th burst occurred as it has significant 
2 0 implications with respect to mining the main sill which 
21 Q. Show you Exhibit 14, which is the 21 includes stopes 11 and 14? 
2 2 November 18, 2011, report from Mr. Blake. If you look 2 2 A. I agree that that's what saying. 
2 3 under Model Results and 5900 Pillar Burst, page 2 2 3 Q. Vv'hat did you understand to be the 
2 4 his report, sentence, "Because the actual 2 4 implications burst to the of 
5 appears to have been controlled, we may 2 the main 





14 But he was believing at that time, if I'm 
15 interpreting him c01Tectly, that this was likely a 
16 foundation failure. And it turns out that the current 
17 thinking is that it's a fault-slip mechanism. 
18 BYMR. ROSSMAN: 
19 Q. And he was believing it was a foundation 
20 failure right up to December 14, 2011, correct? 
21 MR. RAMSDEN: Object to the form, calls for 
22 speculation. 
23 BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
24 Q. Did anyone tell you prior to December 14, 
1 November 16, 2011, burst was anything other than a 
2 foundation failure? 
A. My belief at that time was that it 
4 was a pillar burst. 
5 Q. Okay. Did anyone tell you prior to 
6 December 14th that they felt it was a fault-slip? 
7 A. No. 
8 Q. In fact, Mr. -- will you agree that by saying 
9 "we may want Itasca to rerun the model with structure 
1 0 running through the pillar in order to see if we can 
11 replicate the burst" and that "we really need to better 
12 understand why this burst occurred" that he didn't 
13 fully understand why the November 16th burst occurred? 
14 A. Yes. 
15 MR. RAMSDEN: Object, calls for speculation. 
16 BY MR. R0SS1'v1AN: 
1 7 Q. Did you fully understand that burst 
18 occurred? 
1 9 A. I did not. 
2 0 Q. And what he was saying is he would really 
21 like to see additional modeling to better understand 
2 2 why that occurred, correct? 
1
2 3 :tv1R. RAMSDEN: Object, speculation. 
2 4 THE WITNESS: Correct. His concern 

















that pillar before sending in? 
A. Th!'1t'c: nr.t 
MR. RAMSDEN: Object, compound. 
THE WITNESS: he was referring to. 
MR. RAMSDEN: Let me finish. Object. It's 
compound. It's argumentative. Go ahead and answer if 
you can. 
WITNESS: I can't. 
BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
Q. Is a purpose of modeling to determine the 
safety of a pillar? 
A The purpose of the modeling is to determine 
the appropriate measures to complete the work or 
abandon the work, if that's the appropriate measure. 
~~ 0 Yff<'2010 And 
1 he's referencing all through there what the risk of 
2 foundation failure -- or a pillar failure might be. Is 
3 that one things you to see from 
4 MR. RAMSDEN: Object, calls for speculation 
5 on the part of this witness, foundation. Go 
ahead and answer if you can. 
7 WITNESS: I can't 
8 BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
9 Q. Do you ask for modeling to help you decide 
1 0 whether or not a particular area is safe for your 
11 employees? 
12 A. Yes, we do. That's why we did it. 
13 Q. And did you ask for any additional modeling 
14 after November 16th? 
15 A. I did not. But the modeling that is called 
16 for in here is not specific to the of the 
7 employees performing that work. It's specific to work 
18 that will be done down the road. 
19 Q. So is it your testimony --
20 A Mr. Board has done all of that modeling 
21 in-house since coming to work for us. 
22 Q. And do you know how difficult it would have 
for tvfr. Board to rerun the modeling with the 
2 4 modified structure 
25 
1 8 to 





We had a higher frequency of seismic events 
13 on the eastern portion of the 30 vein than we on 
14 the western portion. 
15 Q. If you look at Exhibit 4, can you tell me 
16 what you're referring to by the eastern portion of the 
l 
18 A. This zone. (Indicating.) 
19 Q. The area to the right of the 5900 pillar? 
2 0 A. Co1Tect. 
21 Q. Which would include the east wall of the 5900 
2 2 pillar? 
2 3 A. That wasn't -- I couldn't tell you exactly 
2 4 what zones he -- he refers to. But I do know that the 
2 5 eastern did have a 
23 
seismic frequency. 
2 Q. He says under Summary, "Because the upper 
3 and back appeared to be we can't assume 
4 the remaining pillar is destressed, hence the 
5 rehabilitation needs to proceed with caution." Do you 
6 recall reading that? 
7 A Yes. 
8 Q. What did you understand he meant by that? 
9 A Proceed with caution. 
10 Q. Okay. What steps did Hecla take to proceed 
11 during the rehabilitation process with caution? 
12 A. The process -- the plan that we put together 
13 utilized a process that was as conservative as we could 
14 possibly make it and still complete the activity. 
15 We actually started repairs 50 to 75 feet 
the area we had the So we were 
17 certain that all the area up to there was as secure as 
18 possible so that our people would be working in secured 
19 ground. 
20 Q. Did you afford consideration to the need for 
21 further modeling before sending employees into that 
22 sill -- into the pillar? 
23 A. I did not. No. 
124 Q. The company could have --




1 0 in and initiate your rehabilitation because the stress 
11 has been relieved to some extent the release 
12 stress that accompanies the roekburst or that the 
3 rockburst is evidence of 
14 Q. We saw reference in a prior exhibit to 
15 reference that at least in November -- or at least in 
1 6 2010 the pillar was wide enough to withstand the stress 
1 7 at that particular level --
18 A. Mm-hmm. 
1 9 Q. -- correct? 
20 A. Yes. 
21 Q. What did you understand that to mean? 
2 2 A. That the load on the pillar was not excessive 
2 3 compared to what the pillar could tolerate. That we 
2 4 were still above unity with the factor of safety. 
2 5 And that to the 
12 
wide enough to handle that load, is it fair to say that 
2 a wider or larger pillar is more -- generally more 
stable than a smaller pillar? 
4 A. I think that's a fair statement. 
Q. Mr. Blake said "Because the upper ribs and 
6 back appeared to be solid, we can't assume that the 
7 remaining pillar is destressed. 11 Did you read that 
8 portion of his memo? 
9 A. Yes. 
0 Q. Did you have that understanding? 
11 A. I didn't agree with that. It's pretty co1mnon 
12 knowledge that after a rockburst the stress -- state of 
13 stress is lower. 
14 Q. Does that assume that the dimensions of the 
15 pillar haven't changed as a result of the burst? 
16 Yes. 
17 Q. So Mr. Blake is telling you that because the 
18 upper ribs and back appeared to be solid, we can't 
19 assume that the remaining pillar de-stressed, but you 
20 didn't believe him? 
21 MR. RAMSDEN: Object to the form. It's 
22 argumentative. Go ahead and answer. 
23 THE WITNESS: I disagreed with him. I had a 
24 different opinion. 
25 BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
32 to 125) 
8 
10 
11 he related that to the 
12 statement that \Ve can't --~ the that the and 
1 3 appeared to be solid to the statement that we 
14 can't assume the pillar is de-stressed? 
15 MR RAMSDEN: Objection 
16 WITNESS: No. I don't know how he 
1 7 related that. 
18 BY MR ROSSMAN: 
19 Q. Okay. Were you involved in the decision to 
2 0 restart mining during the rehabilitation process? 
21 A Which part of the rehabilitation process? 
2 2 Q. Well, prior to December 14, 2011, the company 
2 3 started mining --
24 A Yes. 
2 5 Q. -- 10, 11 and 14 0~rsr,a0'/ 
12 
1 A. Yes. When we had the modification to the (k) 
2 that allowed us to resume operation, we brought 
3 our employees back. 
4 Q. And you--
5 A. And that was part of the process that said 
6 that once the liner a1Tives, we will cease mining 
7 operations. 
8 Q. You believe that MSHA approved the company's 
9 continuing to restmt mining? 
10 A. They did. 
11 Q. Did you speak to anybody at MSHA that 
1? represented that they were agreeable to you continuing 
13 mining? 
14 A. Yes. 
15 Q. Who did you speak with? 
16 A. Scott Amos. 
17 Q. \Vho was present? 
18 A. Scott Amos was present. I think Doug Bayer 
19 was present at the time. 
20 Q. When was this? 
21 A. This was sometime the two rockbursts. 
22 Q. What was discussed? 




our plan was. .And we said that 
were in and in the steel 
pouring Tekfoam around the annulus, outside the 
And he thought that was a good idea. 
Q. He vvhat \Vas a good idea? 
A Our -- the plan that we presented for 
remediation rehabilitation of that drift. 
1 Q. What was specifically said to Mr. Amos about 
1 6 the company's intention to restart mining? 
1 7 A I -- I don't recall. 
18 Q. Okay. Did you or anyone in your presence 
19 tell Mr. Amos the extent to which the company intended 
2 0 to restart mining? 
21 A It was communicated that we would restart all 
2 2 of the the activities. 
2 3 Q. Restart all of the activities, what does that 
24 mean? 


























You were present when Mr. Amos was told the 
company intended to restart all of its mining 
activities? 
A It would be in the request modification 
that went to MSHA what activities we would be 
performing. 
Q. So you're talking about the written 
documentation --
A Yes. 
Q. -- request for modification that was provided 
by Hecla to MSHA? 
A Yes. 
Q. And outside of what's in that document, did 
you or anyone else in your presence make any 
representations to Hecla as to the extent of the mining 
that would be done? 
MR. RAMSDEN: Representations to MSHA, you 
mean? 
MR. ROSSMAN: Yes. 
THE WITNESS: Outside of that document? 
BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
Q. Yes. 
A I can't recall specifics all of the 
conversations But believe that we u1;:,,,.,c,l,"""'"' 
with Scott Amos that we were going to -- at that point 
26 to 12 
0 
11 
12 Did you or anyone else outside of the 
l 3 document tell MSHA what stopes you intended to 
14 A. don't know. 
l 5 Did you or anyone else outside of the 
16 document tell MSHA how many shifts you intended to run? 
l 7 A I do not know. 
18 Q. Did you or anyone else on behalf of Hecla 
1 9 outside of the docwnent tell MSHA where within those 
2 0 stopes you intended to mine? 
2 A. I do not know. 
2 Q. Did you or anyone else on behalf of Hecla 
2 3 tell MSHA outside of the document the distance to which 
2 4 you intended to mine in each of these stopes? 
2 5 A I do not know. 
1 Q. To your lmowledge at the time that MSHA 
31 
2 approved mining activity had they seen any monitoring 
3 data the stress """""V' 
4 A. 1 do not know. 
5 Had they seen any closure data? 
6 A. I do not know. 
7 Q. Was there anything that would have prevented 
8 Hecla from waiting until the tunnel liner was installed 
9 to restart mining? 
10 A. No. 
11 Q. The purpose for the tunnel liner at the 5900 
12 level was to provide further stability? 
13 A. Yes. 
14 Q. And with the tunnel liner and the additional 
15 rehabilitation measures, it was expected that the 
16 pillar could withstand seismic activity up to 2.2 on a 
1 7 Richter scale, c01Tect? 
18 A. I'm not sure what number on a Richter scale 
1 9 it was assessed at But it was assessed that that 
2 0 would be adequate to allow us to continue operations 
2 1 through that stretch. 
22 Q. Was it ever discussed by you or in your 
2 3 presence -- anyone else in your presence whether or not 
2 4 to mining until was 
2 5 that I recall. 
. 6 
Yes. 
And this was after the December 
is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
201 
Q. Do you recall asking Mr. Blake and Mr. Board 
to prepare a memo relating to that rockburst? 
A The question is do I recall initiating that 
request? 
17 Q. Yes. 
18 A I do not recall it, no. 
19 Q. Do you recall what the purpose of their 
2 0 evaluation of that rockburst was? 
21 A Essentially I think this was to follow up on 
2 2 Wilson's -- Wilson Blake's concerns. And we brought 
2 3 Mark in to discuss it, talk about things like 
2 additional modeling that could or should be done, et 
25 cetera. 
1 Q. Okay. If you look at page 5, there's a 
2 section entitled December 14 Event where they're 
describing that particular is that con-ect? Do 
4 you see that section? 
5 A. I see it I'm trying to review it and 
6 understand what's being said here. 
7 (Brief pause.) 
8 BY MR ROSSMAN: 
9 Q. I'm just talking about that section entitled 
10 December 14 Event 
11 A. Oh, okay. Down at the bottom? 
12 Q. Mm-hmm. Continuing onto page 6. 
13 A. (Witness examining document.) Okay. 
14 Q. You agree in that section they are providing 
15 their opinion regarding the cause of the December 14th 
6 rockburst? 
17 A Yes. 
18 Q. If you look at page 6, the top of the page 
19 they say, "This" -- and they're refeITing to the 
2 0 December 14th burst -- "appears to be a typical strain 
21 burst mechanism resulting from the solid pillar in the 
2 2 wall of the 5900 drift reaching its peak strength." 
2 3 Do you recali developing that understanding? 
24 
25 "It appears that the causing mechanism of 




13 3-to- l now, I don't 
l 4 understand why it would ever have been considered a 
15 . That paii confuses me. Other than that, I 
1 6 can certainly read it. And they're saying that, yes, 
l 7 that this was a reduced pillar and that was the cause. 
1 8 This is after the fact, but ... 
19 Q. Well, you agree that Mr. Blake was telling 
2 0 you on November 25th that the pillar had reduced its 
21 width-height ratio as a result of the November 16th 
22 
2 3 A. I still am confused as to how it reduced from 
to 3-to- l. 
Will that Mr. Blake was 
1 at least as of November 18, 2011, that he believed the 
2 pillar walls had reached near their peak strength at 
3 the time of the November 16th burst? 
4 MR. RAMSDEN: Object to the form. 
THE WITNESS: I can't -- I've got to go back 
6 and sort through this. 
7 BY MR ROSSMAN: 
8 Q. And from what we've read, will you agree that 
4 
9 Mr. Blake had told you on November 25th of201 l that we 
1 0 can't assume that the pillar has de-stressed based upon 
11 the solid ribs and walls of the pillar? 
12 (Witness examining document.) 
13 THE WITNESS: It appears that that's what he 
14 said, yes. 
15 BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
16 Q. Okay. The first bullet, the last part of 
1 7 that sentence says, "and the mining- induced 
18 stress in the pillar." 
19 A. Which one are we on? 
2 0 Q. Page 6, first bullet. 
21 A. Ofl5? 
22 Q. Exhibit 15. 
2 3 (Witness examining document.) 
2 4 THE WITNESS: That's what he 




12 recall that? 
13 A. Do I recall reading it? I'm reading it now, 
1 but I don't recall reading --
15 Q. Do you have any basis for disagreeing with 
1 6 that statement that that was the cause of the 
1 7 December 14th burst? 
1 8 A. I don't have the basis to dispute that, no. 
19 Q. He says, "From the intense damage to the east 
2 0 wall of the 5 900 drift through the pillar it is 
2 1 presumed that this burst was located some 5 meters from 
2 2 this wall." 
2 3 Did you ever develop an understanding that 
the source or the believed source of the burst was 
5 meters from the east wall of the 
l 
pillar? 
2 A. I'm sony 
you an as to where 
4 this burst occurred on December 14,201 ? 
5 A. Yes. I was aware that it was a burst within 
6 the pillar. 
7 Q. Did you understand it was a burst -- the 
8 burst damaged the east wall of the pillar and that the 
9 burst was located approximately 5 meters from the east 
1 0 wall of the pillar? 
11 A. I'm sure I understood it at the time. 
12 Q. Prior to December 14th were you monitoring 
13 the east wall? 
14 A. Yes. 
15 Q. And how were you monitoring the east wall? 
1 6 A. With the seismic monitoring system. 
1 7 Q. Seismic monitoring system that was showing 
l 8 nothing but negative readings, correct? 
19 A. No. That was the -- that was the 
2 O instrumentation. 
21 Q. Okay. 
2 2 A. TI1e seismic monitoring system is the 
2 3 rockburst monitoring system. 
2 4 How is 
2 the east wall of the 
0 1 
12 Did you have an understanding as to the 
1 3 extent to which you were stress monitoring the east 
14 wall? 
15 A. I'm sorry. 
1 6 Q. How were you monitoring -- stress monitoring 
1 7 the east wall? 
1 8 A We had stress gauges installed. 
1 9 Q. Do you know how many? 
2 0 A No. I don't know how many we had. 
21 Q. Do you know the location? 
2 2 A Generally I know the locations. 
2 3 Q. What is your understanding of the location of 
2 4 the stress monitoring on the east wall prior to 













A I'm not following you. 





on the east wall November 16th 
I believe so. There was also one vertically. 
On the top? 
Yes. 
Q. And there was one on the west wall? 
A Yes. 
Q. And did you understand that prior to 
11 December 14th the stress monitoring on the east wall 
12 was registering nothing but negative readings? 
A. It was showing a tensile condition, yes. 13 
14 Q. Did you ever ask or direct anyone to evaluate 
15 why it was showing a continuous negative reading? 
16 A Yes. We talked to Zac Thomas about 
9 




Q. Did you ask 
A Yes. 
Q. \Vhat did he say? 
how it was 
A He told me that it was installed using the 
15 procedure that we have for installation of the phones 
1 6 that we got from -- or the gauge that we got from 
17 NIOSH. 
18 Q. Did he use a jumbo or did he use a diamond 




A I'm not sure. 
Q. Did you ask him? 
A No. 
23 Q. Did you ask him what the geology was of the 
2 4 rock in which the platen was installed? 
25 A No. 
14 
1 Q. Did you ask him to inspect that when you were 
2 seeing negative readings? 
3 A Yes. And I he went and checked 
4 the installation. 
5 Q. Did you ever see any pictures of the 








A No. I didn't see. 
Q. Did you ask anyone else to inspect it? 
A No, I did not 




14 Q. Did you ask Mr. Thomas to inspect the 
15 monitoring gauge? 
A. Zac, yes. 4 ,-.i 0 
17 
18 
Q. Who is "we"? 1 7 Q. Excuse me. The with NIOSH. 
A Well, I talked to Zac Thomas about it. I'm 18 Wasn't it Mr. Thompson? 
1 9 sure there were others involved in the conversation -- 19 A No. Mr. Williams. 
2 0 Q. When did you talk to Zac? 2 O Q. Williams. I apologize. Did you ask Ted 
21 
22 
A -- likely Doug Bayer. 21 Williams to inspect the gauges? 
Q. When did you talk to Zac about the negative 2 2 A I don't think so. Ted was retired at that 
2 3 readings? 23 point 
2 4 A Probably as soon as we found out that the 24 Q. Didyou anyone at NIOSH to inspect the 
gone in a different 25 
(Page 38 to 141) 
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8 
Did you ask anyone to contact the 
0 manufacturer before the burst as to there were 
readings on the east waii? 
A. r rlirl nnt. 
Do you know if anyone did? 
A. I do not. 
15 Did you have any discussions with anyone else 
1 6 about the negative readings other than Mr. Thomas when 
1 7 you started seeing them? 
18 A. I don't recall. 
19 Q. Did it cause you any concern? 
2 0 A. Not a huge one, no. 
21 Q. Why? 
2 2 A. I didn't feel that the data was all that 
2 3 that it was all that reliable and that it 
2 4 was my feeling that the seismic monitoring system was 
2 5 our best method the conditions in that 
43 
1 pillar. 
2 Q. It's fair to say your primary focus was with 
3 seismic monitor? 
4 A. Yes. 
5 Q. You weren't concerned with the stress 
6 monitoring? 
7 A. Not nearly to the extent that I was with the 
8 seismic monitoring. 
9 Q. Were you concerned with the stress 
1 0 monitoring? 
11 A. Pardon me? 
12 Q. Were you concerned with the stress 
1 3 monitoring? 
14 A. Yes. I felt that we needed to do it. 
15 Q. But when you were receiving negative 
1 6 readings, you didn't afford it any --
7 A. Negative readings are possible. 
18 Q. Negative readings are possible for many 
1 9 reasons, correct? 
20 A. Yes. 
21 Q. And did you initiate any investigation to 
2 2 determine why the negative readings were occurring at 
23 any 
2 4 A. No, I didn't. 
2 Did you ask anyone 
A. Because there didn't appear to be any reason 
not to. We were far away that it shouldn't have 
impacted it \'le had miners vvho had already lost some 
work and to not perform those activities would put more 
people out of work. And there seemed to be no reason 
not to mine that. 
Q. Did you have an understanding as to how much 
l ore was being removed from those stopes during that 
1 8 period oftime on a daily basis? 
1 9 A. I had a general understanding of what mining 
2 0 activities were going on, and I know how much ore would 
2 1 result from mining. So, yes. I guess the answer is 




1 A. No. 
2 Q. Do you have an estimate? 
A. I could it, but it would be a 
4 process I'd have to undertake to go through. 
5 Q. Talk about thousands, hundred thousands, 
6 what, millions? 
7 A. No. 
8 MR. RAMSDEN: Object, speculation. 
14 
9 THE WITNESS: Yeah. As I said, I would have 
1 0 to go out and prepare an estimate on that. 
11 BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
12 Q. How would you do that? 
13 A. I would calculate the volume that I could 
14 anticipate being removed, apply the specific gravity to 
1 5 it, detennine the grades that would be associated with 
6 that mining and apply concentrated recovery factors to 
1 7 it. It would take an hour or two, but ... 
18 Q. Is it fair to say that each day that the 
19 company was not able to mine those stopes was costing 
2 0 the company substantial revenue? 
21 A. Yes. 
2 2 Q. And was that a factor or a consideration --
2 3 A. No. 
-- in the restart at the 
time that you restarted 
7 to 
consultant would have 
to restart the we 
10 have started the overhand stopes or the upper 
11 
l Did you ask Wilson Blake to provide an 
13 regarding whether you could mine those stopes 
14 during the rehabilitation process? 
15 A. I don't recall. 
16 Q. Did you ask Mark Board, to your 
17 understanding? 
18 A. I don't recall. 
19 MR ROSSMAN: Take a short break. 
20 THE WITNESS: Sure. 
21 short break was taken.) 
22 (Exit Mr. Clary.) 
23 (Whereupon, Deposition Exhibits Nos. 16 
24 through 19 were marked for identification.) 
25 MR. ROSSMAN: Let's back on the record. 
1 MR. ROSSMAN: 
2 Q. Mr. Jordan, between November 16 and 
3 December 1 were stress =An,r,w,r,n 
4 data? 
5 A. Was I personally reviewing it? 
6 Q. Yes. 
7 A. I looked on it on occasion. I did not 
8 perform a formal review. 
9 Q. Do you have an estimate as to how often you 
1 0 would have reviewed it? 
11 A. Probably two to three times a week. 
12 Q. And in doing so, when you would review it, 
13 what would you do? 
14 A. Look for the highlights to -- were there 
15 any -- is there anything going on that's unusual. I'd 
1 talk with the people that were gathering 
1 7 data and see if there's anything that they saw that I 
18 might be overlooking. 
19 Q. Do any evaluation of the data in comparison 
2 0 to any previous monitoring? 
21 A. The stress monitoring you're referring to? 
22 Q. Yes. 
A. No. 








Okay. area or 
at least as identified as stope 
is th~t correct? 
A. No. This is stope 14 --
Q. Stope 14. I apologize. 
A. -- is circled in black. 
Q. And then down below that there's circled in 
black, would you agree that looks to be the 5900 
pillar? 




Q. And will you agree that up to December -- up 
through December 13 of 2012 (sic) there was active 
mining at both ends of stope 14? 
23 
24 
A. There was active mining in stope 14. I don't 
know exactly where it occurred. 
2 Do know if there was at both the 
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east and west ends of stope 14? 
2 A. I don't know. I know that mining was going 
3 on somewhere within 14. 
4 Q. Show you Exhibit 17. Who's Mike Clary? 
5 A. (Nonresponsive.) 
6 Q. I believe that's the individual that was 
7 sitting here? 
8 A. Yes, yes. 
9 Q. In-house counsel for Hecla? 
10 A. Yes. 
11 Q. He sent an e-mail on February 14, 2012, to 
12 Brad Breland; is that correct? 
13 A. Yes. 
14 Q. And that's identifying mining activity in 10, 
15 11 and 14 stopes between November 17, 2011, and 
16 December 13, 2011, correct? 
1 7 A. Correct. 
18 Q. And he indicates 12 feet were advanced and a 
19 6-foot slab on stope 10, correct? 
20 A. Yes. 
21 Q. 96 feet both east and west sides on stope 11, 
22 correct? 





east west sides in stope 
































is a 5,000 something or other 




11 Q. Show you 19. Do you that 
12 document? 
Q. And do you know whose handwriting that is on 13 A Yes. This is a safety committee meeting 
form? 4 document. 
A I see that it's signed by Howard Pettit who 
was a mine supervisor. 
MR ROSSMAN: Okay. 
(Document tendered.) 
BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
Can I see that? 
Q. The purpose of this particular document is to 
report -- this particular document was to report the 
November 16, 2011 burst; is that correct? 
A. Could be. 
Q. If you'll look at the first page, incident 
timing, November 16, 2011. 
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A Yes. 
Q. Okay. And whomever's handv1riting this is --
go to third page. 
A Okay. 
Q. "Direct Causes: Blasting" -- and I don't 
know what the next word is -- "end (sic) will trigger 
rockbursts." Do you know what that says? 
A. It says, "Blasting can and will trigger 
rockbursts." 
Q. Is that a representation on behalf of Hecla? 
A. That's the conclusion that Howard Pettit 
reached. 
Q. And that was your understanding as well at 
15 Q. First page appears to be a -- is this an 




Q. Appears to be an agenda for a safety 
1 9 committee meeting on August 8th, 2011; is that correct? 
2 0 A December 8th. 
2 Q. First page? 
22 A Okay. August 8th. 
23 Q. The second page relates to a 
2 4 October 13, 2011? 
25 A Yes. 
1 Q. Third page relates to a 






Q. Were you at that December 8 meeting? 
A Yes. I always attended those meetings. 
Q. And who was present at that meeting? 
A The department heads and the safety 
l 
7 
8 committee. I'd have to go back and review the minutes. 
9 Q. Were the miners that were actually performing 
1 0 the rehabilitation work present at that meeting? 
11 A I would have to go back and see. I don't 
12 recall who attended that meeting. 
13 Q. Were the miners or the employees -- non-
1 4 the time, correct? 14 supervisor employees typically involved in the safety 











A. Excavation can trigger rockbursts, yes. 
Q. And did you understand that to be a direct 
cause of the November 16, 2011, burst at that point? 
A. No. I would understand that to be Howard 
Pettit's opinion as to what caused it. I didn't feel 
that that was a definitive conclusion, and that's why 
16 A They were -- they would make up the safety 
1 7 committee. It would be composed of hourly 
l 8 And the safety committee meetings were open to 
1 9 attendance. 
20 
we brought Mr. Blake in, subsequently Mr. Board, in to 21 
Q. Do you recall -- well, were there typically 
minutes or a transcript of these meetings prepared? 
review it. 22 A Typically what would be done is the action 
Q. Okay. And did anyone -- IVir. Blake or 2 3 items that were would written down by 
JYf.J. Board prior to December 14th ever tell you that the 2 Scott 
blasting of 5700 did not have any contribution to 2 
9 
other than what's on the agenda here. 
there's a discussion on centralized blasting. 
Q. Okay. Do you recall what was discussed about 
centralized blasting? 
l 5 A believe I raised that topic and asked to 
16 have it put on there. We talked about developing a 
1 7 remote blasting ability so that we could ensure that 
18 everyone was out at the mine -- or out at the station 
1 9 before shooting any blasts rather than relying on 
2 0 timing to get people collected. 
2 1 Q. What was decided? 
2 2 A. That we would go ahead and install a 
2 3 centralized blasting system that would get the 
2 4 specifics of how it was being accomplished at the 
2 5 Galena Mine, which was utilizing a centralized blasting 
1 system, and that we would see if it was possible for us 
2 to implement that or -- and at the same time 
'-'""'"""-"" to see were systems 
4 would be better implemented. 
5 Q. What kind of systems? You mean for remote 
6 blasting? 
7 A Yes. 
8 Q. It says "1st Quarter Safety" -- or it talks 
9 about safety goals being discussed as well; is that 
10 correct? 
11 A. Mm-hmm. 
12 Q. What was discussed about those to your 
13 recollection? 
14 A I couldn't recall any specifics on that. 
15 Q. Do you recall members of the safety committee 
16 asking questions about the monitoring 5900 
1 7 stope --
18 A I don't. 
19 Q. -- or pillar? 
2 0 A. I don't recall that, no. 
21 Q. Do recall people asking what the monitoring 
2 2 results were 
2 3 A I don't recall 
2 4 Q. -- during that period? 
5 that, no. 
WWW 
Q. Do you recall miners -- or members of the 
committee expressing concerns about what 
were wnrk ::it th::it pi11:cir'7 
A. Not that I recall, but that meeting occurred 
three years ago. 
Q. Mr. would have prepared some of 
16 documentation identifying what was discussed? 
1 7 A. Yeah. Right. 
18 Q. Did you have any involvement -- I saw 
19 reference in a representation to MSHA that Hecla 
2 0 intended to install some additional monitoring at the 
21 5900 pillar once it was received from the manufacturer. 
2 2 Did you have any involvement in that? 
2 3 A. I'm trying to recall. I know Doug -- we had 
2 4 some instrumentation on hand, and Doug ordered some 
2 5 additional instrumentation. But I don't recall the 
1 specifics of it. 
Q. Dougwho? 
A. Doug 
4 Q. Bayer. So you didn't have any direct 
5 involvement in that? 
6 A. No. 
15 
7 Q. Did anyone ever tell you whether or not that 
8 instrumentation was received? 
9 A Not that I recall. 
10 MR. ROSSMAN: That's all the questions I 
11 have. Thank you for your time. Appreciate it. 
12 THE WITNESS: Okay. 
13 MR. RAMSDEN: He'll read and sign the 
1 4 deposition. 
15 (Whereupon, the deposition was concluded at 
16 12:45 p.m.) 




















SlTBSCRIBED At'ID SWOR.N to before me this 
NOTARY PUBLIC FOR ____ _ 
RESIDING AT 
MY COl\lfMISS-,10:-c-N--~---
1 REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 
2 I, Patricia L. Pullo, Certified Shorthand 
3 do hereby certify: 
4 That the foregoing proceedings were taken 
before me at the time and place therein set forth, at 
6 which time any witnesses were placed under oath; 
7 That the testimony and all objections made 
8 were recorded stenographically by me and were 
9 thereafter transcribed by me or under my direction; 
0 That the foregoing is a true and correct 
11 record of all testimony given, to the best of my 
12 ability; 
13 That I am not a relative or employee of any 
14 attorney or of any of the parties, nor am I financially 
15 interested in the action. 
159 
1 6 IN WITNESS \XlHEREOF, I have hereunto set my 
7 hand and seal this 17th of 2015. 
21 Notary Public 
816 Sherman Avenue, Suite 7 
22 Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
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TIIE DEPOSITION OF SCOTT HOGAMIER, was taken 
on behalf of the plaintiffs on this 7th day of April, 
at the law offices of Ramsden & Lyons, 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho, before M & M Court Reporting, 
LLC, by Patricia L, Pullo, Court Reporter and Notary 
Public within and for the State of Idaho, to be used 
in an action pending in the District Court of the 
First Judicial District of the State ofldaho, in and 
for the County of Kootenai, said cause being Case 
No. CV 13-8793 in said Court. 
(Whereupon, Deposition Exhibit No. 31 was 
marked for identification.) 
I\1R. ROSSMAN: Record reflect time and piace 
for the deposition of Scott Hogamier. Case of Barrett, 
et al., versus Hecla Mining Company, et al.; Case 
No. CV 13-8793, Case filed in the District Court for 
the First Judicial District, State ofidaho, County of 
Kootenai. Deposition pursuant to the Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
Ai'\fD TIIEREUPON, the following testimony was 
adduced, to wit: 
SCOTT HOGAMJER, 
having been first duly sworn to tell the 








10 in the 0 Where did you work before 
11 1 A. At the 
12 I don't think so. 2 Q. What were you doing for the Galena Mine? 
:MR RAMSDEN: Yeah, you were. 13 A Mining. 
4 THE \VITNESS: Was I? Was that the Marek 14 Q. How long did you work there? 
15 15 A Ten years. 
16 MR. RAMSDEN: Yeah. 16 Q. Okay. And you came to Hecla in 2006? 
17 THE \VITNESS: It was in this room. 17 A Correct 
18 MR. ROSSMAN: Okay. 18 Q. What job title did you obtain when you first 
19 BY MR. ROSSMAN: 19 came to Hecla? 
20 Q. Well, the purpose of a deposition is for me, 20 A Miner. 
21 as plaintiffs' counsel, to ask you questions, find out 21 Q. How long did you work in that position? 
22 what, if any, relevance knowledge or recollection you 22 A Roughly a year and a half. 
23 may have that may relate to this case. Okay? 23 Q. And then what position did you ... 
24 A Okay. 24 A Safety technician. 
25 Q. You're under oath 25 Q. How long were you a safety technician? 





testifying in court. Penalties of perjury apply 
equally here as they would if you were testifying in 
court. Do you understand that? 
A. Yes. 
1 A From I think it was January, February '08 
2 through July of 20 l O -- through June of 20 l O. 
Q. What were your responsibilities as safety 
4 tech? 





Q. We have a court reporter. If you can make 
her life easier by trying to let me finish my question 
before answering? 
6 through the mill, surface facilities, work with MSHA on 
7 their quarterly inspections, note taking at the safety 
A I will do my best. 8 committee meeting, being a member of the safety 
Q. All right. 9 committee. Just lots of -- just every day out in the 
10 A. No promises. 10 field -- you know, try to out in the field two, 
11 Q. Okay. All I can ask is your best. 
12 If you'll always give us an audible response. 
11 three times a week to visit the work headings and stuff 
12 like that. 
13 A shake of the head or a grunt doesn't read very well. 13 Q. As a safety tech were you responsible for any 
1 4 Okay? 14 particular portion of the mine or the --
15 A. Okay. 15 A No. 
16 Q. If you don't understand a question I 16 Q. --







A. Okay. 18 at that time, Steve Thomas and myself. And pretty big 
Q. Need a break, let me know. 19 mine. So we just went wherever we felt like for that 
A. Okay. 2 O day, you know. 
Q. You ready? 21 Q. Were you union at that time? 
A. Yes. 2 2 A I was union when I was a miner. 
Q. All right. I want you to tell me your 2 Q. And then when you were promoted to 
2 4 educational background, please. 2 4 tech, you were now management? 
Ac went through then a year A The year I in the tech 















And to take notes during meetings? 
Correct 
What was the purpose for taking notes du1ing 
meetings? 
A To capture what was said and then type it all 
up, send it around to the members and then post it on 
the bulletin board for all to see. 
Q. And were these minutes verbatim statements or 
were they general summaries? 
A Well, we try to capture pretty much 
everything that was said, you know, within reason. If 
someone was ( demonstrating) like that, you may not get 






















Q. Was someone responsible 
during those meetings? 
A. No. 




Q. No minutes, nothing? 
A. No. 
Agenda? 




Q. Was there ever discussion as to why no one 
- I 












Okay. And did you take notes during every 
meeting during your period employed as a safety tech? 
A. Well, not didn't attend the or 
sometimes Steve would take the notes. 
Q. So one of you would take the notes at every 
meeting? 
A. Correct. 
Q. To what position were you promoted in 2010? 
A They called it safety foreman. 
Q. Are you stili a foreman? 
A. Yeah. 
12 Q. What are your responsibilities as safety 
13 foreman? 
14 A Pretty much the same -- the same kind of 
15 responsibilities. The audits, the safety committee, 
16 out into the work areas, dealing with MSHA 
l 7 as the -- and I started attending the staff meeting. 
18 There's a weekly staff meeting I attended. I'm also 
19 mine rescue. I'm the mine rescue coordinator. So it's 







Q. Anything else? 
A No. 
Q. So you said you started 







was taking notes or minutes of those meetings? 
A No. 
Did you ever take notes those meetings? 
A. No. I -- no. There were no notes. 
Q. What types of things would be discussed in 
staff meetings? 
A Each department would just go around and kind 
of talk about -- they get one or two minutes to just 
9 kind of talk about what was going on in their 







Q. Did you ever talk about safety risks during 
staff meetings? 
A. No, not that l remember. Most of my stuff 
was talking about things that were upcoming to just 
kind of let everybody know what was going on. You 
if maybe we were in the middle of an mspe,ctH)n, 
1 7 we had MSHA there or something's on in mine 








a training held next week or something like that. 
Q. You ever talk about rockburst planning? 
A. No, not in that kind of meeting. No. 
Q. You ever talk about union concerns? 
A. Not that I remember. 
Q. Were you involved at all as m 
4 
T 
0 to 13) 
4/7/20 
8 
1 0 how would you 
They would have went and to the 
management members that dealt with that 
1 3 Who in particular? 
1 4 A. Mine -- maybe mine superintendent, mine 
15 foreman, chief engineer. 
16 Q. Did you have any responsibility for 
1 7 development or implementation of the safety manual? 
18 A. That manual was developed in I believe 1994. 
19 And in 2009, when I was a safety technician, I reVi/fote 
2 0 it and updated it with help from management. So I -- I 
2 1 would give out certain parts of it. It was broke down 
2 2 into different parts. Like the mill had a section in 
2 3 there, track mining, mechanized mining. 
2 4 And so I would take that section to, say, a 
2 5 mme or the foreman or the mill -- mill 
1 superintendent and give them those pieces and say 
2 please read this. Make sure it's accurate. Put 
3 additions or subtractions that are needed in there. 
4 And then I rewrote it in 2009 or updated it 
Q. Did you have any involvement in development 
6 of the ground control plan? 
7 A. No, no. 
8 Q. Have any involvement in the development of 
9 the rockburst plan? 
l O A. No, I did not Those were there before I 
11 was. 
12 Q. As of December 2011, had you ever read 
13 the rockburst plan? 
14 A I'd looked at parts of it that we had -- you 
15 know, but -- yeah, I guess I'd read some ofit. 
16 Q. So in part of your responsibility m 
1 7 your responsibilities as safety manager, you were --
18 MR RAMSDEN: Safety foreman. 
1 9 MR ROSSMAN: Safety foreman. Excuse me. 
2 0 BY I\1R. ROSSMAN: 
21 Q. (Continuing.)-- you were aware that there 
2 2 was a history of rockbursts at the Lucky Friday silver 
mine, correct? 




That drift pillar extended through the 
Friday Mine, correct? 
14 A It came off the station and you go to your 
15 left and it's a mile-long drift back to the Gold 
16 Hunter. So part of it was -- might have been the Lucky 
1 7 Friday, I guess, original Lucky Friday workings and 
18 then you got back to the new workings in the back end. 
19 Q. Okay. Were you responsible at all for 
2 0 seismic monitoring? 
21 A No. 
2 2 Q. Had you read any seismic monitoring for the 
2 3 Gold Hunter or Lucky Friday mines? 
24 A No. 
Did 
seismic monitoring? 
2 A When -- if we had an event, yeah, then we 
would -- we would -- part of my job is if we had an 
4 event was to call MSHA And then they would show up 
5 and then I would deal with MSHA And I would -- we 
6 would, you know, always hear what -- what millimeter it 
7 was or -- or, you know, where it hit and stuff like 
8 that. 
9 Q. Was there typically any communication by 
10 management with union employees regarding seismic 
11 activity? 
12 A Not that I'm aware of. 
13 Q. Was there ever well, you;re aware that 
14 there was stress monitoring going on at ce1tain -- in 
15 certain portions of the mine, correct? 
16 A Yes. 
1 7 Q. Were you responsible at all for stress 
18 monitoring? 
19 A No. 
2 0 Q. Were you aware of the results of any stress 
1 2 1 monitoring? 
2 2 A Not that I saw or remember. 
2 3 Q. Do you ever see any stress data or 







12 closure monitoring. 
13 Do you have any responsibility for closure 
14 
15 No. 
16 Q. Did you ever see any data reports regarding 
1 closure monitoring? 
18 A I may have, but I don't remember what they 
19 were. 
20 Q. Was it a typical practice for you to be 
21 provided data or reports regarding closure monitoring? 
22 A No. 
23 Q. To your knowledge were union employees ever 
24 or as a matter of practice provided closure data? 
25 A. Not that I'm aware of. 
9 
At the safety meetings was there ever 
2 discussion regarding rockburst risk? 
3 Not -- there may have been, but I do not 
4 remember. And if it's not in a note, then no. 
Q. Let's have you look at Exhibit 19 in front of 
6 you. 
7 A. (Complying.) 
8 Q. Do you recognize those documents? 
9 A. Yeah. This is what we would put out prior to 
10 the next upcoming. 
11 Q. Is this an agenda for safety meetings? 
12 A. Yeah. 
13 Q. Okay. If you look at the third page, appears 
14 to be an agenda for a safety meeting for a meeting 
15 scheduled Thursday, December 8, 2011 at 3:30 p.m. 
16 A. Mm-hmm. 
17 Q. This one's from Jeff Hunter. Do you know why 
18 he sent it out instead of you? 
19 A. No. I don't know why he -- we share 
20 responsibilities. After Steve left, Jeff came in. Or 
21 no. After Steve left, I had another guy come in. He 
22 was there about a year. And then Jeff Hunter came into 
23 the department. we share duties. \\lhoever 
24 did it. 



































A. I don't know. I was not 
There was a in that 
affected the 5900 drift pillar on November 16, 2011. 
You were aware 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you recall a safety meeting being held 
after that rockburst? 
A. No. I -- I mean, there must have been 
because it's right there. But I don't -- we were 
pretty busy at that time, so I don't really remember. 
0 
Q. Was it still the practice of the safety 
department to take detailed notes at every one of these 
safety meetings? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And they were handwritten notes that were 
then converted to some kind of electronic medium? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Did you ever see minutes or notes from this 
21 
December 8 meeting? 
A. I may have. I don't remember. 
You don't recall? 
A. Sure. 
Q. Where would those minutes or notes be held at 
Hecla? 
A. They would be on the server. 
Q. And when those meeting minutes were 
developed, they would be posted on a billboard 
somewhere? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Where would that bulletin board be? 
A. In the main hallway of the mine. 
Q. So all miners, all employees would have 
access to it? 
A. Correct 
Q. Do you recall at a safety committee meeting 
in December of 2011 that there was rehabilitation 
efforts being made at the 5900 pillar? 
A. Would you repeat that, please. 
Q. Do you recall there were rehabilitation 
efforts being made at the 5900 pillar in December of 
'11? 







Do you recall any miners ever Pvr,rPc~, 
about what they were 
A. During the --
-- 15 --
14 A. During the repair? No, I do not. 
15 Remember any concerns being raised Bruce 
16 Baraby? 
1 7 A. Not to me directly. Didn't talk to me. 
8 Q. Do you recall Bruce Baraby raising concerns 
1 9 to someone else that you became aware of? 
2 0 A. If he did, I -- I don't know about it. Most 
2 1 those guys wouldn't come to me. They would go to maybe 
2 2 the mine foreman or mine superintendent, something like 
2 3 that. They ... 
2 4 Q. Do you remember having any discussions where 
2 5 concerns were expressed by Rick Valerio --
23 
1 A. No, I don't. 
2 Q. -- regarding the observations during that 
3 process? 
4 A. No. 1-- I went down. I took MSHA down 
5 there. Several times they would want to come visit it. 
6 And we would talk with the miners. And I do not 
7 remember a time in talking with the miners as they were 
8 working, you know, repairing that area that there was 
9 any -- because I was with -- I was with MSHA. He was 
10 there to find that stuff out. And we did not get 
11 anything like that, any kind of comments or concerns. 
12 Q. You say MSHA. Who's MSHA? 
13 A. The one inspector I can remember is Scott 
14 Amos. 
15 Q. How many times do you recall going into the 
6 5900 Scott Amos the November 
17 rockburst? 
18 A. I can remember the one -- well, when he 
19 showed up the first time and we went down, I remember 
20 that time and then one other time. And I remember us 
21 going in and they were they were advancing towards 
22 the area that had blown up. 
23 Q. Okay. Do you know what work had been done at 
24 that point in time? 
A. They were had started at the 
WWW 
8 A. No. 
MR RAMSDEN: Be sure and let him 
0 question before you start your answer. 
1 MR ROSSJViAN: Thanks. 
12 RY MR. ROSSMAN· 
13 Q. Had they installed any bolts or Dywidags by 
14 the time you had this visit? 
1 A. Yeah, they were -- they were installing split 
4 
l 6 sets as well as Dywidags in the back when we made that 
1 7 visit. 
18 Q. When you say in the back, what are you 
19 referring to? 
2 O A. Ceiling, roof. 
21 MR. ROSSMAN: Let's pull out an exhibit here. 
2 2 (Whereupon, Deposition Exhibit No. 32 was 
2 3 marked for identification.) 
24 BYMR. ROSSMAN: 




















the 5900 pillar? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. It identifies a liner and it says liner 
completed. Obviously when you -- your testimony is 
that when you took Mr. Amos down into the pillar that 
liner was not there yet, correct? 
A. No. I did not go underground on the day the 
liner showed up. 
Q. But you said when you arrived with Mr. Amos 
on the particular occasion that you recall they had 
done some work at the back of the pillar. What are you 
referring -- maybe you could refer me on this map to 
where --
MR. RAMSDEN: Object. It mischaracterizes 
his prior testimony. Go ahead and answer. 
THE WITNESS: So in the back. So \.ve 
somewhere in here. (Indicating.) 
BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
Q. Okay. 
A. And they were working towards the area that 
had been damaged. So they were somewhere in this area 
(indicating) prior -- they'd hadn't reached the area 
that had been -- they had not reached the pillar yet. 
But when the rockburst occuned, it had done some 
damage to the -- to the rock strata, 1 guess, from the 
7 (P 
T 
22 to 25) 
4/7/201 
Basically at the intersection between 
substations and the pillar, correct? 
Correct. 
down 
A. I drove through yes. 
How many times did you drive 
that time period? 
A. I don't -- I don't know an exact number. 














When you to a chevron, there's an 1 Q. Did you go down there with Mr. Amos at any 
identifi- -- 16 time other than the one you've mentioned? 
MR. RAMSDEN: It's an insection between the 1 A. Not that I can remember. I do remember those 
substation and the drift, isn't it? 18 two instances, the right after the rockburst when they 
MR. ROSSMAN: Right. 19 showed up and then the one time when we went down and 
THE WITNtSS: Correct. 2 O saw the work being done. 
MR. RAMSDEN: Not the pillar. 21 Q. When Mr. Amos went down with you as they were 
MR. ROSSMAN: The drift. 2 2 doing the rehabilitation work, did he interview any of 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 2 3 the miners? 
BY MR. ROSSMAN: 2 4 A. He talked to some of the miners, yeah, that 
So there's a label 5900 chevron. What is 
Page 27 
1 
2 A The chevron is our chilling and electrical 
3 substation cutout 
4 Q. And then it says 5900 substations. 
5 What is that? 
6 A. It's electrical cutout where our large subs 
7 that provide power to the level. 
8 Q. And then there's a green line with some very 
9 small writing that I can't read. But that's where the 
1 0 rehabilitation efforts had begun to your recollection? 
11 A. Pretty close to that area, yeah. I'm not 
12 going to say that was spot on. But it's got to be 
13 right in that area. 
14 Q. And then there's some green lines drawn for a 
1 5 distance into the drift; is that correct? 
1 A. That's what it appears. 
1 7 Q. And how far between the green X and the 
1 8 pillar itself had they progressed at the time that you 
1 9 visited the drift? 
2 0 A. Maybe halfway. 
21 Q. So about where the green lines end? 
2 2 A. Maybe somewhere in there. I'm not entirely 
2 3 positive on the exact footage, but ... 
2 4 Q. So they hadn't reached the pillar 
25 
WWW. 
2 5 were in there bolting. 
Page 9 
Q. Do you recall who he talked to? 
2 A. I want to say one of them -- the tv,ro that 
out to me that I were were Wally 
4 Lambot (phonetic) and George Houch (phonetic). I 
5 remember those two for some reason. 
6 Q. George Houch? 
7 A. Mm-hmm. 
8 Q. Yes? 
9 A. Yes. 
1 0 Q. Did you have any responsibility for dealing 
11 with safety concerns raised by union members? 
12 A. Yes, I did. 
13 Q. Did you have any responsibility for deaiing 
14 with concerns by union members regarding stability or 
1 5 rockburst risk? 
1 6 A. If they came to me then I would go to the 
1 7 appropriate person. Be it the mine superintendent --
1 8 mostly the mine superintendent is who I would go deal 
19 with. 
2 0 Q. And your testimony at this point has been 
2 1 that you didn't have really any responsibilities with 
2 2 regard to rockburst management, correct? 
2 3 Correct 
2 4 Q. Had you ever any modeling the 5900 
2 5 pillar? 
8 s 6 0 
8 
9 
10 don't know if it was don't know if it 
1 after the first burst -- it have been after 
12 the first but I just because he issued it to 
13 the mine to whomever it received it first and 
14 then -- and then it passed around through many 
15 different departments. 
16 Q. And you don't recall which report that was? 
1 7 A No, I don't. 
18 Q. Do you recall any of the contents of that 
19 report? 
2 0 A No, I don't. 
21 Q. Do you recall reviewing and reading the 
2 2 report? 
2 3 A. I might have, but I don't remember. 
2 4 Q. Do you recall being in any meetings or 
1 A. No. 
2 Do you recall the November rockburst? 
3 A. 
4 Q. What do you recall about it? 
5 A. That it had blown up I believe on -- at or 
6 near blasting time on night shift, I believe. I 
7 believe it was night shift. And did considerable 
8 damage to the drift. And I called -- when I was 
9 notified I called MSHA. And they shut that section 
10 down. They put a G) order on it and dispatched one of 
11 their inspectors. 
12 They came over. And we went down and looked 
13 at it. He immediate -- well, then he modified it to a 
14 (k) order. And then that's when the upper management 
0 
15 would -- we would work with MSHA to devise a plan to 
16 the area and bring it back into order. 
17 Q. Were you involved at all in development of 
18 the rehab plan? 
19 A. Not that I remember, no. 
20 Q. Were you involved at all in any meetings or 
21 discussions regarding the development of the rehab 
122 plan? 23 A. I could have been. That was quite 





1 A Most likely. he would 
2 send them :irrnmcl :ind people's input, if they had 
any, and -- before they were shipped off to the 
district -- well, probably not the district manager --
5 field office supervisor maybe. 
6 Q. He sent them around to whom? 
7 A. I would say probably-- I don't know. Maybe 
18 me. 
19 Q. Just what you recall. 
2 0 A Management 
21 Q. Do you recall him or anyone else providing 
2 2 any of those reports to union personnel? 
2 A. No, I do not. 
2 4 Q. Do you recall anyone providing any of the 
1 saw to union personnel? 
A. I do not 
Q. Or union 
A. I do not. 
5 Q. Were you involved at all in any closure 
6 monitoring at the 5900 pillar during the rehabilitation 
7 project? 
8 A. No. 
9 Q. Were you involved in any stress monitoring? 
10 A. No. 
11 Q. Or were you involved in the installation of 
12 any stress monitors? 
13 A. No. 
14 Q. Were you present when the holes were drilled 
15 or bored for placmg of the platens for the monitoring 
16 gauges? 
17 A. No. 
18 Q. If you could look at Exhibit 18, please. 
19 A. (Complying.) 
20 Q. Do you recognize the handwriting on this 
21 document? 
22 A. Yes. It's mine. 
23 Q. Okay. So that's your handwriting? 
24 A. Yeah. 
25 the 




11 And this is dated November 
l 12 201 ? 
A. 
14 Q. Who's Howard Pettit? 
15 A. He is a supervisor. 
16 Q. Where did you obtain the infonnation from 
1 7 which you developed this document? 
18 A. From what I knew about the accident from what 
1 9 we saw when we went down to look at it when MSHA had 
2 0 arrived. And then as far as the back page, the third 
2 1 page, I'd like to take a second to read it 
2 2 Q. Sure. Absolutely. 
2 3 (Brief pause.) 
2 4 (\Vhereupon, Deposition Exhibit No. 33 was 
THE W1TNESS: Okay. So your question was 
2 
3 BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
Q. Where did you obtain the information from 
5 which you developed this document? 
6 A. Through what I saw when I went down there. 
7 The measurements are just a guesstimate because we were 
8 not allowed to go in there. And from what I know on 
9 the -- like the direct causes. 
10 Q. Okay. 
11 A. And then recommendations would have came from 
12 engineering or mine operations as to if they were going 
13 to add more geophones or anything like that. And the 
14 centralized blasting, I believe I mention in here, that 
15 would be a decision that, you know, somebody -- your 
16 mine ops or something -- you someone like that 
17 would decide maybe to look at. So we went with that. 
18 Q. How did you first -- after you first became 
19 aware of the rockburst, what involvement did you have? 
20 A. I was with MSHA when they arrived. I was --
21 I dealt with them. 
22 Q. That was after you submitted this incident 
23 report, correct? 
24 A. No. This ... 
WWW 
this 
after we kind of saw what 
11 were to do to fix 
12 Q. Do you know when this particular was 
1 prepared? 
14 A. Well, I would have started it on the 16th 
15 with just the basic information on the front page and 
16 then worked on it yeah, you can -- I worked on it 
1 7 the next day or two. 
18 Q. Okay. Did you have any meetings with anyone 
19 before -- or with management before submitting -- or 
2 0 first notifying MSHA of the November burst? 
2 A. I would have consulted the mine 
2 2 superintendent. 
2 3 Q. Doug Bayer? 























I would have told him I had to called MSHA. 
It's a reportable event and told him about it. 
Q. When a witness says I would have done 
something that tells me that that's their practice but 
they don't necessarily recall it. I'm asking what you 
recall. 
Do you recall speaking with Doug Bayer after 
the November burst? 
A. I would have told Doug that I was going to 
call MSHA and let them know we had a rockburst. 
Q. Do you recall telling Doug that? 
A. No, I don't. 
Q. Okay. That would have been your practice to 
contact Doug Bayer? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Do you any 
substance of your discussion with Doug Bayer before 
contacting MSHA? 
A. No. 
Q. Do you recall anything he might have said to 
you before contacting MSHA? 
A. No. 
Q. How long after contacting MSHA did they 
a 
0 s 34 to 37) 
T 4/7/201 
2 
Do you recall up from within the Silver Valley. 













Q. Was there anyone else? 14 understood that blasting could trigger a rockburst? 
A. No. 15 A. Correct. 
Q. you recall any discussion with Scott Amos 16 Q. Was there blasting going on at or near the 
during your observation of the pillar? 1 7 time of the November burst? 
A. Not anything that jumps out at me. 18 A. It was prior to. 
Q. Okay. So ifwe look back at Exhibit 18, 19 Q. How long prior to the burst did blasting 
second page there are -- in Part B, Corrective Actions 2 0 occur to your knowledge? 
To Prevent Reoccurrence From Incident Investigation. 21 A. Roughly seven minutes. 
Was there an incident investigation after the November 2 2 Q. So approximately seven minutes after blasting 
burst? 2 3 had occurred your understanding is the rockburst 
A That's what this is right here. occurred that affected the 5900 pillar? 
Q. So that's what the third 
1 A Correct. 
2 Q. Who was involved in the investigation? 
3 A Doug -- well, mine superintendent -- most of 
4 management because it was a pretty big deal. So most 
5 of management got involved. 
6 Q. What involvement did you have in the 
7 investigation? 
8 A Writing -- talking with mine management and 
9 writing this up and then dealing with the MSHA 
1 0 that was on site. 
11 Q. Do you remember speaking with Wilson Blake --
12 A. No. 
13 Q. -- during the investigation? 
14 MR. RAMSDEN: Be sure and let him finish his 
1 5 question before you start your answer. 
16 THE WITNESS: No. 
1 7 BY :MR. ROSSMAN: 
18 Q. Do you recall the substance of any 
19 discussions with management during the investigation? 
2 0 A We did discuss about blasting, you know, 
2 1 tdggering events like that in the mine. 
2 2 Q. Who did you discuss that with? 
2 3 A. It would have been the mine superintendent 




1 Q. Where did you understand that blasting to 
2 have been performed? 
A Back the Hunter area, in the 
4 stopes or drifts. I don't know which ones exactly. 
5 But we have several different stopes and drifts. 
6 Q. Did you have an understanding as to which 
7 stope or drift the blasting had occutTed within seven 
8 minutes of the rockburst? 
9 A Most of them. That was blasting time. So 
10 all of the stopes would -- they would come in at 4:00 
11 o'clock in the afternoon; mine their cycle; so muck, 
12 bolt, drill, blast. And 1 :00 o'clock was the blasting 
13 time. So any stope or drift that was ready to blast at 
14 1:00 o'clock then shot their round. 
15 
16 
Q. So they would all -- all the stopes would 
blast at approximately the same time? 
A 1 :00 o'clock. 
I 
17 
18 Q. 1 :00 o'clock. And do you know was there 
blasting going on at each of the stopes where active 
2 0 mining was being conducted? 
1 
19 
21 A I don't -- I guess I don't know how to answer 
2 2 that. If we were mining the heading and they were able 
2 3 to blast, they would blasted. But I don't know 





1 contents investigation 
If you could read under Direct Causes in your 
investigation report, what did you write? 
12 A. No. I think John added -- John added the 













1 4 Somebody added that because it's not my writing. 
"Blasting can and will trigger rock bursts." 
Did you circulate this investigation report 
before submitting it to MSHA? 
15 Q. Where is that at? 
16 A. It says, "Implement remote blasting 
17 capability." That is not my handwriting. 
A. Yeah, I did. It went to John Jordan and --
yeah, John saw it for sure. 
18 Q. That's on the second page? 
19 A. Correct 
Q. And so when you were identifying direct 
causes for the November burst, that was your 
understanding at the time? 
2 0 Q. And that's a -- it says assigned to M. Achord 














And was that based upon the investigation I 1 
that had been conducted by management up to that point? J' 2 
MR RAMSDEN: Object to the form, foundation. . 3 
Go ahead and answer if you can. I 4 
THE WITNESS: Please -- sorry. Please repeat 
1
1 .S 




BY MR ROSSMAN: I 7 
Tell me what did you base that understanding 8 
that blasting can and will trigger rockbursts as a I 9 
10 direct cause of the November burst? 1' 10 
11 A. On my knowledge of mining, the years I had 11 
12 mined. Sometimes between -- when I worked at the I 12 
I 
13 Galena and when I worked at the Friday, the few we had 113 
14 at the Friday seemed to happen during blasting time. 114 
1 Q. You'd seen that as a common occurrence? 1 15 
A. I'd seen it before. J 16 
17 MR. RAMSDEN: Object to the fonn. It's I 1 7 
18 argumentative. Go ahead and answer. II 18 
19 THE WITNESS: I had seen it before. 1 9 
2 O BY MR. ROSSMAN: 2 0 
21 Q. Before filling out the Direct Causes section 
2 2 of this report had you discussed with any management 
2 3 the cor1nection or correlation between the blasting and 
2 4 the burst? 






Q. What is centralized blasting? 
A. All the stopes and all the work headings 
would be hooked up to an electrical circuit. So you --
Page 45 
you tie in your round. You tie your electric primers 
into your electric lead wire. That ties into an 
electric line that was ran to your heading. And it 
runs all the way out to a centralized location, so be 
it a station, the shifter shack, something like that. 
And then once you come out -- if you were my 
supervisor, I'd come in and see you, let you know that 
I was out. Once all work headings, work -- all the 
miners were out of the work headings and it became 
l :00 o'clock, or whatever blasting time might be, then 
the supervisor -- or depending on, I guess, where you 
work -- at our mine currently right now the supervisor 
throws the hammer, for lack of a better word, right, 
and all the rounds go off. 
Q. And how is that different than the blasting 
that was in November 2011? 
A. So we were using fuse primers at that time, 
12-foot. I think they were 12-foot fuse primers. And 
you lit those with some poppers is what they're called. 
They're little igniters. And then you stood outside 
the slot of your heading or up the drift, depending. 
Normally somewhere near the fan. And you waited for 
your round to go off and then you your fan 
and then headed for the station. 








11 What information did you base that indirect 
1 cause on? 
13 A. The information that I believe I would have 
14 got from Doug, Karl, management that -- that mapped 
15 faults and stuff like that. There was a -- this 
16 rockburst, this 11/16 rockburst also did damage in the 
1 7 54 ramp. And there was a fault system that ran through 
18 that ramp system. And so the correlation with the 59 
19 main line as well as the 54 ramp would have been some 
2 0 kind of a fault-slip event up there that caused that 
21 intersection to see some damage. 
2 2 Q. Do you recall inspecting the 54 ramp after 
2 3 the November burst? 
2 4 A. I did go up there, yeah. I went up there 
2 5 with -- after which one? This one? 
1 Q. November burst. 
2 A. Yeah, I went up there with MSHA. 
3 And were you able to inspect or observe the 
4 fault lines at that level? 
5 A. No, not right at that level, not where the 
6 damage occuITed. 
7 Was there discussion with management before 
8 preparing this report about potential indirect or 
9 direct cause of the pillar damage at 5900 being the 
0 result of a fault-slip? 
11 A. That information would have came out after it 
12 was looked at by the rock mechanics that Hecla uses and 
1 3 as well as our engineering would have deduced that. 
1 4 Q. And the reason you included it on this 
47 
5 document is that someone would have -- management would 
1 6 have communicated to you --
1 7 A. Somebody would have told me that, yeah. 
18 Q. -- management would have communicated to you 
19 that they believed that was an indirect cause of this 
2 0 particular incident, conect? 
21 MR. RAMSDEN: Object to form, foundation, 
2 2 speculation. 
BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
www rnrncour om 
8 
cause was a Luw.,c-0,11 
Not that I when I was up to the 
12 area of the 54 ramp. Couldn't tel1. Couldn't see 
13 anything. 
14 Q. What did you understand the mechanism to have 
15 been for the damage at the 5900 pillar from a 
16 fault-slip? How did that occur? 
7 MR. RAMSDEN: Object, calls for speculation. 
THE WITNESS: I don't know. 
BYMR ROSSMAN: 
2 O Q. Did you develop an understanding as to how a 
21 fault-slip contributed to the 5900 rockburst? 
2 2 A. I know what damage it did to 54. I don't 
2 3 know how it contributed to the 59. 
2 4 Q. What damage did you observe at the 5400 




A. One pillar next to the substation was 
damaged, and there was bags in the back of the 
intersection. 
4 Q. What does "bags in the back" mean? What does 




A. I'm sorry. I didn't hear you. 
Q. You said there were bags in the back. What 
does that mean? 
A. So we use chain-link fencing, nine-foot rolls 
1 0 of chain-link fencing. And we put that up and then we 
11 put our bolts through the chain-link fencing so it's --
12 all the chain-link fencing is held in place. 
1 3 And so bags had fonned. So loose material 
14 from the back would have just bagged-up in the back of 
15 the chain-link fencing. 
6 Q. And do you know when you would have 
1 the third page of Exhibit No. 18 to MSHA? 
18 A. It would have all went out at the same time. 
1 9 I don't know when. I don't know the date I submitted 
2 0 it to MSHA. 
2 Q. Would you have submitted the third page of 
2 2 Exhibit 18 prior to completion of the investigation by 
the company? 
A. I -- I may 
you know submitted this 
13 46 0 
T 4/7/20 
1 
2 It says under Recommendations, "Continue to 
13 install and monitor geo-phones in areas of the mine." 
14 What are geophones? 
15 A. Listening devices that the engineering 
16 department puts out in certain locations to try to be 
able to pinpoint where a rockburst had occurred. 
18 Q. It says, "Look into the possibility" -- under 
19 Recommendations, "Look into the possibility of using 
20 centralized blasting." Do you know whether or not the 
21 mine looked into the possibility of using centralized 
22 blasting after the November burst? 
23 A. We implemented centralized blasting, but I do 
2 not remember the date in which it was implemented. But 
25 we use that now. 
1 
1 Q. Do you recall whether centralized blasting 
2 was implemented before the December 14th burst? 
3 A No. 
4 Q. That injured the plaintiffs? 
5 A No. 
6 Q. Do you recall whether there were any efforts ., 
made to implement centralized blasting before the I 
8 December 14th incident? 
9 A So as part of the recommendation from this, 
10 Achord, who was our electrician 
11 maintenance -- I don't know what you'd call him --
12 maintenance supervisor, started researching centralized 
1 13 blasting. 
14 Q. Did you ever see a report or recommendation 
15 from Mike Achord as to 
16 A No. 
17 Q. -- what would need to be involved in 
18 implementing centralized blasting? 
19 A I have never seen a report. 
20 Q. And you don't recall when centralized 
21 blasting was first initiated? 
22 A I do not know the exact date. It took a 
23 while to research and then implement. It's quite an 
24 undertaking to run that through the entire mine. And 



































A. I do not know that. 
Q. And how did geophones help the mine in 
ensuring the safety of employees? 
MR. RAMSDEN: Object to the form, calls for a 
conclusion. Go ahead and answer, if you can. 
THE w1TNESS: My understanding of a geophone 
is that it picks up not only blasting, the waves that 
move through rock during blasting, but also during a 
rockburst so that you can pinpoint where that rockburst 
hit. Because not -- not every rockburst does damage, 
so you may not know. If it didn't do damage in this 
room, where did it happen? And that's the idea beyond 
the geophone is try to understand where that happened. 
BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
53 
Q. Do geophones help, to your understanding, 
identify cracking or popping or other indications of 
stress buildup? 
A. That I don't know. 
Q. Then it says Conclusion, "Rock bursts can and 
will happen without warning. Ensuring our employees 
are in a safe place during blasting wiU aid in our 
goal of sending everyone home safe and sound. 
Continued monitoring of the working areas is a must." 
Where did you obtain that information? 
A. Well, that -- I've worked in a lot -- well, 
I've worked in mines that have rockburst issues. 
know that they happen without warning. Been physically 
there when they have happened. I know from my work 
experience that a lot of them happen during blasting 
time. And so that's where I came up with this. 
Q. Did you have any discussion or communication 
with management before developing that, the Conclusion 
section of your report? 
A. No. I would have sent it to John. John 
would have looked at it, gave it back to me ifhe had 
any recommendations or anything that he did not like. 
I would have it and off it would have went. 






9 understand, guess, where 
1 O be geophones, in geophones. 
1 Were you including stress monitoring in that 
I statement? 
1
13 A. I don't know much about stress monitoring. 
1 4 The only what I know of it is what we had done 
15 once -- once a quaiier. A guy named Ted Williams from 
1 6 NIOSH would come over and him and the engineering 
1 7 department, a member of that, would go down and read 
1 8 stressmeters. 
1 9 Q. Do you know whether stress monitoring was --
2 0 monitoring gauges were installed during the rehab 
2 1 efforts at the 5900 pillar? 
2 2 A. I do know they were installed. 
4 
2 3 Q. Did you know how many monitoring gauges were 
2 4 installed? 


























Q. Did anyone tell you that additional 
monitoring gauges were intended to be installed? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you ever see the data or reports relating 
to that monitoring during the rehab process? 
A. No, I didn't 
Q. If you'll look at page 2 of Exhibit 18, 
Corrective Actions To Prevent Reoccurrence From 
Accident (sic) Investigation. It says Action to 
Control Causes. The first is "rebolt affected area" 
and assigned to John Lund. And that's November 23rd, 
20011. Do you know what that means? 
A. Yeah. Fix it. 
Q. Reinstall bolting, Dywidags at that level? 
A. Yes. 
Q. it said, "Shotcrete affected area." P.J1d 
you understood that that was one of the corrective 
actions to be taken? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you know if that was ever performed? 
A. I think it was. I think we shotcreted prior 
to the tunnel liner showing up. 
Q. Do you !<-,.now when shotcrete was installed? 
A. Sometime in December. 
WWW. 
8 
0 Q. Those appear to be the order 
1 and subsequent modifications 
12 rockburst? 
13 A. Yes. 
14 Q. Did you have any involvement in these 
15 modifications? 
16 A. No. 
7 Q. Did you have any involvement in carrying out 
18 these MSHA orders? 
19 A. No. 
2 0 Q. If you look at the 8605614-04, which is about 
21 five pages back -- six pages back. Are you at that 
22 page? 
23 A. lam. 
2 4 Q. Do you recall reviewing this modification to 
2 5 the order? 
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1 A. Yeah. I would have ended up with it and 
2 stuck it in the file. 
3 Q. Looks like this dated December 2011, 
and signed by Rodney Gust. Do you know who that is? 
5 A. I do. 
6 Q. Did you have any dealings with Rodney during 
7 this time period? 
8 A. Yes, I did. 
9 Q. What dealings did you have with Rodney? 
O A. Rod was there -- Rod showed up for a -- a 
11 separate -- I took him, I believe -- either me or 
12 somebody, I don't remember who, would have took him 
13 down and showed him the rockburst area when he was on 
14 site. 
15 Q. Do you recall being involved in that? 
16 A. I may have been. 
1 7 Q. Do you recall being involved in that? 
18 A. Nope. 
19 Q. Okay. This pa1iicular modification, the 
2 O second paragraph says, "Three of the six stress gauges 
2 1 have been installed where the rock burst had occurred. 
2 2 At least three additional stress gauges are on order 
2 3 and will be installed as soon as they are received." 
2 4 Do you recall that of the modification? 







look at the next page, this is it's 
labeled 8605614-03. But I think that's redunda..'1t with 
modification for some reason. It's dated 
6, 2011. Do you recall reviewing this 
modification? 
A. (Witness examining document) Yes. 
16 Q. Did you have any responsibility for carrying 
1 7 out this modification? 
18 A. Like what? 
Q. Well, let's start up at the top. It 19 
20 specifically says, "This modification is based upon no 
2 1 movement of the affected area has occurred since 
0 





A. r don't remember. 
Was that vour understanding- at the time? 
• V 
A. That's what somebody told MSHA because that's 
what's right here. 
Q. Well, you knew employees were going down into 
the 5900 pillar to perfonn rehabilitation efforts, 
correct? 
A. Correct 
Q. And as safety foremari one of your 
2 0 responsibilities is to take steps to ensure their 





monitoring began." Did you have any involvement in the 2 2 A. Correct. 
closure monitoring during that time period? , 2 3 Q. Did you make any effort to determine whether 
A. No, I didn't. I 2 4 or not there was stress buildup in that pillar during 
Q. Did you ever see the closure monitoring data? i 2 5 that project? 
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1 A. No. 














-- I can't say for sure. 
you to speculate. Do you know whether 
No. 
data was ever provided to --





13 MR. RAMSDEN: Be sure and let him finish his 
14 question before you start your answer. 
15 MR CLARY: It's hard. You'll get it, Scott. 
16 MR ROSSJ\.1AN: I depose 
1 7 same problem. But if you can just consciously try to 
18 work with me on that 
19 BY MR. ROSSivlAN: 
2 0 Q. It says, "Stress monitors indicate the area 
2 1 is destressed as compared to other active areas of the 
2 2 mine. 11 You were not seeing monitoring data at that 
2 3 point in time, correct? 





1 A. I may have. 
2 Do you recall doing that? 
A. I could have seen I don't know. There 
4 were lots of people working on this over the course 
5 a month. So someone may have mentioned it I don't 
6 want to speculate though. So I don't -- I don't know. 
7 Q. Did you have the understanding at the time 
8 these employees were performing that rehab project as 
9 of December 6, 2011, that the stress monitors were 
1 O indicating that the pillar was de-stressed? 
l 1 A. I did not hear anybody say that it was 
12 building stress. I did not hear that. 
13 Q. So as of December 6, 20il, to your 
14 recollection nobody had told you that the pillar was 
1 5 building up stress? 
6 A. Correct. 
1 7 Q. If you had been informed of that, would that 
1 8 have been a concern for you as safety foreman? 
19 MR. RAMSDEN: Object, speculation. 
2 O THE WITNESS: I believe it would have. 
21 (Brief pause.) 
2 2 THE WITNESS: Can we take a break? 
2 3 MR. ROSSJ'v1AN: Absolutely. 








11 Did you that was a 
12 the 6 modification? 
13 MR. RAMSDEN: Object, calls for a legal 
14 and a conclusion. Go ahead and answer. 
15 THE WTTNESS: If it was in here then it was a 
1 requirement. 
1 7 BY iv1R ROSSMAN: 
18 Q. And you would have read this, correct? 
1 9 A. Correct. 
2 0 Q. Do you recall having an understanding that if 
2 1 there was detectable closure, cracking, movement or 
2 2 distortion that there were certain responsibilities on 
2 3 Hecla at that time? 
2 4 MR. RAMSDEN: Object, calls for a legal 
2 5 conclusion and a conclusion. 
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1 BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
2 Q. Go ahead. 
3 As I stated, if it was in here and we 
4 then we would had to have act on it. 
5 You understood that at the time, correct? 
6 A. Correct. 
7 Q. Were you involved at all in -- well, strike 
8 that 
9 Did you understand as part of the 
1 0 rehabilitation plan that certain employees were to be 
11 observing or looking for indications of stress buildup 
12 at the 5900 pillar? 
13 A. Yes. 
14 Q. Who was responsible for that? 
15 A Employees who went through the area. 
1 6 So any went through the area 
1 7 was supposed to look for indications of stress buildup? 
1 8 A Correct. 
19 Q. Do you recall any employees informing you of 
2 0 indications of stress buildup? 
21 A. No. 
2 2 Q. Would you have documented it if an employee 
2 3 communicated to you indications of stress buildup? 
2 4 A. Probably not. 
WWW. 
Did you understand that was a responsibility 
as a part of this modification? 
MR. RAMSDEN: Object, legal conclusion, 
conclusion. Go ahead and answer. 
THE WTTNESS: It would have been a Hecla 
15 responsibility if we told them we were going to do that 
I 1 6 and it ended up in this modification. 
1 
1 7 BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
18 Q. It says, "This modification allows 
1 9 approximately 3 trucks per shift to make 10 rounds 
2 0 each per shift." What does that mean, to your 
2 1 knowledge? 
2 2 A. That our pockets where we dump the ore are 
2 3 out on the station. You have to travel through this 
2 4 area to get back into the work headings. So it allowed 
2 5 three trucks shift to make ten runs 
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1 that area, so out and back. 
2 Q. Prior to November 16,2011, do you know how 
many per were the 5900 
4 pillar? 
5 A. Typically we have three to four trucks per 
6 day running. 
7 Q. Three to four trucks per day running? 
8 A. (Nodding.) 
9 Q. Do you know how many rounds each of those 
10 trucks were performing per shift prior to the burst? 
11 A. No, I do not. 
Q. Did the company keep record of the number of 
rounds trucks were perfonning per shift? 
A. No, not that I've seen. 
(Whereupon, Deposition Exhibit No. 34 was 
marked for identification.) 
17 BYMR. ROSSMAN: 
18 Q. Recognize that document, Exhibit 34? 
1 9 A. Yes, I do. 
2 o Q. What is it? 
2 1 A. It is a conference letter written to 
2 2 Mr. Pereza. 
2 3 Q. Who is tv1r. 
2 4 A. He is a MSHA -- I know his --
25 




Let's start with Exhibit 35. a date 
the bottom of 12/12/201 L Would that be li2 
3 approximately the date this was prepared? 
14 A. Yeah. 
15 Vvbere did you obtain the information from 
1 6 which you prepared this document? 











wen, of th;:it 
A. No. 
dimensions 
14 Q. Do you know what factors the original 
15 modeling had been based on? 





done prior to me even working for Hecla, so ... 
Q. So that's information that would have been 










THE WITNESS: This would have came from my 21 Q. Yes? 
superintendent and I collaborating to send this out. 
BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
Q. You and Doug Bayer? 
A. Correct. 
1 Do you recall collaborating with Doug Bayer 
2 on this particular document? 
A. I believe so, yeah. We got to 
4 discuss the reasons that we felt the citation was 
5 issued without warrant. We felt we had never had a --
6 through any previous rockbursting that may have 
7 happened at the Lucky Friday or the Gold Hunter, or 
8 even my time at the Galena, no citation had ever been 
9 wTitten for a rockburst until this one. 
10 Q. You wanted to express that to MSHA? 
11 A. Well, most of the information came from Doug. 
12 I don't -- lot of this information in here. Most of 
13 this infonnation came from Doug. 
14 Q. Do you know where Doug obtained this 
15 information? 
16 A. Doug has an history in 
17 in mining indust1y and very familiar with the Lucky 
8 Friday. Served as the chief engineer for quite 
19 sometime, so he was -- that is where. 
20 Q. Did he tell you where he obtained this 
21 infonnation? 
22 A. No. 
23 Q. The third paragraph says, "The area pillar 
24 where the rock burst occurred was designed with a 



























A. Yes. Sorry. Yes. 
Q. Let's look at Exhibit 34, please. 
A. (Complying.) 
Where did obtain the information for this 
letter? 
A. I am going to read it. Okay? 
Okay. 
(Brief pause.) 
THE WITNESS: This would have came from my 
management. That's where I would have got this 
information. 
BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
Q. You say your management. Who is that? 
A. My superintendent, my manager, people from 
the engineering depa1iment. 
Q. Do you recall meetings with those 
individuals? 
A. Not that I can remember. 
Q. Do you recall being provided any 
documentation by those 
A. Not that I remember. 
Q. Did they provide you the specific language to 
include in this letter? 
A. Yeah. And I would have -- I would have 
written out whatever I knew and then I'd send it to 









So management would 
regarding the stress 
1 3 stress gauges, correct? 
14 MR. RAMSDEN: Object to the form. 
1 5 THE WITNESS: Yeah, I -- or they just would 
1 6 have put this in here themselves. That would have been 
1 7 a modification they made. 
18 BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
19 Q. And you don't recall management ever showing 
2 0 you stress monitoring data, correct? 





Q. There's a reference to, "A report written by 
Blake, rock mechanic, stated 'While it was clear 
that nearby mining was no longer stressing the pillar, 
it was known that the pillar was still being loaded by 
1 closure as a result of continued mining in the 
2 Gold Hunter."' Where did you obtain that infonnation? 
3 A I didn't put that in here. 
4 Q. Somebody else would have --
5 A. Yeah. 
6 -- provided it? 
7 Down in the second paragraph, midway through 
8 it says, "The stress gauge was working, but was reading 
9 a negative stress after it was installed. We feel the 
l 
1 0 gauge was working properly after installation until the 
11 burst occurred on 12/14/2011." Do you know where you 
12 obtained that information? 
1 3 A. Management. 
14 Q. That's not something that you would have 
15 provided? 
6 A. No. 
1 7 Q. And you don't recall who specifically on 
1 8 behalf of management provided that infonnation? 
19 A. No. 
2 O Q. Do you recall ever seeing a report by Wilson 
21 Blake and Mark Board after the December 14th incident? 
2 2 A. Yeah, I did get it after the December 14th. 
2 3 Q. Do you recall why you received that report? 
2 4 A. To file it I keep all those -- it had to do 
it in the 
WWW 
Do you where you were 
9 made aware 
l O A At my son's Christmas concert. 




home and then went to the 
Q. Do you recall what was once you arrived 
at the mine? 
1 7 A I called MSHA, the 1-800 number, reported the 
18 rockburst and got my diggers on -- diggers are work 
19 clothes you would wear underground -- and headed over 
2 0 to top station. 
21 Q. And were there efforts to extract the miners 
2 2 at that point? 
2 3 A It was already under way. 
2 4 Q. Had they been extracted at that point? 
25 A Some of them. 
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1 Q. Were you involved at all in investigating the 
2 December 14th rockburst? 
A. what I in the that I had to 
4 send to MSHA. 
5 Q. So there was a separate report for the 
6 December 14th incident? 
A. Correct. 
8 Q. Do you recall investigating that incident? 
9 A. Not -- not much -- no, I don't. Nope. 
10 Q. Do you recall developing an understanding as 
11 to the cause of that burst? 
12 A. Not at that time. 
13 Q. Do you recall at some point in time 
14 developing an understanding as to what caused that 
15 burst? 
1 6 A. I believe some sort movement on 5300 
1 7 sill pillar. 
18 MR RAMSDEN: I'll object, foundation. 
19 BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
2 0 Q. Do you know where you obtained that 
21 information? 
2 2 A. Mine management. 
2 3 Q. Who on behalf of mine management? 
2 4 A I don't ~nv~ 0 '~ 
5 Do you recall was it or was it 
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A. 
Do you 
miners that the 
November burst? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. Do you know if they told any of the miners 
that the changed dimensions affected the stability of 
that pillar? 
A. I don't know. 
19 Q. Were you involved at all in the decision to 
20 mine the Gold Hunter vein during the rehab efforts at 
21 the 5900 pillar? 
22 A. To mine our normal work headings, is that 
23 what you're talking about? 
24 Q. On or about December 6th the company started 
25 in the Gold Hunter vein. Did 
1 that understanding? 
2 A. Yeah. We went back to mining after the 
3 initial rehab was done. 
4 Q. Were you involved at all in the decision to 
5 restart mining? 
6 A. No. 
7 Q. Did anyone communicate to you why the company 
8 decided to restart mining? 
9 A. No. 
0 You understood that mining 
blasting, correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you also understood that the 5900 
rehabilitation efforts had not been completed, correct? 
A. Correct. 
16 Q. Did that cause you any concern as the safety 
17 foreman? 
18 A. No. 
19 Q. Why not? 
20 A. Because the rehab had been done. The area 
21 had been fixed. And it had -- no one was indicating 
22 that anything was taken weight, stress and there was no 
23 talk of that, that I was aware of And so it, I 
24 guess -- it was time to go back to work until -- the 
5 tunnel liner was a little ways 


































THE It was stability along with the 
bolts, the shotcrete, the repair work that was done. 
It was all one big part of it. 
BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
Q. And that one big part of it had not been 
completed when mining was restarted, correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And you understood that the tunnel liner was 
a safety measure at that level, correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Did you have any communications with anyone 
about the fact that the rehabilitation had not been 
completed? 
A. No. We had submitted a told 
Page 77 
them what we were to They looked at it, 
okayed it, signed on it. And we were back to 
in the Gold Hunter. 
Q. You understood MSHA had signed off on it 
based upon the information provided by Hecla, correct? 
A. Correct. 
MR. RAMSDEN: Well, object to the form. That 
assumes this witness knows why MSHA signed it -- or 
signed off on it. 
BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
Q. You were Hecla's primary contact with MSHA, 
correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. You knew when mining was restarted that 
immediately additional blasting would be occurring? 
MR. RAMSDEN: It's been asked 
answered. 
BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
Q. Correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Yet you didn't have any concerns regarding 
the safety of the miners performing the rehab at the 
5900 pillar? 
MR. RAMSDEN: It's been asked and 
answered. 
0 s 74 77) 
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7 
in time. Go ahead. 
0 A. No. 
Were you aware that Wilson Blake had 
12 recommended to Hecla that the rehab proceed 
13 with caution? 
14 A. No. I didn't see his report at that time. 
15 Q. Had anyone told you that Heda's consultant 
1 6 had recommended that they proceed with caution through 
1 7 the rehabilitation efforts? 
18 A. I don't remember that. 
19 Q. Had anyone told you that a consultant had 
2 0 commw1icated to Hecla that he did not believe that the 
21 pillar had completely de-stressed after the November 
2 2 burst? 
2 3 A. No. I don't remember that. I knew Wilson 
2 4 was up there. I had seen him around the facility, 
25 but... 
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1 Q. But never shared with you any of 
2 the contents or communications or opinions that 
3 Mr. Blake provided to it? 
4 A. No. 
5 Q. Did you have any involvement in the MSHA 
6 litigation over the December 14, 2011 burst? 
7 A. I don't think so. The only thing I've -- no. 
8 Q. Did you have any involvement in the decision 
9 to settle with MSHA over some of the citations they had 
10 
11 A. On the December 14th rockburst? 
12 Q. Yes. 
13 A. I don't believe so. I ... 
14 Q. Were you aware of the extent to which mining 
15 was being conducted at stopes l 0, 11 and 14 during the 
16 rehabilitation efforts? 
17 A. "To the extent," what do you mean by that? 
18 Q. Did you know how much they were mining at 
19 those particular stopes? 
20 A. Normal mining activity, I suppose. 
21 Q. Nom1al mining activity meaning they were 
22 mining to same extent they were mining before the 
23 November burst, to your observation? 
24 MR RAMSDEN: Object to the fonn, foundation. 
7 
can't say with any 
the rate at which 
did go back to 
8 
8 there was no the initial 
rehabilitation efforts. then once we got the 
10 to go through the culvert and go back -- or go through 
11 the area and go back to back end, then whatever 
12 stopes were mining prior to went back to work. 
13 Q. Did anyone indicate to you after December 6, 
14 2011, that Hecla was limiting in any way its mining 
15 activities until the rehabilitation efforts had been 
16 completed? 
1 7 A. No, not that I remember. 
18 Q. Do you know how many shifts the mining crews 
19 were performing at that time? 
2 0 A. Two shifts a day. 
21 Q. And at each shift there was blasting 
2 2 occurring, correct? 
2 3 A. I would -- yeah. 
2 4 Q. That's how you mine, you blast? 

























Q. Did anyone ever tell you that the stress 
monitoring was revealing negative readings at one of 
locations during the rehabilitation efforts? 
A. Not until after the second rockburst. 
Q. So someone told you that after the second 
rockburst, the December rockburst? 
A. Yep. 
Q. Who told you that? 
A. It was someone out of the engineering 
department. 
Q. Did that cause you concern when you heard 
that? 
A. I didn't understand it. 
Q. Why didn't you understand it? What part of 
it did you not understand? 
A. I don't know really anything about the stress 
gauges. I didn't -- I don't know how they work. I'm 
not familiar with them. And I didn't understand what 
that meant 
Q. According to the unopposed motion to approve 
settlement signed by MSHA and Hecla -- and this is 
paragraph 17 of the unopposed motion -- respondent or 
Hecla had 111 violation over 345 inspection days in the 
15 months piior to the issuance of citation No. 8605620 
21 
T 













































THE W1TNESS: I don't remember. 
Were you made aware time that 1 BY MR. ROSSMAN: 
a citation to Hecla? 13 Q. You don't remember them ever doing that? 
A. Yes. 14 A. No, I don't No. Mining -- yeah. I don't 
Q. Were you aware that MSHA had issued 111 15 remember. 
violations over 345 inspection days? 16 Q. Did you have concerns about the number of 
A. I was aware anytime they issued a citation. 1 7 seismic events that were occurring in the couple years 
Q. Were you aware that they'd issued 162 18 leading up to 2011? 
violations over 416 inspection days leading up to the 19 A. No, I didn't. 
citations? 2 o Q. Why not? 
MR. RAMSDEN: Same objection, foundation. 21 A. The mine in which I came from was a very 
THE WITNESS: Like I said, every time they 2 2 active mine. Lots of events. And the Lucky -- the 
issued a citation, I knew about it. 2 3 Gold Hunter part of Lucky Friday was not like that at 
MR. ROSSMAN: 2 4 all. They were few and far between. 
Did the number of citations cause 25 MR. ROSSMAN: That's all the 
8 
83 
concern as the safety foreman? 
8 
have. Thank you for your time. 
A. Yeah. That-- it was quite a few. 
Q. Did you take any steps to address why this 
number of citations had been issued? 
A. We did work to mitigate all the citations. 
Q. So each time a citation was administered to 
Hecla, you were involved in doing work to address those 
citations? 
A. Well, I would bring -- I would come up from 
underground with the inspector. He would give me the 
paperwork. And then I would go to most -- mine ops, 
because that's where most of the citations -- mine ops, 
mill ops, surface, I would go to whoever was in charge 
and tell them it needed to be fixed. 
Q. Were you ever involved in any efforts to 
prevent -- develop a plan to prevent further citations? 
A. No. 
Q. Look at Exhibit 3, if you would. 
A. (Complying.) 
Q. You're not listed as a recipient of this 
e-mail. But on April 4, 2011, Wilson Blake was 
forwarding an e-mail to Hecla management indicating --
and the first sentence says, "There is no question that 

























THE WITNESS: Thank you. 
MR. RAMSDEN: No questions. He will read and 
sign. 
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1 0 attached hereto. 
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No Likelihood ( ) Unlikely () Reasonably Likely ( ) Highly Likely ( ) Occurred(~ 
Just.if ication: -----------------------------------
No Lost Workdays ( ) Lost Workdays or Restricted Duty ( ) Permanently Disabling ( ) Fatal () . 
" Justification:~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-
Persons affected: 
None () Low () Moderate () High () Reckless Disregard ( ) 
I J.(/f /1 .z.. r1i,,,r t1i <' cffea,i&,,.. 
Area/Equipment (Orders): 
I / 
Unlikely () Reasonably Likely ( ) Highly Likely ( ) Occurred~ No Likelihood ( ) 
Justification: --!......._;_.....:...:...:.::;....:_:,::___.L..!,~!;!.,:;.::..;;;;_,,_ __________________ _ 
No Lost Workdays () Lost Workdays or Restricted Duty () Permanently Disabling (~ Fatal ( ) 
Persons affected: 
Moderate () High () Reckless Disregard (-1 
I . 
Area/Equipment (Orders): 
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Exhibit 17 
6.Mina 
LUCKY FRIDAY (Contractor) 
a_ Condition or Practice e.i. Written Notice (103g) I 
At 02:25 p.s.t. the mine safety representative contacted MSHA 
that a fall of ground had occurred in two separate travelways 
verbal 103(j} order was issued by MSHA Boise f/o supervisor to 
withdraw miners from the affected areas. 
to inform them 
the mine. A 
The affected areas of the mine are hereby withdrawn from service to include 
the 5700 intersection on the #54 ramp from the sp~ay chamber cut out to down 
ramp of the affected area {at the old day box cut out). This order also 
includes the 5900 main haulage which experienced substantial roof fall. The 
5900 main haulage is ordered out of service from the intersection of the 
lateral on the 5900 level to 30 feet before the chevron which is currently 
taped off. 
9. Violation A. Health : .. ·1 
Safety" : 
Other,~·_; 




A. Injury or Illness (has) {is}: No Likelihood Unlikely 
C. PartrSection of 
Tdle30CFR 
Reasonably Likely ' 
B. Injury or ill.nass could rea-
sonabl be expected to be: No Lost Workdays ' Losl Wo!kdays Or Ras!rlctad Duty 
C. Significant and Substantial; Yes No' .. 
11. · Negligence {check one) A.None B.Low C.Moderate D. High 
12. Type of Action I 03 i 13. Type of Issuance (check one) Cltalton 
14. Initial Action 
A. Citation : 8. Order , C. SafeQuard f:_·: D. Written Notice 
E. Citation/ 
Order Number 
See ConUnualion Form (MSHA Form 7000.:la) 
Highly Llkely L:l Occurred, , 
PalTl'\anenUy Disabling _: Fatal ! 
D. Number of Peraons Affected: 
E. Reckles!! Dlsregaru 
Ortler 0 Safeguard ~.. Written Notlr.e 
F. Dated Mo Da Yr 
15.AreaorEquipmant The 54 ramp from the intersection of the 5700 at the spray 
chamber tank cut out to the day box cut out near the fall of ground on the 
down ramp side. Also included is the 5900 main haulage to 100 feet from 
16. Termination Dua 
A. Data 
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S&ci!on 11..Juatfficatlon for Adlon 
Conunuatlon of s. Condition or Practice 
This Order issued to ensure the safety of any person in the mine until an 
examination or investigation is made to determine that the affected areas are 
safe. Only those 
persons selected from company officials, state officials, the miners' 
representative and other persons who are deemed by MSHA to have information 
relevant to the investigation may enter or remain in the affected area. 
Continuation of 15. Area or Equipment 
the intersection of the 5900 main haulage and lateral and the south side of 
the fall of ground to approximately 30 feet before the chevron. 
Secllon Ill-Subsequent Action Taken 
8. Extended To Mo Da Yr 
A. Dale B. Time (24 Hr. Clock) 
Sedloll lV-lnsf)<'lcijon Dal.a 
9. Type oflm1pecilon E08 1159234 
· Slgnatura 
... ..:ottG. Amos 
MSHA Form 7000-:la, 
12. Date 
See Continuatloo Form 
.-. J C. Vacated l i D. Terminate<! E. Modifi.e<I 
Mo Da Yr 
l l/16/2011 




Setcilon U-Juatiflcallon for Action 
Change 








Reason MSHA has determined the mine operator can institute minimal repairs. 
This action is to modify the issued 103(j) order to a 103(k) order. 
This action is to modify the order to allow only those miners necessary to 
complete repair work to operate inside the affected area addressed by this 
action. 
Based upon the mine operator's written plan of operation, this order is 
hereby modified to allow miners to conduct work including roof bolting, 
scaling, and removal of pipe to assess damage and clear the way for repairs. 
It allows limited mucking only to build bolting pads from which to conduct 
initial assessments of the damage up to the brow. It is based upon miners 
will work only under supported ground and will not begin mucking operations 
until all repairs up to the brow have been conducted and a representative of 
MSHA has reviewed the activities to ensure mucking can continue safely . 
• 11is action does not include any work being done at the 54 ramp. This action 
is based upon the mine 1 s stated goals of repairing damage at the 5900 haulage 
to ensure needed utilities -ii:re ·avaflable· b-efore conducting repair work at· -the. 
54 ramp. 




Section IV-inspecti<:Jn Cata 
9. Type of lnsiaction 
Signature 
~ott G. Amos 
MSHA Form i000-3a, Mar 85 (rev~ 
Yr 
Set? Conlinuattoo f'orm 
B, Time (24 Hr. Clock) i -, C. Vacated t J O. Terminated ~ E.Modllied 
1159234 
i2. Date Mo Oa Yr 13, Time (24 Hr. C!ock) 
l l/16/2011 
Department 
Mine and Health Administration 
6.Mina 
LUCKY FRIDAY 
7, Mine ID 
10-00088 
(Conlrador) 
Section 11-Juellffeollon for Ad!ort 
Based upon bolting and scaling work conducted by the mine near the 
groundfall, and the report by miners that the 12 feet long roof bolts are 
going into solid ground, and a written plan of action submitted by the 
opera to MSHA addressing work to be done, this order is hereby modified. 
This modification allows the operator to follow the plan submitted to scale, 
bolt and repair through the fall of ground at the 5900 haulage way. Only 
persons necessary to complete work in area are allowed to enter the affected 
zone previously established. 
Based upon the written plan submitted to MSHA, this order is also hereby 
modified to allow repairs to be conducted at the 5700 sublevel of the 54 
ramp. Provided only those miners necessary to complete work travel in the 
affected area. 
The mine operator has established a set bolting, moiling, and scaling plan 
which involves the installation of wire mesh and a minimum of 3 inches of 
fibermesh style shotcrete. 
Seclion 111-SubsequentAdion Taken 
8. Extended To A. Date Mo Oa Yr 8. llme (24 Hr. Clock) 
9. Type of lnspectloo 
·. Signature 
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7. Mine ID 
10-00088 
(Con!raclor) 
103(k) order is hereby modified to allow the mine operator to drill the 
required holes and install 3 stress gauges in the 5900 main haulage where 
the rock burst occurred on November 16, 2011. At least three additional 
stress gauges are on order to install in this location as well. 
The mine operator has rehab bolted the bursted area by following the Lucky 
Friday Mine, 5900 drift pillar rockburst repair plan. The area has been 
bolted with 20 foot cable bolts, 12 foot dywidags, 6 foot dywidags, and 4 & 6 
foot friction bolts. The bolts secured wire mesh and then it was all coated 
with 3 inches of shotcrete. 
At this time, the installation of the stress gauges is the only work that can 
be conducted in the 5900 main haulage burst area. All the areas under the 
original order will continue to be barricaded and remain under the order. 
S&dlon 111-SubscquMI Action Taken 
B. Extended To Mo Oa Yr 
A. Date S. Time (24 Hr. Clock) 
Seci!on IV-!ns~iln Dala 
9. Type of Inspection E08 
11. Signature 
Rodne D. Gust 
MSHA Form 7000-3a, Mar as (ravi~ad) 




SM CantinuaUon Fiann 
;.. ·~ C. Vacated LJ D. Terminated ~ E. Modified 
Mo Da Yr 
11/30/201 l 
13. Time {24 Hr. Clock) 
1720 
Thi lOJ(k) order s 
the utilities though 
h<:: Inodified t.o a110, .. , the rnine operator. t:o r.e.Lnsi:a1.l 
he 5900 main dr Et where the rock burst had occurred. 
Three of the si:< stress gauges h<'.l'/'2 been nscalled 1,1here the rock bu:rsc had 
occurred. At least three addicion3l stress gauges are on order and wlll be 
installed as soon as they are received. Management has been monitor.iny these 
gauges on a shift to shift hasjs, until NIOSH completes the build on the data 
collector. The data collector with take i~eaclings every 1:,,10 hours and the 
data and that data will be reviewed weekly, unless the current data dictates 
the readings should be evaluated on a shorter or longer basis. 
At thls time, t.he only 1-1or:k t:hc1t can be conducted i.n the :;900 main hau.L:ige 
burst area s t:a re-establish che ul:.i.l.iti.es t:hr:ouqh t~h s area. All l:he 
areas und,=:r 1:he oriqtnal o-rder will continue to be barricaded and remr1i.n 
under the o,:de1·. 
III-Sub1cquen1 ,\clioo Taken 
Form 
(Contrnclor) 
This modification is to allow l ted travel through the Efec ed rea of 
the5900 main haulage and of the 54 ramp at t 5700 level. 
This modification is based upon no movement: of the affected area has 
occurred since monitoring began (about four days) afte,: sl1otcrete and 
bolti llov,ing the mine's level three bolting pLrn • .. 1ere follm,1ed. Stress 
monitors indicate the area is destressed as compared to other active areas of 
the mine. 
This action is to allow very limited activities utilizing the 5900 main 
~aulage based upon the temporary repairs already conducted by the mine until 
the engineered culvert arrives and more permanent repairs are made. 
Upon arrival of the culv0,rt from the manufacturer, t 
nstall the culvert and on y those miners workinc,1 on 
n the affected 2r 21. 
min,,,. will stop 1:10 k 
t l 1 e ,.: u 1 v e r t: • ..1 i. l l l. ,: av '·"' .\ 
"hi.s modification :o based upon the mir11:o ·11111 
e s LH' t a n d end o the Ls t sh L f t to de t e rm i n e 
·t two daily surveys a 
',·lht::tl\er rmJ,rernent is occur 1.rt,,J 
th su st I: ons t~he r1900 mai11 haul e dr chevron. 
This modification i.s based upon no foot travel •..iii l i.n the affoct 
at·ea and that e,,1 mob.i.le equipment operator \·i.Lll d 1/ i_ S tl cl l i n S [Y:: (; t· l O Ii 
f tile aff~ected area before travel occurs. 
is modification is basc:!d upor-i the mine has 1 e.l Et ,..;rit:.:en plan to 
add1:ess any crack.Lng or closure of the main haulage, and that:. the mirtf.:, ·..ii l l 
stop travel in the affected area should detectc:1ble rnovernenl:, distocti.on, 
cracking or damage occur. 
This modification is to allow further repair 1,1ork at the 5700 level of Lhe 5,1 
ramp to incl the installation of utilities through the affected area and 
to allm-1 miners to conduct t r irs a he 700 leve.L of the ~>ti r mp. 
'~'his modification is t:o allov1 backfillLng of parts ot: the S700 level 
Sea Conlk1tk1Ucn F orrn 
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intersection at the 54 ramp as to provide strain relief and to prevent miners 
from going into areas unnecessary to their da work. 
Any significant changes will be reported to MSHA to include additional 
stressing, closure, cracking or squeeze and deformity. 
This modification allows approximately 3 trucks per shift to make 10 rounds 
each per shift. It allows mechanics/electricians to travel through the area 
if required to repair equipment. It allows only miners necessary to conduct 
normal mining activities to travel through the area. 
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7. Mine ID 
10-00088 
(Contractor) 
Section II-Justification ror Action 
Order #8605614 is terminated. Conditions that contributed to the accident 
(rock t) 
Section !II-Subsequent Action Taken 




SecUon IV-lnspectlon Data 
9. Type of Inspection EO J 
·Signature 
;ames E. Stembrid e 
MSHA Form 7000-3a, Mar 85 (revised) 
been and normal mining operations can resume. 
Yr 
B. lime (24 Hr. Clock) 
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FROM: Wilson Blake and Mark Board, Consultants 
SUBJECT: Recent Bursting in Gold Hunter and its Implications 
INTRODUCTION 
Mark Board's Memo is presented first, followed by Wilson Blake's analysis of the 
bursting, damage, and ground supp01t requirements for new 5900 level access. 
Introduction (l\'fark Board) 
A tour of the eastern footwall ramp development from 5700 to 5900 levels at the Gold 
Hunter Mine was held on December 20, 2011. Evidence for the rockburst source 
mechanism was examined in the footwall as well as the damage to the 5900 pillar. The 
following memo describes the observations, conclusions regarding the source mechanism 
of the November 16 and December 14 events, and recommendations regarding the bypass 
drift for the 5900 footwall access and ground support for the footwall ramps and future 
development. 
Observations 
The tour group included Lucky Friday engineers and geologists, an MSHA 
representative, a Lucky Friday worker's representative, and Hecla consultants Rad 
Langston, Wilson Blake and Mark Board. The tour began on the 4900 level Silver Shaft 
and progressed to the footwall and down the east footwall ramp to the 5900 footwall 
access drift and pillar damage zone. The repaired damage in the ramp at 5700 level was 
inspected initially. Here, damage from the Nov. 16 seismic event at the electrical 
substation cutout and 5700 14 stope access had been repaired, consisting of scaling of the 
excavation surfaces, rebolting with Dywidags and split sets, and erection of posts beneath 
the brow of the substation cutout. The posts had taken no additional load as evidenced by 
no observable squeeze on the wedges used to tighten the posts in place. The trace of the 
F3 fault, which had been painted previous to the event, could be seen to have undergone 
recent movement As seen in Figure 1, the fault showed both dilation and shear 
movement within relatively small vertical distance. A thin crack with white rock powder 
was observable, as was some minor flaking of rock chips from the tunnel surface. The 
direction of movement was difficult to detetmine from the observations, although it 
appeared to me to be footwall movement toward the orebody. 
At 5750 sub, the F3 or F4 fault showed significant dilation in the ramp (Figure 2). This 
fault was intersected by two bolts which showed only dilation - no shear. Little 
additional damage or movement on these faults was observable below about 5800 level. 
Thus, the primary damage zone observed on the faults was from about 5700 (most 
intense) to about 5800 level. 
""'· 
.• 
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The 5900 pillar damage (Figure 3) resulting from the December 14 seismic event 
consisted of a rock expulsed from the east rib and shoulder of the drift. Although it was 
not possible to get a close-up look of the damage, the ejected rock consisted of particles 
from fine, crushed material to perhaps a foot or so on a side. The volume of the cavity 
created was around 15' high by 15' deep into the wall, and about the width of the 
orebody. Several broken cables could be seen protruding into the cavity from the roof. 
This damage is different than the damage in this area that resulted from the November 16 
event, which appeared to be shakedown from the roof of the drift in the orezone. The 
particle size from this event was large, with no evidence of rock powder or finely crushed 
rock. The damage zone was contained within the ore pillar, and appeared to stop 
abrnptly in the wall rock on the footwall side. Although difficult to see from a distance, 
it did not appear that the bolts were heavily loaded. 
Figure 1. F3 fault intersections on 5700 ramp showing dilation of the fault (top) and 
shea1· movement (bottom). 
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Figul'e 2. F3 or F4 fault intersection with ramp at 5750 sub showing dilation along the 
fault in the lower rib of the /'amp. No shear movement was obse,·ved as seen 
by tlie split bolt intersectbtg the fault plane. 
Ronnel E. Barrette, etal vs Helca Mining Co., etal Docket No. 43639 4Ba of 1172 
486 of 1172 
Figure 3. Damage to 5900 foohvall access drift from December 14 rockburst Damage 
consisted of rock expulsed from east wall and slioulder of tlte drift. The rock 
was contained by the liner which was under co11structio11. 
Rockburst Mechanism 
November 16 Event 
The November 16 event was located by the ESG seismic system to be in the footwall of 
the 5700-14 stope, above and to the east of the 5900 pillar. Damage from this event was 
centered in two locations: a) in the east footwall ramp at the 5700 elevation, and, b) in 
the back of the 5900 drift within the 5900 pillar. The actual event location appears to 
have been in the footwall near 5700 level, which induced shakedown damage in the 5900 
pillar. This event was not located in the 5900 pillar, otherwise intense fragmentation of 
the rock would have occurred rather than the observed large fragment shakedown. 
Additionally, observations by Wilson Blake after this event indicated that the back was 
still stressed and working, indicating that the pillar itself had not failed and unloaded, and 
the event likely ejected already yielded and loosened material from the back of the drift. 
Observations from this site visit showed ample evidence of recent movement on the F3 
and F4 faults and their splays, particularly in the area directly at and below 5700 level. A 
schematic of the proposed mechanism of the event is shown in Figure 4. 
Ronne! E. Barrette, eta! vs Helca Mining Co., etal Docket No. 43639 
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Figul'e 4. Schemati.c of Nov. 16 rockburst mechanism. 
This event appears to be a result of shearing along the F3/F4 north-dipping fault system 
and their splays. The overall mechanism is driven by closure of the orebody, and the 
inward movement of the bedded argillitic wall rock. This closure extends to significant 
depth in the wall rock due to the anisotropic behavior of the thinly-bedded argillite/siltite. 
This wall rock displacement toward the stope causes differential displacement across the 
footwall faults. Since the faults are complex in topography, with splays and 
discontinuous nature, they do not readily slip in response to this deformation. Instead, 
the movement may "hang up" on discontinuous solid portions of the faults and suddenly 
slip when these fail in shear. This can result in the 2.5+ ML events experienced in the 
footwall. The fault movement will result in emission of a seismic wave from the source 
focus which will travel in all directions. The backfill in the stopes will retard wave 
transmission to the hangingwall and force wave travel down the footwa11 side of the 
stope. In this case, the wave encountered the 5700 level development, causing 
shakedown damage there, and the stressed 5900 pillar. Due to the interaction of the wave 
with the stressed nature of the pillar, the pre-yielded rock in the roof of the flat-back 5900 
drift was ejected in large blocks. The resulting size of the 5900 pillar drift was 
significantly increased, reducing the width:height ratio of the pillar and increasing the 
pillar stress. The large size of the ejected blocks and the continued obvious high stress in 
the pillar after the event ( evidenced by breakage to a solid, arching back and popping of 
the rock) indicate that this event occun-ed remotely from the pillar. 
December 14 Event 
The December 14 event appears to have occurred directly in the 5900 pillar, in the 
immediate east rib of the 5900 drift. Damage was finely-fragmented and crushed rock 
and bolts and cables appearing to be broken in tension at the drift east shoulder and rib. 
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ratio, resulting in explusion of the flnely~fragmented rock into the drift. 
The 5900 pillar drift will not be rehabbed and therefore a new footwall access drive is 
required. There are two general choices for drift access location: a) through the orebody 
(and previous stope paste) on the 5900 level, either west or east of the current 5900 drift 
and pillar, and, b) extended to the east through the orebody abutment on the 5900 level. 
In our opinion, option a) - driving the access through the orebody and existing stope 
paste fill west of the existing 5900 pillar drift is the preferred option for the following 
reasons: 
• The drift through the orebody will be located in a stress-shaded and relaxed zone in the 
hangingwall. 
• The bypass drift to the west is outside the main burst zone along the Gold Hunter vein. 
• The drift will be more stable under possible seismic conditions than a drift through solid 
abutment. The fill ls not as stiff as solid rock, and has no block structure, thus is able to 
withstand greater seismic strain than a drift in solid. Drifts through fill in other mines 
(e.g., Brunswick) have proven to be stable under seismic loading. 
• The drift through fill should be easier to support than a drift in hard rock. The fill can be 
supported using liner plate backfilled with Tekfoam or paste should perform well under 
static or dynamic loading. Since the liner is not fixed to rock and is backpacked with a 
soft and plastic material, It should easily accommodate additional closure of the stope 
walls. 
• The immediate footwall and hangingwall contacts can be supported heavily with bolts, 
cables and shotcrete to provide a stable entry to the tunnel section through paste. 
• Unless located far from the end of the orebody, a drift in the abutment stress zone may 
be in a highly-stressed zone and more prone to strain events during driving. 
Figure 5 shows a photo of the current crosscut, west of the existing 5900 pillar drift. As 
seen, muck has been stowed into the entrance to the crosscut, but the crosscut itself is in 
good condition, with no apparent effects from the recent seismic events, even though the 
ground support is relatively light. The by-pass would presumably connect to this 
crosscut. 
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Figure 5. View of X crosscut, west of the existi11g 5900 pillar drift, wliicl, would be the 
location of a new west by-pass fol' the 5900 pillar drift. No seismic-related 
damage was visible. 
Introduction {Wilson Blake) 
In my Memo of 11/27 /11, I concluded that the November 2.8 rockburst was a foundation 
failure. After the underground tour of footwall openings on December 20, 2011, it 
became clear that this rockburst was not a pillar burst in the 5900 pillar, but was a fault-
slip event associated with closure of the of the mined out zone off of the 5900 level. This 
Memo will go into further details regarding the cause of this burst, its association with the 
December 14th burst, as well as the impact of any future bursting on the new 5900 level 
access drift. 
November 16, 2011 2.8 Rockburst 
The mine's MP 250 microseismic monitoting system did not locate the 2.8 burst as it 
occurred during afternoon shift blasting. The mine's new ESG seismic monitoring 
system did locate the burst in the footwall, to the east and above the 5900 pillar, as shown 
on figure 6. The installation and calibration of this system has not yet been completed. 
The location error for this burst was given as 141 ft . Because the source solution was near 
the pillar, the burst was initially presumed to be associated with the 5900 pillar. 
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Figure 6. - Location of 2.8 Burst Calculated by ESG System. 
After viewing the major damage on the 5700 sublevel during the 12/20/11 mine visit, 
including the stope access drift being cut off, it must be concluded that the actual burst 
epicenter was between the 5700 sub level and the intersection of the 5700 slot access with 
the 5700 14 stope.. Further, the damage to the 5900 pillar now appears to be the result of 
the seismic shockwave traveling down in the hard, silicified, footwall zone adjacent to 
the fill and impacting the stressed back of this pillar. The mechanism for this burst was 
shown on figure 4. 
The last cut of 5700 14 overhand stope was instrumented to measure both stress in the 
main sill pillar above and closure from the mining below. This instrumentation was to 
help us determine the behavior of the sill as a result of mining. The instnnnentation 
layout and closure readings are shown on figure 7. The data indicates reduced closure 
between W3 to E3. It should be pointed out that the increased closure between E3 to ES 
was likely due to a 2.5 magnitude burst that occurred on 2/22/10 out in the footwall from 
the E4 station, on a north dipping stmcture. This burst occurred during mining of the last 
overhand cut in this stope. Prior to taking planned instrument readings in September 
2011, a 1. 9 magnitude burst on 8/2/11 occurred in the main sill pillar some 50 ft above 
and some 50 ft to the west of the 5700 stope/slot access intersection. This burst damaged 
the back of the intersection, as well as the stope back going out both east and west. 
Access was lost to take any further readings, hence, the 5700 stope access drift was 
blocked off. The stress gage readings were inconclusive. Only gage C went up 
significantly, but dropped to zero when the instmments were read on the 6/8/11 . The 
closure data appears to support the conclusion that the 2.8 burst was closure driven, as 
discussed previously by Board. 
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Figure 7. - 5700 14 Stope Instrumentation and Closure Readings. 
Burst Mechanism 
While it appears clear that the 2.8 burst was a fault slip event, it was not a classic double 
couple earthquake type shear failure. The failure zone was not likely movement along a 
single fault structure, such as the F3 fault, but rather shearing type movements along and 
across a number of structures moving toward the mined out vein. For this reason, it is not 
possible to use the standard earthquake equations that relate burst magnitude to a fault 
radius and to the fault displacement It is also not possible to detennine a point source 
epicenter for the burst since the fault place ,Hunu,, ... u,vV'-'•U• 
an unknown volume of rock. 
Damage 
equation: 
V = 4000 X [ R/(lQAM/3)]"'(-1.6) 
where, v = the peak particle velocity in mm/s 
R = distance from source in m 
M= rockburst magnitude. 
This relationship was based on well established blasting damage criteria which uses a 
cube root scaling factor. 
It is not straight forward to detennine the distance from the burst to any structure or 
opening when the burst epicenter is not a point source, as is the case with the 2.8 burst on 
November 16th. Hence, some best guess judgment was used to determine distances to 
the mine structures listed below. 
Location Distance from Byrst,m Peak Particle Velocity,mm/s 
5900 Pillar 42 326 
5700 Sublevel 15 1635 
5900 Access at Lateral 57 200 
Reroute 1 at vein Intersection 103 77 
Reroute 2 at vein Intersection 34 458 
Reroute 1 at Lateral 109 71 
Figure 8 shows a plot of this damage criteria. It should be pointed out that the Nuttli magnitude, 
Mn, is used by the Canadians instead of the local Richter magnitude, Ml, which we use, The 
Nuttll magnitude corresponds to the Richter magnitude minus 0.3. Hence, our 2.8 burst would 
correspond to a 3.1 burst on this plot. 
it was apparent from our underground visit that there was no damage observed at the intersection 
of the 5900 access drift and the 5900 lateral, which was subjected to a shock load of 200 mm/s. 
There was also no damage observed at the 5900 lateral and the intersection that would connect 
to Reroute 1, which was shock loaded by 71 mm/s, Figure 5 is a photo if this intersection 
indicating no damage of any kind from ihe 2.8 burst. It should also be pointed out the only 
damage observed to any opening along the 5900 level from the 2.8 burst was in the immediate 
5900 pillar location. The back and walls beyond the pillar in either footwall or hanging wall were 
not damaged. 
It ls apparent. as previously recommended by Board, that Reroute l Is the best location for the 
new 5900 bypass access from the Silver Shaft to the existing 5900 lateraL The reroute locations 
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Figure 8. - Damage Criteria from Blasting Studies and Some Observed Rockbursts Damage. 
(Rockburst Handbook for Ontario Hardrock Mines.) 
2.2 December 14 Rockburst in 5900 Pillar 
The 2.8 burst shockwave damage to the 5900 pillar reduced the size of this pillar, as well 
as its height to width ratio, in effect, increasing the stress in this pillar and making it more 
burst prone. For this reason the culvert was being installed through this pillar to provide 
additional resistance to possible shock loading. 
From the intense damage to the east wall of the 5900 drift through the pillar it is 
presumed that this burst was located some 5 m from this wall. The shock loading on this 
wall was therefore some 4500 mm/s. The ground support required to contain damage 
from this burst would have to be some 27 kJ/m2 • With Teckfoam surrout1ding the culvert 
it was presumed that the culvert would have been deformed from the 2.2 burst, but would 
have remained serviceable. 
I 
, .. 
Figure 9. - Reroute Options for 5900 level Bypass Drift 
Ground Support Requirements for 5900 Bypass Drift 
.. ... .. , ' < . 
Stress conditions smTounding the 5900 bypass drift will be basically biaxial since the 
horizontal stress parallel to the drift is cut off by the mined out Gold Hunter vein. Hence, 
the vertical stress will some 8400 psi and the horizontal stress will be equal to the vertical 
stress, resulting in a hydrostatic stress (Based.on depth to surface and previous in situ 
stress measurements carried out at the Lucky Friday and Cd' A District.) This stress field 
is very favorable for opening stability, and this bypass drift normally would not require 
additional ground support beyond the standard Lucky Friday drift support. 
Drifting through the backfill is not really a problem, as it was routinely done along the 
Lucky Friday vein during mining of the 05 hanging wall vein split. Futther it is routinely 
done at a number of Canadian mines. 
However, because of the 2.8 burst, the ground support installed along the 5900 level 
bypass drift in the immediate vicinity of the vein will have to be reinforced to contain the 
effects of another burst of this magnitude occurring above this drift. It should be pointed 
out that the majority of all bursts induced by mining in the Gold Hunter have occun-ed 
along a well defined zone in the footwall that is located to the east of this bypass drift 
location. Since we cannot presume that this bypass drift neru· the vein intersection is in a 
safe location with respect to future bursting, it will have to be reinforced to contain a 
shock loading of 500 mm/sec. Further, for an increased factor of safety, the ground 
support for this bypass drift in the vicinity of the vein should be able contain 
effects of a shock load of some 1000 mm/sec. 
495 of 1172 
The standard Lucky Friday ground support for the 5900 bypass drift can be installed up 
to and beyond the 'burst prone' zone - some 20 ft before and after the vein intersection. 
Within this 20 ft zone the bypass drift back and ribs should be sprayed with at least 2 
inches of steel fiber reinforced shotcrete with advance, followed by the usual 
reinforcement of Dywidag bolts, split sets and chain link mesh. This reinforcement 
should be supplemented by rows of 6.5 ft SS46 split set bolts and O gage steel straps 
along the back and ribs as shown on figure 10. Further, at least 2 12 ft Dywidag bolts 
should replace 8 ft bolts in the back, and all the reinforcement should be carried down to 
the floor. 
' ,. ".
Figure 10. - Kidd Creek Drift on 7000 ft Level some 30 m from 3.8 Mn Rockburst. Note 
Minor Damage below Ground Support. 
The paste backfili shouid be sprayed with shotcrete and reinforced with split sets and 
chain link mesh, followed by the installation of a culvert backfilled with Techfoam. 
SUMMARY 
The November 16, 2011 2.8 burst was a fault slip type burst, caused by normal wall 
closure being impeded by 'locked up'fault structures. This burst occut1"ed near the 5700 
sublevel close to the 14 stope access. The shockwave from this burst damaged the 
footwall access ramp system down to the 5800 sublevel, as well as damaging the top of 
the 5900 access pillar. The damage to this pillar reduced its size, as well as its 
width:height ratio, hence, leading to the 2.2 burst in this pillar on December 14, 2011 . A 
culvert to provide increased resistance to shock loading was being installed through this 
pillar when the burst occun-ed. 
Ronne! E. Barrette, etal vs Helca Mining Co., etal Docket No. 43639 4915 of 1172 
some ft 
mined out vein. The paste backfill of the vein can be supported with shoctcete, split 
sets and chain link mesh, and supplemented by a culvert and Techfoam. 
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5900 Main Line P!Uar u 
ow Low Top 
te 
PSI PSI PSI 
Fl'°" 18:30 . . -2/2/2011 6:15 0.00 a.oo 0.00 / /2011 16:30 79.24 -22.64 113.20 
12/3/2011 6:15 350.92 -S6.60 226.40 
12./3/2011 16:30 396.20 -79.24 283.00 
12/4/2011 6:15 452.80 -90.56 362.24 
12/5/2011 6:15 518.46 ·96.22 491.29 
12/5/2011 15:30 542.23 -99.62 526.38 
12/6/2011 6:15 568.26 -101.SB 582.98 
12/6/2011 18:30 705.24 ·.106.41 641.84 
12./7/2011 8:30 741.46 ·95.09 671.28 
12/7/2011 14:40 753.91 -96.22 691.65 
12/8/2011 7:10 790.14 ·99.62 743.72 
12/8/2011 14:20 804.85 -98.48 768.63 
12/9/201i 7:15 825.23 -99.62 818.44 
12/9/2011 14:40 834.28 -101.88 830.89 
12/10/2011 6:30 858.06 -106.41 881.83 
12/10/2011 14:00 868.24 -106.41 895.41 
12/11/2011 7:00 893.15 -108.67 938.43 
12/11/2011 14:00 899.94 ·110.!:)4 959.94 
12/12/2011 6:30 910.13 -118.86 988.24 
12/12/201'1 13:00 914.66 -105.28 1004.08 
12/13/2011 5:05 931.64 -106.41 1035.78 
12/13/2011 12:30 938.43 -109.80 1047.10 
12/14/2011 6:30 959.94 -113.20 1083,32. 
Note; These values represent the change In stress from th.e base!lrte establfshed after temperature stabillzatlon 
on 12/2/11. 
5900 Main Line Pillar I ,p 
~ Westlow East Low A 
its r I Digits~ 
12il/201 72 ' 2508 30.8 2369 , 35,9 
12/2/201 27 37.7 2523 39.4 2422 39.2 
12/2/2011 2634 37.7 2521 39.4 2432 392 
12/3/2011 2658 37.7 2518 39.4 2442 39.2 
12/3/2011 2662 37.7 2516 39.4 2447 39.2 
12/4/20i1 2667 37.7 2515 39.4 2454 39.2 
.---· 
12/5/2011 2672.8 37.7 2514.5 39.4 2465.6 39.1 
12/5/2011 2674.9 37.7 2514.2 39.4 2468.7 39.1 
12/6/2011 2677.4 37..6 2514 3$.4 2473.7 39.1 
- -
12/6/2011 2689.5 37,6 2513,6 39.4 2478.9 39.1 
12/7/2011 2692.7 37.6 2514.6 39.4 2481.7 39 
12/7/2011 2693.8 37,6 2514.5 39.4 2483.7 38.9 
12/8/2011 2697 37.6 2514.2 39.4 2488.1 39 
12/8/2011 2.698.3 37.6 2514.3 39.4 2490.3 39 
12/9/2011 2700.l 37.6 2514.2 39.4 2494.7 39 
12/9/2011 2700.9 37,6 2514 39.4 2496 38.9 
12/10/2011 2703 37.6 2S13.6 39.4 2500.S 38.9 
12/10/2011 2.704.1 37.5 2513.6 39.4 2501.9 38.8 
12/11/2011 2706.1 37.6 2513.4 39.4 2505.5 38.9 
12/11/2011 2706.7 37.6 2513.2 39.4 2507.4 38.9 
12/12/2011 2707.8 37.5 2512.5 39.4 2510.1 38.8 
12/12/2011 2708.2 37.5 2513.9 39.3 2511.5 38.8 
12/13/2011 2709.7 37.5 2513.6 39.4 2514.3 38.8 
12/13/2011 2710.3 37.5 2513.S 39.3 2515.S 38.7 
12/14/2011 2712.2 37.5 2513 39.4 2518.7 38.7 
